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The purpose of this study is twofold. Firstly, it aims to illuminate key aspects of the work 
of Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), the ‘Father of Jewish Enlightenment,’ in particular, 
his well-known, and universally rejected, theory of Judaism. Secondly, it brings 
 Mendelssohn’s ideas and insights to bear on the problem of Nihilism, a problem in the 
development of which Mendelssohn is usually considered to have played a merely 
incidental role. It is argued that these two domains, seemingly worlds apart, are 
mutually illuminating. 
 
Moses Mendelssohn enters our history books in two separate contexts, which seem to 
have nothing in common. In the context of ‘Jewish Studies,’ Mendelssohn is best known 
for his idiosyncratic view of Judaism as a religion devoid of any principles of belief, and 
for his confidence in its compatibility with reason – positions developed in his 
Jerusalem: Or, On Religious Power and Judaism (1783). In the history of philosophy, 
Mendelssohn is known as the last representative of the dogmatic Leibniz-Wolff School, 
rendered obsolete by Kant’s critical, transcendental turn. In this broader context, 
Mendelssohn is also widely recognized to have played a role, if only contingently, in the 
 
 
emergence of the term Nihilism at a decisive moment in the historical development of 
the problem, namely, the so-called pantheism controversy, in the context of which he 
published his last work of philosophy, Morning Hours: Lectures on God’s existence 
(1785).  And yet he has never been taken as belonging to the development of the 
problem in its essence.  
 
This dissertation aims to show that Moses Mendelssohn’s work offers a decisive 
intervention in the problem of Nihilism, arguably the fundamental problem of Modernity, 
an intervention that has great value for contemporary debates of the problem. Following 
and expanding on Kant’s intervention in the controversy, which I show to have been 
deeply engaged with Mendelssohn, makes it possible to bring to light Mendelssohn’s 
unrecognized contribution. In response to Kant’s groundbreaking critical philosophy, 
which seeks to account for the conditions of possible experience, Mendelssohn 
develops a theory of the experience of possibility. Implicit in this theory is a profound 
reformulation of the problem of Nihilism, as a crisis in the experience of possibility. 
Mendelssohn’s unique post-Kantian philosophical position regarding subjectivity, nature 
and the divine absolute is given more concrete articulation in being related and traced 
back to his political theology and his reflections on Judaism. In this way, the two 
separate lines in Mendelssohn’s reception – as the father of Jewish enlightenment and 
as an incidental facilitator, or vanishing mediator, in the consequential pantheism 
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friendship and emotional support throughout the turmoil of writing the dissertation I 
know not the proper words of gratitude.  
 
I wrote my first paper on Kant and Mendelssohn in Dorothea von Mücke’s seminar on 
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I am grateful to all my teachers at Tel Aviv University. Jose Bruner, Adi Ophir and 
Moshe Zuckerman, each in his own way, were responsible for initialing me into critical 
thinking. Eli Friedlander was my first introduction to two key eras and areas of my schol-
arly interest: Kant and post Kantian philosophical and aesthetic movements (German 
Romanticism), and early 20th century reception of this legacy, particularly in the work of 
vi 
 
Walter Benjamin. Eli’s engagement with philosophy, while sober and calm is a deeply 
existential one, and remains a model and inspiration for me. Igal Halfin taught me many 
things, ranging from 20th century political messianism, particularly Stalinism and Na-
zism, to post structuralist critical theory and psychoanalysis and the fraught intersection 
of history and anthropology; but above all, he taught me how to teach myself, and oth-
ers. Igal, who I’m now proud to call my friend, remains a constant challenge, always 
keeping me on my toes, driving me not only to explicate my ideas but also to ground 
them and be clear about their relevance to the world we inhabit. Igal embodies an ideal 
of authentic intellectual engagement and passion, in which intellectual and ‘ordinary life’ 
pursuits are never separate domains.  
 
Eric Santner from the university of Chicago had generously shown me hospitality and 
friendship. I have learned much from reading his work for more than a decade now, and 
have benefited even more from his teaching and my conversations with him. Eric is tire-
lessly seeking new and better formulations for some of the deepest and broadest prob-
lems of modern life, and constantly finding new ways to bring complex theoretical issues 
into direct contact with ordinary, everyday experience, a quality apparent in his writing 
but even more so in his teaching and live conversation. I am deeply grateful for his 
friendship and mentorship.  
 
All graduate students should be as fortunate as I have been in enjoying the friendship, 
guidance and engagement of colleagues and peers of the likes of which I have been 
vii 
 
blessed with. Informally but unmistakably, the company of and conversations with my 
friends during graduate studies have not only made me smarter, but were often the 
main, if not sole source of comfort and solidarity. Their contribution to my work, while of-
ten indirect, has been immense. I have enjoyed and learned from my conversations with 
Ghassan Fawzi, Suzanne Schneider-Reich, Kali Handelman, Ahmed Dardir, Roni 
Henig, and Nasser Abourahme, my colleagues and friends at Columbia University. 
Yitzhak Lewis, my friend, colleague and collaborator at Columbia, a visionary and a nat-
ural leader and organizer, had co-created with me an intellectual setting for our gradu-
ate seminar group in Jewish studies. I have learned much from our intellectual ex-
change, and have also been trying to learn from his unshakable disposition and ever 
constructive pragmatic attitude to life. Both my friends Noam Yuran and Nitzan Lebovic I 
consider academic ‘older brothers’. Nitzan had supported me from my very first steps in 
Academia, and is also responsible for my interest in the problem of Nihilism. I can 
scarcely think of a conversation with Noam from which I haven’t learned something 
new, or was forced to more carefully construct an argument, all the while enjoying my-
self deeply. My friends from Chicago University, Amichai Amit and Anastasia Berg, have 
opened a gateway into their unique intellectual world for me, and their company kept me 
thinking, and warm, in the cold winters we’ve spent together in Chicago. My gang from 
Ljubljana, Simon Hajdini and Lidija Šumah, generous as they are brilliant, have almost 
instantaneously become my close friends and comrades. I know of no better proof for 
the reality of spirit than the true comradery I have enjoyed in a climate often geared to-




Gil Anidjar, Elik Elhanan, Rivka Feldhay, Mordehai Kremnitzer and Simon J. Cook have 
read and commented on the work in different stages. I have gained much from their 
suggestions, critiques and encouragements. Rivka had not only confidence in the pro-
ject, even when mine was quivering, she was also capable, at crucial junctures, to help 
me get reoriented and realize what it was I was doing.  Simon, who I employed as an 
editor, but have quickly come to consider a friend and a colleague, has done much 
more for this project than edit it – although he had done a fine job at that too. Simon 
served as a ‘creative producer’ and Socratic midwife for both the overall structure of the 
work and some of its key arguments. This project would not have come to fruition if it 
weren’t for our peripatetic walks together, which often I begun not knowing which way I 
wanted to go, and ended realizing I have already gotten there.  
 
Writing a dissertation is often a lonely undertaking, which is not to say it is done alone. 
Many friends and family members have provided mental, spiritual and material support. 
My parents, Neomi and Mordehai Kremnitzer, who have allowed me to grow up without 
giving up on my less than practical passions, have always encouraged and supported 
me in a myriad of ways, only some of which I am fully conscious of. Without their love 
and support I could not have set forth on this path, let alone get as far as I have. My 
parents in Law, Simon and Hana Samama, and my uncle in Law, Avi Adler, have the 
rare gift of being able to continuously offer invaluable help without ever evoking a sense 
of debt, only pure gratitude. My brother, Guy Kremnitzer, is not only one of my favorite 
ix 
 
people in general, but also one of my favorite people to talk to. Every conversation with 
Guy, a true autodidact, is engaging and profound, offering an opportunity to gage some-
thing of a new topic he had just recently mastered all by himself. Much of my thinking 
has developed in the course of our conversations throughout the years. His penchant 
for problem solving and eye for design, were generously enlisted to the cause of my dis-
sertation in critical moments.  
 
Finally, my wife Michal, my sine qua non, who sets such a high standard of commitment 
and originality in her work as an artist, has been a constant source of inspiration for me. 
The support and encouragement she had given me are enough to put me forever in her 
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Introduction: How to Believe in Nothing? Moses Mendelssohn’s 
Subjectivity and the Empty Core of Tradition 
 
 
The purpose of this study is twofold. Firstly, it aims to illuminate key aspects of the work 
of Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), the ‘Father of Jewish Enlightenment,’ in particular, 
his well-known, and universally rejected, theory of Judaism. Secondly, it brings 
 Mendelssohn’s ideas and insights to bear on the problem of Nihilism, a problem in the 
development of which Mendelssohn is usually considered to have played a merely 
incidental role. It will be argued that these two domains, seemingly worlds apart, are 
mutually illuminating. 
 
Moses Mendelssohn enters our history books in two separate contexts, which seem to 
have nothing in common. In the context of ‘Jewish Studies,’ Mendelssohn is best known 
for his idiosyncratic view of Judaism as a religion devoid of any principles of belief, and 
for his confidence in its compatibility with reason – positions developed in his 
Jerusalem: Or, On Religious Power and Judaism (1783). In the history of philosophy, 
Mendelssohn is known as the last representative of the dogmatic Leibniz-Wolff School, 
rendered obsolete by Kant’s critical, transcendental turn. In this broader context, 
Mendelssohn is also widely recognized to have played a role, if only contingently, in the 
emergence of the term Nihilism at a decisive moment in the historical development of 
the problem, namely, the so-called pantheism controversy, in the context of which he 
published his last work of philosophy, Morning Hours: Lectures on God’s existence 
(1785).  And yet he has never been taken as belonging to the development of the 
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problem in its essence. I shall argue that Mendelssohn’s views of Judaism are best 
understood in light of the issues raised in the controversy, and also that the controversy 
and its aftermath appear in a new light as a result of revising Mendelssohn’s 
involvement in it.  Making Mendelssohn’s thinking available and relevant entails a 
consideration of the reasons for its neglect, and his inclusion, in turn, may bear 
consequences for how to consider the problem and expand the parameters of the 
debate. 
 
The manner in which Mendelssohn had come to seem so utterly irrelevant to the debate 
on Nihilism is every bit as interesting as the problem itself, for it seems a matter of tone 
and resonance far more than a matter of substance. As we shall see, Mendelssohn 
views Judaism as organized around divine legislation, which he distinguishes from 
revelation. Unlike revelation, as commonly understood, divine legislation is understood 
by Mendelssohn to be binding, but as involving no determinate content, no final 
significance. In the chapters that follow, we will spend much time in working up to, and 
unpacking Mendelssohn’s thinking here. For now, let us simply note that, for 
Mendelssohn, this feature is ultimately the key to the vitality of the tradition, perhaps 
even the key to its survival through the turmoil of history. It is in strikingly similar terms 
that later generations would come to describe the deep crisis of tradition. 
 
If one were to look for something like a ‘Jewish take’ on Nihilism, one natural place to 
begin would be the vibrant, if deeply troubled, intellectual scene of early twentieth-
century German Jewry. Indeed, in his influential ‘Homo Sacer,’ Giorgio Agamben, one 
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of the main contemporary theorists of Nihilism,1 has singled out as paradigmatically 
encapsulating the modern crisis of meaning, or Nihilism, an expression used by 
Gerschom Scholem, the founder of the modern study of Jewish mysticism, to describe 
the law in Kafka’s universe in his correspondence on the topic with Walter Benjamin: 
 
Being in force without significance: nothing better describes the ban that our age 
cannot master than Scholem’s formula for the status of law in Kafka’s novel… 
everywhere on earth men live today in the ban of a law and a tradition that are 
maintained solely as the “zero point” of their own content… All societies and all 
cultures today… have entered into a legitimation crisis in which law (we mean by 
this term the entire text of tradition in its regulative form, whether the Jewish 
Torah or the Islamic sharia, Christian dogma or the profane nomos) is in force as 
the pure “nothing of revelation.”2 
 
“Being in force without significance,” describing here the modern crisis of tradition, could 
equally apply to Mendelssohn’s formula for the vitality of tradition, indeed, what enables 
it to withstand dramatic historical transformations. One formula, resonating in two echo 
chambers, and producing an entirely different tune. And yet, while the difference is 
minimal, a matter of tone and inclination rather than substance and content, there 
                                                
1 On Agamben as a theorist of nihilism see S. Weller, Literature, Philosophy, Nihilism: The 
Uncanniest of Guests (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 137-62.   
2 G. Agamben and D. Heller-Roazen, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 51. 
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seems to be an abyss separating Moses Mendelssohn, the ‘first German-Jew,’3 and the 
last generation of German-Jews before the Holocaust, the generation of Walter 
Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, Gershom Scholem, Hannah Arendt and Leo Strauss, to 
name a few. Whatever else separates Mendelssohn from these and other German-
Jews of their generation, they are all united by their distance from the optimism 
regarding enlightenment associated with Mendelssohn and embodied in his unique if 
momentary position: an observant Jew hailed as ‘the Socrates of Berlin,’4 a symbol of 
the universal promise of enlightenment. 
 
The father of Jewish enlightenment, it would seem, had no heirs. Not only did his 
biological offspring forsake Judaism in order to partake in the culture of their times,5 
none of his intellectual heirs seem to have been able to hold on to both their heritage 
and enlightenment. For Arendt,6 after Mendelssohn the only respectable position for a 
                                                
3 In the sense of a significantly dual identity, participating in both the majority, German culture 
and the life of the Jewish community. The entry of Mendelssohn, the son of a Jewish scribe, into 
Berlin, has become apocryphal, signifying the beginning of ‘German-Jewish dialogue.’ See for 
example Amos Elon, The Pity of It All: A Portrait of the German-Jewish Epoch, 1743-1933 
(Picador, 2003). Two centuries later, Gerhard (Gershom) Scholem, a prime product of the 
German-Jewish complex, would declare the notion of a ‘German-Jewish dialogue’ a myth. 
Gershom Scholem, “Wider den Mythos Vom deutsch-jüdischen Gespräch,” Judaica 2 (1970). 
4 M. Leonard, Socrates and the Jews: Hellenism and Hebraism from Moses Mendelssohn to 
Sigmund Freud (University of Chicago Press, 2012). 
5 Four of Mendelssohn’s six children converted to Christianity. Mendelssohn’s oldest surviving 
daughter, Brendel Mendelssohn, (1764-1839), would become known as Dorothea von Schlegel, 
novelist and translator and the wife of Friedrich von Schlegel. Von Schlegel first converted to 
Protestantism and then, with her husband to Catholicism. See M.A. Meyer et al., German-Jewish 
History in Modern Times: Emancipation and Acculturation, 1780-1871 (Columbia University 
Press, 1997), 168-98.   
6 Arendt never treated Mendelssohn in depth. Where she does mention him, she does not quite go 
so far as to label him a parvenu, but she certainly sees his position as untenable, and quite likely 
5 
 
Jew was that of a pariah,7 someone allowed into the category of exceptional human 
being on the precondition that he no longer belongs to the religion of his people; one 
neither properly included within their particular identity nor fully belonging to the 
universal. To occupy a role in public life, one had to be estranged from one’s own 
people. Whatever role history has assigned Mendelssohn in the subsequent 
developments of Jewish history, he certainly did not perceive himself as ‘the Jewish 
Luther,’ as he has been often referred to,8 that is, someone offering a path for his 
people within the universal, a mere emulation, doomed to fail, of a way that would 
ultimately lead to the secularization of the Jews modeled after that of the Christian 
world. If there was an authentic position held by Mendelssohn that enabled both 
adherence to Jewish religion and full participation in the ideas of enlightenment, after 
his death it was no longer tenable, as if it perished along with him. 
 
In the context of the wider narrative of enlightenment, Mendelssohn’s moment as ‘the 
                                                
inauthentic, motivated by the desire to fit in. See ‘The Enlightenment and the Jewish Question,’ 
in Hannah Arendt, The Jewish Writings (Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2009), 3-18. 
7 Arendt drew the two concepts of pariah and parvenu from Bernard Lazare, the Jewish-French 
Anarchist known for his open debate with Theodor Herzl. Arendt edited some of his writings in 
English for Schocken Books in the 1940s. She uses the Pariah/Parvenu dichotomy in a few 
places in her book on totalitarianism, in her Rahel Varnhagen book and in a few of the essays 
collected in ‘The Jewish writings.’ See for a few examples: Hannah Arendt, The Origins of 
Totalitarianism, New-York, 1958, 66; Rahel Varnhagen: The Life of a Jewess, (trans. C. 
Winston), London, 1957, 169; The Jew As Pariah: Jewish Identity and Politics in The Modern 
Age, New York, 1978, 67-90. 
8 Heinrich Heine wrote: “as Luther had overthrown the Papacy, so Mendelssohn overthrew 
the Talmud; and he did so after the same fashion, namely, by rejecting tradition, by declaring 
the Bible to be the source of religion, and by translating the most important part of it. By these 
means he shattered Judaic, as Luther had shattered Christian, Catholicism; for the Talmud is, in 
fact, the Catholicism of the Jews.” H. Heine, Religion and Philosophy in Germany: A Fragment 
(Beacon Press, 1959), 94. 
6 
 
Socrates of Berlin’ has been relegated to an historical footnote by the Kantian break in 
the history of philosophy. The title Mendelssohn had endowed upon Kant – “the all 
destroying” – has outlived the life and works of its author, consigning Mendelssohn to 
the wrong side of history, the last representative of the now obsolete pre-Kantian 
philosophy. 
 
In the grand narrative of the history of ideas Mendelssohn plays the role of vanishing 
mediator in at least two ways. He is the author of ideas to be later developed and 
systemized by others, especially in the field of aesthetics,9 and he played a crucial role 
in debates in which his own intervention no longer seems to deserve much attention. 
More than a case in point is the notorious pantheism debate, which stood at the 
intersection of politics, religion and the viability of metaphysical systems, where many of 
the stakes of further developments in German philosophy were spelled out, and where 
Mendelssohn conventionally appears again as a failed mediator. Either naive or 
inauthentic, Mendelssohn’s insistence on both rationalism and faith did not withstand 
the test of time. 
 
It is in light of the aftermath of the pantheism controversy that Mendelssohn was held, 
                                                
9 See for a few examples: A. Nivelle, Kunst- und Dichtungstheorien zwischen Aufklärung und 
Klassik (De Gruyter, 1971); K.W. Segreff, Moses Mendelssohn und die Aufklärungsästhetik im 
18. Jahrhundert (Bouvier, 1984). L. Goldstein, Moses Mendelssohn und die deutsche Ästhetik 
(Gräfe & Unzer, 1904). For a more recent critical appraisal of this period of German Aesthetics 
see F.C. Beiser, Diotima's Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism from Leibniz to Lessing 
(OUP Oxford, 2009). 
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by the aforementioned generation of German-Jews, the last before the Holocaust, to be 
a tragic failure.10 Neither here nor there, Mendelssohn just did not seem to have the 
goods. His conception of religion did not seem to offer the depth and emotional charge 
of myth and mysticism, and his conception of enlightenment, of truth and reason, had 
nothing original about it, and held no promise. Mendelssohn was old, but not even the 
good kind of old, belonging to antiquity, still in contact with the power of origin, but 
merely the modern, unappealing, ‘just out of style’ kind of old. 
 
Mendelssohn did not fare any better amongst political thinkers and activists concerned 
with solutions to ‘the Jewish problem.’ As a political theorist, Mendelssohn’s advocacy 
of Jewish rights in European countries held little appeal for Zionists and non-Zionists 
alike in the aftermath of the great turmoil of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
In light of all this, it might seem strange to insist on a reading of Mendelssohn through 
the lens of themes and interests common to Mendelssohn and the German-Jews of the 
early twentieth century. Strange, that is, to insist that Mendelssohn’s writing is relevant 
to contemporary debates regarding politics and religion, faith and reason. Themes like 
the decay of tradition and authority, the growing distance between theory and practice, 
                                                
10 For a brief yet excellent recent assessment of Mendelssohn’s reception history, see Michah. 
Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn's Theological-Political Thought (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 2011), 1-9. For a discussion of Mendelssohn’s reception in the context of 
the pantheism controversy, from Leo Strauss through Alexander Altman to Fredrick Beiser, see 
Martin Yaffe’s ‘Strauss on Mendelssohn: An Interpretive Essay,’ in L. Strauss and M.D. Yaffe, 
Leo Strauss on Moses Mendelssohn (University of Chicago Press, 2012), 219-317. 
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and the hollowness of the law are common to Mendelssohn and his unfaithful heirs. But 
where Mendelssohn sees the key to the vitality of the Jewish tradition in its adherence 
to a law that has no final meaning, Scholem and Benjamin11 – and following them, 
Agamben – see the deepest crisis of a secularized modernity in its profound Nihilism.12 
 
Is there a way to reconsider this double effacement of Mendelssohn, as the heirless 
father of Jewish enlightenment and as mere vanishing mediator in the affair that gave 
birth to the modern problem of Nihilism? In what follows, I shall argue that indeed the 
two aspects must be thought together. Since Mendelssohn’s role in the pantheism 
controversy has been taken as entirely reducible to the purely accidental, mere 
historical background for the emergence of consequential intellectual and philosophical 
developments, there has never been an attempt to assess his possible contribution to 
that ongoing debate. His contribution, as well as his seeming irrelevance to the debate 
at the time, we will proceed to argue, has to be understood in light of his arguments in 
Jerusalem, published in 1783, about reason, belief and revelation. 
 
                                                
11 It was in the midst of Benjamin’s immersion in Kafka’s writings that he received from 
Scholem a first edition of Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem. See H. Eiland, Walter Benjamin (Harvard 
University Press, 2014), 240. There is a remarkable overlap between the themes and concerns of 
Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem and Benjamin’s writings on Kafka, including the notions of a law that 
has no final meaning, what Scholem described as ‘validity without significance’ in Benjamin and 
Scholem’s correspondence on Kafka, a phrase Agamben describes as paradigmatic for the 
modern experience of a senseless, yet valid, tradition. See Agamben and Heller-Roazen, Homo 
Sacer, 51. 
12 See Walter Benjamin and Gerschom Scholem, The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin and 




Nihilism: Overview, or Much ado about nothing 
Nihilist: “We believe in nothing Lebowski. Nothing. And tomorrow we come back and we cut off 
your Johnson.” (The Big Lebowski) 
 
We believe in nothing. Such a statement points to the spontaneous, cynical attitude of 
contemporary, modern society. We know that behind every appearance of objectivity lie 
subjective interests and desires, behind all claims of morality the brute operations of 
power, behind our illusions of freedom complex mechanisms of domination. While in 
academic circles one can encounter a rekindled interest in living, non-mechanistic 
nature,13 which more and more appears open to change and innovation,14 while the 
technological horizon seems open to unforeseen possibilities (we may be able to avoid 
death, rewrite our DNA, leave the planet, and so on15), our second nature – the domain 
of culture and society, once associated with freedom, meaningful life and creativity, 
seems hopelessly determined by senseless, contingent, mechanisms beyond our 
control, accessible perhaps to understanding and theorizing, but as fixed and 
unchangeable as Newtonian physics. 
 
                                                
13 See, for example: J. Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Duke University 
Press, 2009), and L.R. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects (Open Humanities Press, 2011). 
14 C. Malabou and M. Jeannerod, What Should We Do with Our Brain? (Fordham University 
Press, 2009). 
15 The possibility with which Hannah Arendt famously opens her reflections on the human 
condition, chronicling the demise of the political, public sphere. H. Arendt and M. Canovan, The 
Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 2013). 
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In this way, ‘belief in nothing’ encapsulates a certain, well known ending of the story of 
western modernity. Beginning with an unprecedentedly optimistic vision of the future, 
and so resolved upon leaving the past behind, modernity, once its confidence in 
enlightenment was shaken, if not destroyed, was left with neither a future nor a past. 
We stand now torn between a blind leap into an unknown, no longer promising future, 
and an attempt to recover the past from which we believe that we have broken so 
decisively, and perhaps too hastily.16 The modern sense of progress, resting on evident 
improvements in modern scientific and technological knowledge, had carried over to a 
confidence that human life could be endlessly improved through the sharpening of 
reason and disillusion from unchecked beliefs. Once knowledge is liberated from its 
received, unchecked assumptions, it is opened into infinite progress, infinite 
accumulation, and promises to take society as a whole along with it on this wondrous 
ride. For a variety of reasons, however, recent history seems to have dissuaded many 
from this optimism; the unstoppable march forward in scientific knowledge and 
technological power17 has indeed increased human powers beyond our wildest 
imaginations, but rather than bringing about eternal peace and prosperity it has shown 
to be equally, if not more compatible with the destruction of human life and life worlds, 
                                                
16 See for example: M.A. Gillespie, The Theological Origins of Modernity (University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 7-10. 
17 M. Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays (Garland Pub., 1977). 
If Heidegger’s story about the decline of the west (the forgetting of the question of being) can be 
summarized as the falling trajectory of being towards modern technology, conceived as an object 
to be manipulated and worked on, Foucault in his genealogy of the subject offers the 
complementary story of the fall of the subject from a technological, practical affair, to an object 
of knowledge. See M. Foucault et al., The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège 
De France 1981-1982 (St Martins Press, 2005). 
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establishing the reality of mass extinction, human and natural, advancing ever growing 
social-economic inequalities, and opening up the possibility of utter and complete 
annihilation on a planetary scale.18 Ours is a modernity ‘gone wild,’ detaching itself from, 
and ultimately undermining the very ideas and values that had championed it. In sum, 
we seem no longer able to believe in the core values or ideas of our own, modern life 
form, seeing them as self-delusional, ideological constructs. 
 
We believe in nothing, we have nothing to fix our hopes on, no signpost or compass to 
orientate our will. All we know is that this, reality as we know it, is morally bankrupt and 
intrinsically unsustainable. We cannot want this, what appears in front of us; yet we no 
longer believe there is anything beyond it. We either despair, melancholically resigning 
from all grand ambitions,19 holding them to be futile and inauthentic, and more likely 
than not a sure road to disaster, and settle for our limited, petty life and pleasures, or we 
affirm the only possible course of action that remains: the destruction of the order of the 
                                                
18 See R. Brassier, Nihil Unbound: Naturalism and Anti-Phenomenological Realism (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007). 
19 As Robert Pippin emphasizes, Nietzsche speaks of the devaluation of our ‘Highest Values.’ 
See R. Pippin, ‘Heidegger on Nietzsche on Nihilism,’ in T.L. Pangle and J.H. Lomax, Political 
Philosophy Cross-Examined: Perennial Challenges to the Philosophic Life (Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), 176. It would be nonsensical to speak about a devaluation of all values, since some 
minimal value commitment is implicated even in the simplest of actions, as action is inherently 
self-conscious. See S. Rödl, Self-Consciousness (Harvard University Press, 2007), 17-64. This is 
why such a devaluation is perhaps best captured as a crisis in sublimation, a crisis in the capacity 
to elevate something to the level of the ‘Highest.’ See Alenka Zupančič, The Shortest Shadow: 
Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Two (MIT Press), 72-85. 
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world as we know it, hoping against hope that from the ruins something better will 
emerge.20 
 
We believe in nothing. Read with a slightly different inclination, however, there emerges 
from this statement a paradoxical, positive credo. We believe in nothing, which, by 
nature of the everyday magic of the form of propositional language, can also mean that, 
whether we know it or not, whether we have meant it or not, we have asserted a 
nonsensical belief that nothing is something, indeed an object, if not the only possible 
object of belief.  There is no surprise that the very term Nihilism – the casting of nihil, 
nothing, in the form of a belief system, or ideology, the form of an ‘ism’ – produces a 
paradoxical and elusive object.21 
 
As Robert Pippin nicely puts it, it is “as if the most prominent and disturbing 
manifestation of Nihilism is the absence of any manifestation.”22 Nihilism, understood as 
the incapacity to fully believe, to truly commit, could appear in the guise of its opposite, 
                                                
20 In her study of Nietzsche, Alenka Zupančič offers this definition: “Indeed, if one were to 
define more precisely the general term “nihilism” (which is often used in a loose, careless 
fashion), one could say that it refers to nothing but the configuration of this mortifying either/or. 
Nihilism ‘as such’ is the configuration wherein the will (or desire) is captured in the alternative 
between directly willing nothingness itself and not willing. In this sense, Nihilism is not a 
general category that then falls into active and passive Nihilism; it refers to the very tension 
spanning the space between these two figures or ‘alternatives’ – it does not exist outside this 
space.” Alenka Zupančič, The Shortest Shadow, 66.   
21 Nietzsche spoke of Nihilism as “that most uncanny of guests,” knocking at our door. See 
'Nachgelassene Fragmente,' in F.W. Nietzsche, G. Colli, and M. Montinari, Sämtliche Werke: 
Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, vol. XII (Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag), 125. 
Recently, Shane Weller had organized his genealogical account of Nihilism around its uncanny 
nature. See S. Weller, Literature, Philosophy, Nihilism: The Uncanniest of Guests. 
22 Pippin, ‘Heidegger on Nietzsche on Nihilism,’ 175. 
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of overzealous commitments, masking an underlying doubt as to their value.23 We seem 
to either believe too much, or too little, no longer being able – were we ever? – to simply 
believe, to take things at face value; to spontaneously see the value in things, and just 
be “in the midst of life.”24 
 
Nihilism is often associated with ‘the death of God,’ or secularization, as its dark 
shadow, its monumental side effect.25 It is not clear, however, how far this helps clear 
up the fog. Secularization, in this problematic, diagnostic, sense, has been understood 
as the disenchantment of the world, the progressive disappearance of magic, of what 
cannot be accounted for scientifically, from the world (from Weber26 to Taylor27), and the 
gradual replacement of God by Man. Alternatively, it has been described as a 
concealment of Modernity’s theological origins: secularization here means the process 
of disguising or forgetting  the theological, an act of repression that only makes the 
hidden more potent and unruly.28 ‘Secularization’ in its negative, that is, nihilistic sense, 
                                                
23 Pippin draws attention to this, easily overlooked remark Heidegger makes in his analysis of 
Nietzsche: “Nihilism is at work even – and especially – there were it is not advocated as doctrine 
or demand, there were ostensibly its opposite prevails.” See M. Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volumes 
One and Two: Volumes One and Two (HarperCollins, 1991), vol. 1, 26. 
24 “Being in the midst of Life” is a notion that lies at the heart of Eric Santner’s comparative 
reading of Freud and Rosenzweig. E.L. Santner, On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: 
Reflections on Freud and Rosenzweig (University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
25 To be distinguished from the more triumphant, or prescriptive sense. For a consideration of the 
connection and distinction between the descriptive and prescriptive understandings of 
secularization see J. Cassanova, ‘The secular, Secularizations, Secularism,’ in C. Calhoun, M. 
Juergensmeyer, and J. VanAntwerpen, Rethinking Secularism (Oxford University Press, USA, 
2011), 54-74.   
26 M. Weber, The Sociology of Religion (Beacon Press, 1993). 
27 C. Taylor, A Secular Age (Harvard University Press, 2007). 
28 Classic examples include: C. Schmitt et al., The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition 
(University of Chicago Press, 2008); K. Löwith, Meaning in History: The Theological 
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thus oscillates between two, opposing meanings: it denotes either a world increasingly 
devoid of meaning and purpose, hollowed out like a lifeless shell, or a world laden with 
meanings that have been set free from their contextual and practical confinement, 
constantly overflowing and threatening to burst out of their secularized understanding, 
like the incredible Hulk bursting out of Bruce Banner’s ridiculously unsuitable clothes.29 
We either cannot believe, or we suffer from surplus belief. Since we can no longer 
possess belief, fully avow it, it now possesses us.30 
 
Nihilism, then, is a modern problem, the problem of the modern as such. For it arises in 
the context of an epoch and a civilization that defines itself in temporal, historical terms 
as fundamentally new,31 as a decisive break with the past. No longer determined by 
                                                
Implications of the Philosophy of History (University of Chicago Press, 1957). The famous 
polemical response is H. Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (MIT Press, 1985). 
More recently, one can classify such diverse genealogical approaches as those of Gillespie and 
Agamben under the same rubric of ‘concealed origins.’ 
29 See for example Gillespie’s genealogy, tracing the origins of modern Nihilism to the 
nominalist revolution of the middle ages that led to an emphasis of the divine will over God’s 
reason. This, he argues, lies at the origin of our anxiety-ridden sense of ‘contingency.’ Despite 
the medieval origins, the disastrous consequences only fully emerge in modernity, with the 
gradual replacement of God by Man. Such a limitless divine will is clearly not cut for human 
measures. See M.A. Gillespie, Nihilism before Nietzsche (University of Chicago Press, 1996) 
and The Theological Origins of Modernity. 
30 Robert Pfaller builds upon Octavio Manoni’s distinction between (avowed) faith and 
(disavowed) belief, to develop a typology of cultures. Disavowed beliefs, superstitions that 
nobody avows first personally, but are intrinsically attributed to some other, are universal. They 
are to be found in ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’ societies alike. It is only in some cultures that a 
notion of faith develops, and it is only from this perspective, the assumption that belief is 
something that is to be first personally, consciously avowed, which makes disavowed beliefs, or 
as he calls them, “illusions without owners,” appear problematic. R. Pfaller, On the Pleasure 
Principle in Culture: Illusions without Owners (Verso Books, 2014). 
31 R. Koselleck (K. Tribe trans.), Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time (Columbia 
University Press, 2005). 
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tradition and circumstances, modernity is a self-grounding,32 self-asserting and self-
defining age.33 For such a civilization, the persistence of the past, of what was to have 
been left behind, is a haunting, disturbing specter. 
 
The productive tension captured by the expression ‘the death of God’ is worth spelling 
out, as it brings out some of the elusive qualities of belief. Declaring God to be dead, to 
have died, is certainly something different from mere disillusionment, the shaking off of 
an erroneously held belief, gaining a better knowledge as to reality and the nature of 
things. Minimally, it asserts that God, at least for as long as he was worshipped and 
believed in, in some way existed, indeed, lived. It further suggests that his passing away 
is to be dealt with in a completely different manner than the correction of a mistake or 
illusion. The implication, in other words, is that beliefs have a life and a reality of their 
own. They die, rather than dissipate, leaving behind them a heritage and debts, 
although due to their incorporeal existence, they are intrinsically harder to bury and 
mourn, their heritage harder to take on, and their debts harder to repay. The figure of 
the death of God thus raises a series of questions pertaining to the nature and life of 
beliefs, cautioning against their reduction to items of knowledge. It is not primarily an 
intellectual crisis, a problem of credible belief, analogous to the skepticism and rejection 
of a scientific claim, although it is clearly linked to such claims of knowledge.34 Belief, in 
this sense, should not be assimilated into knowledge, understood entirely as some kind 
                                                
32 P. Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
33 R.B. Pippin, Modernism as a Philosophical Problem: On the Dissatisfactions of European 
High Culture (Wiley, 1999), 120. 
34 Pippin, ‘Heidegger on Nietzsche on Nihilism,’ 174. 
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of neutral propositional content. And so, having trouble believing is an existential crisis – 
whether psychological or civilizational – a crisis in one’s mode of being, in the ability to 
lead a life.35 
 
With such high stakes and broad cultural-historical concerns, it is clear that the problem 
of Nihilism is not an abstract philosophical problem, of concern for specialists and 
intellectuals alone.36 Unlike skepticism or solipsism, which are problems that arise, as it 
were, when we abandon our everyday immediate experience, and reflect on our ways of 
knowing, Nihilism is taken to be a much wider cultural problem that impacts our 
ordinary, everyday experience. Nor is it, for that matter, indifferent to abstract, 
philosophical or scientific knowledge. Nihilism, we might say, deals with the real effects 
of abstraction, which seem to bring knowledge into direct conflict with life. At stake is a 
knowledge that is detrimental to life, destructive in nature, annihilating everything vital, 
dissolving all organic bonds, cutting the ground beneath our very feet, and severing our 
relation to the world and others. Nihilism arises as an historical-philosophical problem, 
as it deals with the emergence of a form of knowing,37 whose origins are a matter of 
much dispute, but seems to culminate in the modern, scientifically inclined outlook, 
which tears apart the organic tissue of a life form; the emergence of a life form that can 
                                                
35 For analysis of the self-destructive nature of modernization see M. Berman, All That Is Solid 
Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity (Verso, 1983). 
36 Although it is often localized as a problem of late nineteenth-century European intellectual 
elites. 
37 Whether understood more narrowly as an ‘episteme’ or ‘discourse’ or more broadly as 
‘ontological horizon,’ a fundamental experience of being. Indeed, it could be said that it is the 
matter of a mode of knowledge, understood more narrowly, in Heideggerean terms, ontically, 
which brings about a catastrophic shrinking of humanly possible ‘ontological horizons.’ 
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no longer take anything for granted, restlessly questioning everything, seeking for 
grounds, scrutinizing all appearances, until it can only appear to itself as an apparition, 
a mere semblance, hovering in the void.   
 
But the figure of the death of God also carries the weight of a specific, though globally 
consequential history, namely, the history of Christianity. The death of God is a deeply 
Christological image, arguably the very characteristic mark of Christianity, with its 
central icon of the crucified Christ. To the extent that the death of God is an intrinsic 
component of modern secularization, so to that extent secularization, and even atheism, 
become essentially epiphenomenal of Christianity.38 
 
In Nietzsche, it is worth recalling, the declaration of the death of God is met with 
mockery and indifference, rather than melancholy and panic,39 for how can a 
transcendent, supersensible being die? God has long been dead, God can never die – 
either way, the message does not seem to get through. The death of God arises as an 
epistemological and existential problem only under the assumption that it is impossible 
                                                
38 A point on which both champions and critiques of Christianity and secularization are in 
agreement. Favorable accounts of the essential link between Christianity and secularism run 
from Hegel to Zizek. See for example S. Zizek, The Fragile Absolute, or, Why is the Christian 
Legacy worth fighting for? (London: Verso, 2000). For critical accounts see T. Asad, Formations 
of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. (Stanford University Press, 2003); T. Asad, 
Genealogies Of Religion, (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); C.M. Bell, Ritual Theory, 
Ritual Practice. (Oxford University press, 1992). 
39 F. Nietzsche et al., Nietzsche: The Gay Science: With a Prelude in German Rhymes and an 
Appendix of Songs (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 480-1. 
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for God to die. It is a problem that arises, as it were, with the ‘fall’ of what was held to be 
transcended.40 As Heidegger puts it in his analysis of Nietzsche: 
 
[The] “Christian God” also stands for the “transcended” [Übersinnliche] in general 
in its various meanings – for “ideals” and “norms,” “principles” and “rules,” “ends” 
and “values,” which are set “above” beings, in order to give being as a whole a 
purpose, an order, and – as it is succinctly expressed – “meaning” [Sinn]. 
Nihilism is that historical process whereby the dominance of the “transcended” 
becomes null and void, so that all being loses its worth and meaning. Nihilism is 
the history of beings [die Geschichte des Seienden], through which the death of 
the Christian God comes slowly but inexorably to light.41 
 
In this key, Nihilism is understood as a problematic “fall” into immanence,42 a fall, if you 
will, into contingency, an arbitrary world of nature without a sense of order and purpose, 
                                                
40 A perspective from which the real question, what emerges as a near impassable 
epistemological barrier, is how to understand any other kind of belief. Could anyone really 
believe in Gods that are not only ontologically, but morally not transcendent? See P. Veyne, Did 
the Greeks Believe in Their Myths?: An Essay on the Constitutive Imagination (University of 
Chicago Press, 1988). 
41 M. Heidegger, Nietzsche: Volumes Three and Four: Volumes Three and Four (HarperCollins, 
1991), vol. 4, 4. 
42 In the political-theological register, Eric Santner speaks of the transition from absolute 
monarchy, in which the sovereign, by virtue of his divine, “second” body, is transcendent to the 
political body, to the post-revolutionary democratic political body, in similar terms, as the body 
into which the sovereign has “fallen” is now charged with an excessive immanence. See E.L. 
Santner, The Royal Remains: The People’s Two Bodies and the Endgames of Sovereignty 
(University of Chicago Press, 2011), 3- 62. 
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and a contingent fall at that, an historical accident, the destiny of that civilization that 




The elusiveness of the object meant to be named by the term, is matched by the 
ferocity with which the act of naming is pursued; attaching the label of nihilism is rarely 
done in the manner of an indifferent, scientific classification. Nihilism is either diagnostic 
or accusatory, depending on how one imagines this pathology is to be combated.44 
 
Aside from inflicting a mild dizziness, the brief overview offered above has surely 
intimated to the reader that the literature on the topic, which is as difficult as it is vast – 
indeed, to the extent that it has the pretense of identifying the core problem of 
modernity, it is in principle as vast as an exhaustive genealogy of modernity can be, i.e. 
                                                
43 “In Nietzsche’s view, Nihilism is not a Weltanschauung that occurs at some time and place or 
another; it is rather the basic character of what happens in Occidental history. Nihilism means 
that the uppermost values devalue themselves. This means that whatever realities and laws set 
the standard in Christendom, in morality since Hellenistic times, and in philosophy since Plato, 
lose their binding force, and for Nietzsche that always means creative force.” Heidegger, 
Nietzsche: Volumes One and Two: Volumes One and Two, vol. 1, 26. 
44 Nihilism is to be overcome, even if ‘nihilistically,’ as it were. Weller’s discussion of twentieth-
century theories of Nihilism and their relation to literature highlights this distinctive feature of 
the discourse of Nihilism. It belongs to the very development of the term that theorists turn the 
concepts back against the thinker or thinkers from whom they have inherited them, redefining 
the problem such that it now includes the previous theoretical perspectives on which they are 
building, and who they now seek to overcome as part of the problem. See Weller, Literature, 
Philosophy, Nihilism: The Uncanniest of Guests. 
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of indeterminate scope – is far from offering anything resembling a consensus as to the 
nature and history of its object.45 
 
Setting aside, for now, the conceptual difficulties in approaching the problem, its 
terminological emergence and trajectory are easier to determine. The term first arises in 
relation to Kant’s transcendental philosophy and, after a brief yet stellar literary carrier in 
the anti-nihilistic novels of Turgenev46 and Dostoyevsky, makes its way to the center of 
Nietzsche’s anti-philosophical thought, where it receives some of its decisive 
formulations and associations.47 
 
                                                
45 Looking at only a select few of recent accounts, one can see the origins of nihilism traced to 
different historical epochs, ranging from medieval Nominalism’s collapsing the ‘scholastic 
synthesis of reason and revelation’ (Gillespie), to Aristotelian politics and metaphysics 
(Agamben), or Plotinus(Cunningham). See Gillespie, Nihilism before Nietzsche, G. Agamben, 
The Coming Community (University of Minnesota Press, 1993) and The Man without Content 
(Stanford University Press, 1999), and C. Cunningham, Genealogy of Nihilism (Taylor & 
Francis, 2005), respectively. The historically ‘expansive’ application of the term goes as far back 
as Windelband’s influential history of philosophy, which applies the term to Gorgias’ ‘doctrine’ 
that “there is no being.” W. Windelband and J.H. Tufts, History of Philosophy with Special 
Reference to the Formation and Development of Its Problems and Conceptions (Macmillan, 
1931), 103. John Burnet’s subsequent distinction between ‘cosmological’ and ‘ethical’ nihilism, 
attributed to Gorgias and Thrasymachus respectively, stands in a long line of classifications, 
divisions and subdivisions of the problem, still very much in play today. J. Burnet, Greek 
Philosophy: Thales to Plato (Macmillan, 1932), 120. An historical and sociological classification 
of Nihilism is offered by Goudsblom. J. Goudsblom, Nihilism and Culture (Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1980). More recently, Carr distinguished a resigned, post-modern Nihilism from its 
predecessors, who have still held the hope of overcoming it from within.  Slocombe argues that 
genealogical and classificatory accounts cannot but do violence to this elusive subject matter, 
which he offers to connect with the sublime. See W. Slocombe, Nihilism and the Sublime 
Postmodern (Routledge, 2013). 
46 Maraglit and Buruma, see in Bazarov, Turgenev’s nihilist, a prime example of what they call 
Occidentalism. Indeed, their notion of Occidentalism has much in common with nihilism. 
47 Or its first ‘radical inflation,’ as Weller puts it. 
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Why was Kant’s legacy of transcendental idealism seen to be so disastrous? Astute 
contemporary critiques have found Kant’s turning of the philosophical gaze inward, so to 
speak, aiming to establish knowledge and morality on an understanding of our 
subjective constitution, a position which can only lead to catastrophic consequences for 
knowledge and morality alike. Nihilism in this context was intended to name, indeed, to 
call out, extreme Kantians who considered the thing-in-itself as nothing for our 
cognition.48 Such a position could only give rise to disastrous cognitive, and moral 
consequences: all we know are appearances, illusions, with no grasp on the real. But it 
is Friedrich Jacobi who is credited – in a rare scholarly consensus on the topic – with 
first developing the term conceptually, in a letter to Fichte49 in 1799.   
 
More than a decade earlier, however, Jacobi had been involved in the infamous 
“pantheism controversy” with Moses Mendelssohn, where he argued that Spinozism 
amounted to atheism. The controversy had its origins in a private correspondence 
between Jacobi and Mendelssohn regarding Lessing’s alleged Spinozism, and is today 
                                                
48 The first use of the term in print was apparently by F.L Goetzius in his De nonismo et 
nihilismo in theologia (1733), which was, however, a relatively unknown work and seemed to 
have played no role in later reappearance and development of the concept. In the late eighteenth 
century it was used by J.H. Obereit, and more importantly, by D. Jenisch, who characterized 
transcendental idealism as Nihilism in 1796 in his On the Ground and Value of the Discoveries 
of Herr Professor Kant in Metaphysics, Morals, and Aesthetics. He uses the term to describe the 
work, not of Kant, but of the extreme Kantians who teach that things-in-themselves are nothing 
for our cognition. See Gillespie, Nihilism before Nietzsche, 65. 
49 Fichte was influenced by Jacobi, and had expected his support in the controversy (known as 
the ‘atheism controversy’) over his own philosophy, a controversy that would ultimately cost 
him his position. Scholars today are baffled by this expectation, which was indeed disappointed, 
as Jacobi intervened in favor of Fichte’s accusers. See D. Henrich and D.S. Pacini, Between Kant 




considered, alongside Kant’s transcendental philosophy, the major intellectual event of 
the period, ushering in a series of important intellectual and cultural developments.  In 
Jacobi’s view, Spinoza’s admirably consistent application of rationality’s prime principle 
(the principle of sufficient reason) leads inevitably to a world with no room for 
spontaneity, creativity and freedom. For Jacobi, there was no point in offering a 
philosophical counter argument, for it was rational philosophy itself that was the 
problem; it could not but lead to such a deem, unlivable view of reality. The only way out 
was a salto mortale, a leap of faith. Philosophy, in its unwitting path of despair, can only 
bring us to the brink of an existential choice. His argument against Fichte follows a 
similar path. As he sees it, Fichte’s Idealism recognizes no truth beyond consciousness 
or reason and therefore falls into an absolute subjectivism that is essentially an inverted 
Spinozism. It reduces everything to the activity of the I, and thus reduces God to a mere 
creation of the human imagination, just as Spinozism had reduced God to (a lifeless, 
mechanistic) nature. Jacobi concludes: 
 
Man has this choice and this choice alone: nothing or God. Choosing nothing he 
makes himself God; that means he makes God an apparition, for it is impossible, 
if there is no God, for man and all that is around him to be more than an 
apparition. I repeat: God is and is outside me, a living essence that subsists for 
itself, or I am God. There is no third Possibility.50 
 
                                                
50 Gillespie, Nihilism Before Nietzsche, 66. 
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As Nihilism emerged, as both a concept and an accusation, the significance of the 
epistemological and metaphysical background seems to have been taken for granted. It 
just seemed obvious, for many contemporary participants, that certain metaphysical 
outlooks have disastrous consequences. 
 
Indeed, this notion is shared by the two paradigmatic figures of criticism that emerge 
and crystalize in the wake of this affair. One model of critique is of course the Kantian, 
which links freedom with rational criticism and the rejection of metaphysical dogma, 
often associated by Kant with ‘mysticism.’51 This model is often invested in securing the 
boundaries of philosophy against ‘lazy,’ undisciplined thought. The other emerging 
model, embodied by Jacobi, could be labeled as anti-philosophical; it rejects 
philosophical criticism as itself dogmatic and asserts a certain immediate, preconceptual 
knowledge, or belief, as primary to, and sometimes as capable of curing, the ailments of 
philosophy and rationalism. 
 
In this narrower sense, then, Nihilism is a post-Kantian problem,52 essential to the 
development of one of the post-Kantian trajectories, often referred to as ‘Continental 
                                                
51 On Kant’s early attraction, and then rejection of ‘mysticism,’ see Henrich, Between Kant and 
Hegel, 67-8.   
52 The identification of Kant’s philosophy as a major moment in the history of the problem, 
indeed, one in which it reaches its fully developed, contemporary form, is shared by many 
genealogical accounts to this day, even as interpretations of the problem, and Kant’s role in it, 
vary significantly and are even diametrically opposed. For example, Gillespie sees in Kant, 
specifically in his third antinomy, the articulation of the absolute tension and separation between 
nature and freedom, the culmination of a process that originates in the medieval “nominalist 
revolution.” “While the earlier separation of a scientific and an aesthetic/moral realm governed 
by different standards and laws clearly called into question the initial global claims of modernity, 
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philosophy’: from the Romantics and German idealists to Marx, Nietzsche and 
Heidegger and on to the French post-structuralists. Moses Mendelssohn seems like an 
odd fit, to say the least, in this trajectory. In the history of philosophy, Mendelssohn 
emerges as the last representative of the dogmatic Leibnitz-Wolf school philosophy, 
which Kant’s critical turn had rendered obsolete. After Kant, Mendelssohn’s realm of 
influence had been decisively restricted to Jewish affairs, in part due to the ‘disciplining 
of Philosophy’ that followed the rise of the modern German University. 
 
  
In the University 
Willi Goetschel describes the disciplinary process as “the transformation through which 
philosophy changed from an enlightenment project of independent critique of 
independent intellectuals into a fully professionalized discipline in the modern university 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth century.”53 While philosophy became a 
stakeholder in the university, playing a central role in the formation of the modern 
academic curriculum, it also became professionalized and disciplined, a process 
accompanied by its differentiation and reconstitution in relation to the other disciplines 
                                                
it was really Kant’s codification of this separation in his antinomy doctrine that cut the ground 
out from under the modern project as a whole” (Theological Origins, 7). Agamben, on the 
contrary, sees in Kant the culmination of a long process, where two ontological spheres – the 
sphere responsive to Being as what “is,” and the sphere of religions, responsive to Being as 
“ought,” come to their zone of indistinction. See The Theological Origins of Modernity, in 
particular 43, 259-61, 270-87, and G. Agamben and A. Kotsko, Opus Dei: An Archaeology of 
Duty (Stanford University Press, 2013), in particular 195-9, 224, 232-4,243-72, respectively. 
53 W. Goetschel, The Discipline of Philosophy and the Invention of Modern Jewish Thought 
(Fordham University Press, 2013), 1.   
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that it was instrumental in engendering. The proliferation of distinction outside, with the 
constitution of new disciplines, was accompanied by an internal differentiation into 
subfields, which eventually gave rise to such categories as “Jewish Philosophy.”54 
Mendelssohn is, as Goetschel puts it “the classic that modern Jewish philosophy never 
had”.55   
 
During the nineteenth century, Mendelssohn’s memory lived on mainly within the Jewish 
world, where he was celebrated as a bridge between the community and the gentile 
society. His first biographer, Isaac Euchel,56 referred to him as Rambemam, (Rabbi 
Moshe ben Mendel), echoing the title of Rambam given to Maimonides. The implied 
analogy was intended to signify that, like Maimonides, Mendelssohn was renowned 
amongst the gentiles as a profound philosopher, and respected by the Rabbis for his 
extensive Talmudic learning. While much of his teaching was never accepted, he was 
respected by Reform and Orthodox Jews alike.57 By the end of the century, however, 
many criticisms, on all fronts, had started to emerge, centering on the views 
Mendelssohn had expressed in his Jerusalem. Mendelssohn now seemed too liberal to 
                                                
54 As Goetschel points out, this double process of differentiation, external and internal, 
“confronts philosophy, at the institutional level with its inner tension between its universal 
claims and its modern form of professionalization, whose historically particular determinants are 
undeniable.” Goetschel, The Discipline of Philosophy, 2. For more on the institutionalization and 
professionalization of modern, university philosophy, see also S. Weber, Institution and 
Interpretation (Stanford University Press, 2001), 18-32, and J. Derrida and P. Kamuf, Without 
Alibi (Stanford University Press, 2002), 202-37. 
55 Goetschel, The Discipline of Philosophy, 189. 
56 Isaac Abraham Euchel, Toldot Rabenu Hehakham Moshe Ben Mendel (Berlin: Hinukh 
ne'arim, 1838). 
57 Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom, 3. 
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the socialists, while for the Zionists (such as Peretz Smolanskin) he appeared as a 
traitor to his people in following the dangerous political illusion of Jewish emancipation. 
He was too rational for the Orthodox and too atavistically attached to Halakha, Jewish 
law, for the Reform Jews.58 
 
Nonetheless, the bicentenary of Mendelssohn’s birth in 1929 was celebrated in Jewish 
communities across Germany and accompanied by many publications. The main event 
in Mendelssohn’s reception – an event now more than eight decades in the making – 
was the initiation of a definitive scholarly edition of his works, the bicentenary edition, or 
the Jubiläumsausgabe, which began in 1929 and was projected to have sixteen titles, 
before the rise of Nazism put a long halt on the enterprise. The international board was 
headed by Adolf von Harnack, the leading protestant theologian in Germany and 
prominent members included Ernst Cassirer, the leading Kant scholar of the day, and, 
Lucien levy Bruhl, a leading anthropologist and philosopher from France. Prominent 
scholars of Jewish studies were involved in editing the volumes. The project’s 
supervising editors included Ismar Elbogen, “Weimar’s premiere Jewish historian”59 and 
Julius Guttmann, the leading historian of Jewish philosophy, and amongst the editors of 
specific volumes was one of Guttman’s young research associates, Leo Strauss.    
 
                                                
58 Ibid, 4. 
59 I. Schorsch, From Text to Context: The Turn to History in Modern Judaism (Brandeis Univ. 
Press, 1994), 6. 
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As Micha Gottlieb remarks, in the same way that many today feel an affinity with the 
Weimar era, people of that era seemed to have felt an affinity with the late eighteenth 
century, the eclipse of the age of enlightenment, epitomized for some by the pantheism 
controversy.60 An influential case in point is Leo Strauss. 
 
Strauss, then a young Zionist attracted to Jewish Orthodoxy, was a harsh critic of the 
Weimar republic. Liberalism, in his view, was Nihilism, which, in the context of the 
German Jews of his day, meant it offered only tepid, inauthentic half measures that 
allowed Jews to be tolerated – but secretly despised – by the majority society on the 
condition they leave their religious identity behind. Liberalism had thus left Jews 
existentially moribund, alienated from both German and Jewish identities. Mendelssohn 
interested Strauss for he remained committed, at least “externally,” to “Orthodox” 
Jewish concepts such as revelation, providence and the immortality of the soul, and 
saw no contradiction between his religious stance and reason. Mendelssohn’s position 
attracted Strauss, but he suspected it was untenable. Strauss noted that Mendelssohn 
was called out on these tensions, in the pantheism controversy with Jacobi. Strauss’s 
view of Mendelssohn’s performance in the controversy was heavily influenced by the 
arguments of Jacobi, who was the subject of his dissertation.61 In seeking to bridge faith 
and reason, Strauss deemed Mendelssohn’s stance “indecisive, lukewarm and 
                                                
60 Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom, 2. 
61 Strauss’s 1921 dissertation, written under the supervision of Ernst Cassirer was entitled “The 
Problem of Knowledge in F.H. Jacobi.” See ‘Das Erkenntnisproblem in der philosophischen 
Lehre Fr. H. Jacobis,’ in Leo Strauss, Philosphie Und Gesetz, Frühe Schriften, vol. II, 
Gesammelte Schriften (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1997), 237-93. 
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mediocre,” a “cautious half-dogmatism.”62 Strauss’s judgment of Mendelssohn was thus 
largely shaped by his understanding of the pantheism controversy, and Mendelssohn’s 
failure, in his eyes, to live up to the challenge it had posed. His judgment – which 
echoed Jacobi’s dismissive judgment of his opponent in the pantheism affair - has had a 
lasting effect on Mendelssohn’s subsequent reception,63 in part because of it being the 
only authoritative account until the publication of Alexander Altman’s magisterial 
biography of Moses Mendelssohn in 1973.64 
 
Perhaps due to the rekindled interest in the faith/reason debate with the so called ‘return 
of religion,’ the 1990s saw a surge of literature on Mendelssohn, in parallel (in the strict, 
geometric sense of no crossing) with a rekindled scholarly interest in the pantheism 
controversy.65 On all fronts, Jacobi’s judgment, mediated by Strauss, seemed to have 
left a permanent impact. 
 
Within “Jewish Studies,” many of the recent accounts have tried to come to terms with 
the tensions that seem to split Mendelssohn in two: the Orthodox Jew and the German 
enlightenment philosopher. Thus, to cite but two prominent examples, Allan Arkush 
                                                
62 Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom, 6. 
63 See Martin Yaffe’s ‘Strauss on Mendelssohn: an interpretive essay,’ where, amongst other 
things, Yaffe details the differences between Leo Strauss and Alexander Altman’s accounts of 
the pantheism controversy. In Leo Strauss on Moses Mendelssohn, 59-145. 
64 A. Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study (University of Alabama Press, 1973). 
65 See for example, Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to 
Fichte (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); P.W. Franks, All or Nothing: 
Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Harvard 
University Press, 2005). 
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sees Mendelssohn as a deist willing to reform Judaism to adapt to the times,66 while 
David Sorkin sees him as a traditionalist only half-heartedly committed to enlightenment 
values.67 Others have attempted to offer a more nuanced, middle path, showing 
Mendelssohn to be consistent in his own way, so to speak.68 In a sense, both those 
whose empathize  the tension, and those who try to reconcile them are right, and both 
are wrong; Mendelssohn, as will be argued, is both consistent and irrecoverably split; 
his is the consistency of a split unity. 
 
 
Intervention: Mendelssohn’s Neither/Nor 
In the field of Jewish studies, Moses Mendelssohn is best known for his highly 
controversial, if not idiosyncratic account of Judaism as a religion that is committed to 
no principles of belief, an idea almost universally rejected, and, as I shall argue, deeply 
misunderstood. Outside this field, Mendelssohn is mostly known for having played the 
role of Jacobi’s interlocutor in the pantheism controversy, though he is not seen as 
having contributed anything substantial to it or to its subsequent developments. 
Mendelssohn’s non-belonging to the debate, I argue, is not only a clue that allows for a 
reinterpretation of Mendelssohn, but also an omission constitutive of the debate. 
 
                                                
66 A. Arkush, Moses Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment (State University of New York Press, 
1994). 
67 D. Sorkin, Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment (Halban, 2012). 
68 See, for example Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom, and Gideon Freudenthal, No Religion without 




In a memorable scene from Ernst Lubitsch’s Ninotchka, Leon, Ninotchka’s suitor, tells 
her the following, well known joke: A man comes into a restaurant. He sits down at the 
table and he says ‘Waiter, bring me a coffee without cream.’ Five minutes later the 
waiter comes back and says ‘I’m sorry sir, we have no cream. Can it be without milk?’   
 
There has been much, worthy philosophical commentary on this joke in recent years, 
and it is not our intent to add to it. The point to be taken from this joke is that what is 
subtracted from a given substance shapes in important ways at least our experience of 
it. Coffee without cream is not the same as coffee without milk. The pantheism 
controversy and its aftermath, I argue, are in this sense “without Mendelssohn”; that is 
to say, while his involvement in the affair appears contingent, thus excluding his views 
from the essence of the controversy, that very exclusion is essential, establishing the 
very parameters of the issue.   
 
While a few pioneering works, to be briefly discussed below, have brought 
Mendelssohn’s thinking on Judaism and his involvement in the pantheism controversy 
into contact, there has been to date no attempt to connect Mendelssohn’s fundamental 
claim about Judaism, i.e., that it subscribes to no beliefs, with the larger issues at stake 
in the pantheism controversy. The primary premise of the present research is that it is 
necessary to bring the two into contact, and this for two reasons: to illuminate 
Mendelssohn’s thinking about Judaism and, also, to beat down new paths within the 
larger debate on Nihilism. Though it might seem a strange move made in regard to a 
figure held to epitomize ‘dogmatic’ philosophy, this study takes up Mendelssohn as a 
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‘critical model’ in Adorno’s sense,69 allowing us to revisit a philosophical problem in a 
way that affects the very parameters in which the question is posed. Such critical 
models are philosophical case studies, intended to brush the examined text against the 
grain with “the ambition of bringing out the liberating potential of the not yet realized.”70 
 
If one goes by the standard account of Mendelssohn’s role in the pantheism controversy 
it is immediately obvious that he has nothing to contribute to the ongoing philosophical 
debates sketched above. Certainly, it cannot be questioned that Mendelssohn failed to 
perceive Jacobi’s challenge as the epoch-making intervention it turned out to be. 
Mendelssohn seems to have recognized no inescapable contradiction between the 
modern, scientific outlook and traditional religion and morality, nor did he perceive 
Spinoza’s philosophy of immanence to be the radical consequence of all rationalism, an 
inescapable ‘fall’ into contingency and immanence. Such are the generally agreed signs 
of Mendelssohn’s limitations. Yet if the controversy and its implications are examined 
from Mendelssohn’s viewpoint, what comes into view are rather the limitations of the 
debate itself, or at least the limitations of the debate as it has been framed ever since 
the controversy. This novel perspective is attempted in the first part of the dissertation. 
What emerges into view from this work of repositioning is that Mendelssohn’s ‘failure to 
see’ the problem does not have to be taken as a sign of his naivety, inauthenticity or 
limited capacities as a philosopher. Indeed, and as becomes clear in the second part of 
                                                
69 T.W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics (Routledge, 1990), and T.W. Adorno and H.W. Pickford, 
Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords (Columbia University Press, 2005). 
70 In Goetschel, The Discipline of Philosophy, 8. 
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the dissertation, one only need look elsewhere in his writings, namely in his “Jewish” 
work, Jerusalem (1873), to see he that he did address the problem, albeit in his own 
way and on his own terms. And from this neglected perspective it is also clear why the 
challenge as it was presented to Mendelssohn failed to make the impression that 
commentators have looked for. 
 
While the arguments of the following chapters take a novel perspective, they do draw on 
– and should be situated in relation to – some recent literature on Mendelssohn.  In 
general, two significant lacunas mar existing scholarship. We begin by dwelling on the 
first, which can be stated as follows: the pantheism controversy deals with the relation 
of knowledge – in its most abstract – and practical life, and it is precisely Mendelssohn’s 
unique outlook on the question of this relation that makes him relevant to the lingering 
debate, but also, quite possibly, what has made his relevance virtually invisible so far. 
Both Mendelssohn’s metaphysical reflections and his political theology are 
practical/theoretical complexes, and do not allow for such neat separation. Indeed, what 
emerges – as we shall see – is a strange kind of unity, a fundamentally split unity. 
 
Two excellent studies have recently offered readings of both Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem 
and his Morning Hours, each, however, highlighting one aspect at the expanse of the 
other. Gottlieb has dedicated an excellent, book length study71 to Mendelssohn’s 
involvement in the pantheism controversy, which takes seriously Mendelssohn’s views 
                                                
71 Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom.   
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on Judaism as explicated in his Jerusalem. But Gottlieb understands the controversy as 
essentially a pragmatic, political affair. In a series of publications,72 Willi Goetschel has 
also related Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem to his intervention in the controversy (which 
intervention is set out in his Morning Hours of 1785). Goetschel approaches both texts 
from the other end than does Gottlieb, so to speak, emphasizing Mendelssohn’s 
“metaphysical aesthetics,” as he calls it, which he sees as a Spinozist legacy. In this 
dissertation I shall argue that the pantheism controversy, and perhaps consequentially, 
much in the debate around Nihilism, has to do with the links established between 
metaphysical views and practical, political affairs. 
 
The topic of political theology, heavily discussed across academic disciplines, has in 
recent years been recognized to be overdetermined.73 Certainly, a major tension within 
this constellation is its oscillation between two interrelated problems, or two interrelated 
intersections: religion and politics, theory and practice. One could group under the 
heading of practical philosophy a set of texts and problems that speak to the relation 
between religion and politics as fundamental social institutions, with changing relations 
over time and across cultures. As a problem in social and political theory, political 
theology has to do with the limits and grounding of power, with legitimizing power, of the 
order of law and its exception, as explored in the tradition that can be traced back from 
Carl Schmitt to Thomas Hobbes and even Aristotle, and whose most recent inheritor is 
                                                
72 Goetschel, The Discipline of Philosophy, and Spinoza's Modernity: Mendelssohn, Lessing, and 
Heine (University of Wisconsin Press, 2004) 
73 Hammill, Graham L., Julia Reinhard Lupton, and Etienne Balibar. Political Theology and 
Early Modernity (The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 1-20. 
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Giorgio Agamben. It is often assumed in the exploration of such problems that the more 
abstract, metaphysical issues are epiphenomenal or expressive of the more 
fundamental, practical reality. However political theology can also be seen as the site 
where these very categories – religion and politics, and by extension, perhaps more 
fundamentally, the material, secular realm, and the spiritual – are determined. At this 
more abstract level, and as a branch of theoretical philosophy, stands the problem of 
the relation and boundary between the material realm and the spiritual, the sensible and 
supersensible. Pursuing this line of inquiry, it is often implicitly assumed that it is on this 
level that the ‘real issues’ lie, either because such fundamental perceptions determine 
the horizon of meaning of a given life form, or at least because they reveal something 
other levels of inquiry cannot properly approach. We are dealing with the limit and 
encounter of the theoretical and practical, either as a problem in practical philosophy, or 
as a problem of theoretical philosophy. Either branch must include in some way, its 
other. 
 
While no doubt a simplification, it is possible to trace these two fundamental orientations 
to the two figures of critique that crystalize in the pantheism controversy. It could be said 
that Jacobi, the proto existentialist anti-philosopher, orients our thinking in the first 
direction – on the level of ‘lived experience,’ always concrete and particular, where 
things take shape, and where even the most abstract philosophical ideas are in truth 
grounded. At the same time, it is one of the fundamental legacies of Kant’s critique that, 
while difficult, theses domains, the practical and theoretical, must – and therefore can – 
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be kept apart. That giving up on – at least the possibility – of freedom, understood as 
rational self-determination, is a moral disaster, freely submitting to the worst, self-
induced slavery. In relation to the figures of Jacobi and Kant, Mendelssohn’s position is 
elusive, since it rejects both – seemingly exhaustive – alternatives. For Mendelssohn, 
as we shall gradually explicate in the following pages, theory and practice do not form 
strictly separate domains, nor is one reducible to the other. 
 
This brings us to the second major lacuna in existing scholarship, which has to do 
primarily with Mendelssohn’s relation to Kant’s philosophy. As we shall see, the 
pantheism affair had the effect of tying the fate of Kant’s immediate reception to 
Jacobi’s challenge. Kant’s philosophy was heralded as a response to that challenge, 
and subsequent generations of intellectuals saw the need to go beyond Kant to a large 
degree in light of Jacobi’s challenge. Due to at least to some extent to Mendelssohn 
himself, the idea that he might offer a worthwhile, interesting response to Kant, or to 
Jacobi’s existential challenge, has never been seriously considered. Yet for 
Mendelssohn there is no contradiction between the ‘existential’ outlook and the ‘rational’ 
one: while distinct, they coincide. The unity of Mendelssohn’s thought is elusive, since it 
is a fundamentally split unity. The fundamental duality consistently attributed to 
Mendelssohn is not strictly speaking false; but the assumption underlying it – namely, 




This second problem manifests itself also on the level of style. In his influential study, 
Dieter Henrich had identified Jacobi with the emergence of a new style of philosophy 
that brought it much closer to literature.74 Between the existentially inclined, expressive 
mode of philosophy associated with Jacobi, and Kant’s difficult, rigorously 
conceptualized philosophy for the specialist, there once again seems to be no position 
for Mendelssohn other than that of a tepid, half measure. Indeed, the difficulty in 
interpreting Mendelssohn has, somewhat paradoxically, to do with his disarming clarity 
of expression. There is something self-effacing not only in Mendelssohn’s rhetoric, but 
in his very style, in his plain-speaking manner of presentation.75 
 
The very word ‘style’ has a similar effect, as it is either taken to be an epiphenomenal 
ornament to work of substance, or, in a modernist vein, to hold the secret key, to ‘show’ 
what cannot be directly said. For Mendelssohn, modes of expression as well as media 
of communication are far from merely ornamental, nor does he allow them the ‘final say’ 
over substance. Indeed, Mendelssohn’s conjoined inquiry in his Jerusalem into the 
division of politics and religion, and the limits between image (with its inherent bond to 
                                                
74 Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel, 74. “This period was also one of extraordinary productivity 
in literature. Jacobi, a very influential philosopher, was also a writer… his was not a superficial 
impressionist philosophy… but a serious work that contributed in important ways to the 
development of philosophy at the time… Jacobi was the first genuine Poeta Doctus, a learned 
poet in the fullest sense… both a creative philosopher-scholar and a creative writer. Moreover, 
many others like him emerged during this time… I do not think there has been any time in 
history, before or after, in which the connection between literature and philosophy was as direct 
and mutual.” 
75 Mendelssohn never produced a canonical philosophical work, one putting forward a 
systematic, original intervention. Much of his work is scattered in theories of art and beauty, in 
literary criticism, essays of psychological observation, and so on. 
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the sensible) and sign (with its supposed transparency), between the figurative and the 
conceptual, displays a sensitivity to the interrelated problems of political-theology and 
the seemingly more theoretical-linguistic problem of the limits between conceptual work 
and figurative speech.76 
 
As Willi Goetschel notes, resistances to the pigeonholing of a Jewish thinker under the 
rubric of “Jewish Philosophy” are as old as the emergence of such rubrics.77 In the early 
twentieth century, the expansion of the category “Jewish thought” had moved in the 
direction of including styles and themes that do not fit the mold of disciplinary 
philosophy. Most prominent has been Jewish mysticism, emerging as an exciting, new 
field of study almost single handedly through the work of Gerschom Scholem. 
Scholem’s contemporary “Jewish philosophers,” figures such as Franz Rosenzweig and 
                                                
76 Gil Anidjar has recently argued for the centrality of blood, both literal and figurative – indeed, 
on the very threshold between them – in Christianity. The argument is nicely encapsulated in his 
recasting of Carl Schmitt’s famous formula: “All significant concepts of the history of the 
modern world are liquidated theological concepts. This is so not only because of their historical 
development but also because of their systematic fluidity, the recognition of which is necessary 
for a political consideration of these concepts.” Gil Anidjar, Blood: A Critique of Christianity 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). This topic will be discussed in chapters 3 and 4, 
but already here we can see the confusion that arises, the ‘bleeding’ of one domain into the other, 
in relating to two domains by the terms of one of them, boundaries and jurisdiction, and the 
resulting, literal violence. Does the problem arise because of a tendency to imagine symbolic 
difference, a distinction, in terms borrowed from the perceptible world, ‘boundaries’ and 
‘borders’? Is the problem, then, the irreducible figurative nature of language, operative even 
‘behind the back’ of conceptual distinction? Or is the problem related to the very operation of 
conceptual distinction, even if it were to be liberated from this imagery of boundaries? Is the 
separation or distinction between religion and politics a mere example of this fundamental 
linguistic problem, or is it more intimately bound up with it? As we shall see Mendelssohn has 
much to say about the boundaries and intersection of both politics and religion, and ‘image’ and 
‘sign’, and a reading of Jerusalem needs to account for their connection and intersection in his 
writing. 
77 See Goetschel, The Discpline of Philsophy, 3. 
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Martin Buber, were to varying degrees and in different ways, heavily influenced by the 
mystical tradition, reacting against what they perceived as a sterile rationalism. For 
various reasons, the interest in Jewish mysticism and mystically inclined philosophers 
has, up until recently, far eclipsed interest in Mendelssohn, who is usually considered to 
be a paragon of a failed rationalism. Mendelssohn’s explicit criticism of “fanaticism” and 
“enthusiasm” have no doubt contributed to this image. As we shall see, however, 
Mendelssohn’s rationalism coincides, rather than clashes with ‘mystical’ experience, 
and his critique of “mysticism” is not directed against any particular set of ideas but 
rather a certain social institutionalization of ‘the mystical’. Both Mendelssohn’s 
metaphysical-theological and political-theological branches of thought seem to bring 
together seamlessly elements drawn from modern (Leibnitz, Kant) and medieval 
(Maimonides) philosophy, as well as from the “unwritten” Jewish theology as developed 
by the early modern Kabbalists (Jewish mystics), into a uniquely Mendelssohnian unity, 
divided through and through.   
 
 
In the four chapters that follow these introductory arguments and claims will be fleshed 
out. Chapter One reviews the pantheism controversy and revises the standard account 
of Mendelssohn’s role within it. The second part of this first chapter then challenges the 
accepted reading of Mendelssohn’s role by way of a reading of Kant’s contribution to 
the controversy in his essay ‘What is Orientation in Thinking?’ It is shown that Kant’s 
own position arose out of much greater engagement with that of Mendelssohn than is 
39 
 
normally acknowledged. Kant is seen to be responding to Mendelssohn’s, rather than 
Jacobi’s challenge. 
 
Chapter Two turns from Kant to Mendelssohn, following in the footsteps of Kant’s 
essay, but going beyond the point that he was willing to go. The chapter offers a reading 
of Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours, which was composed in part as Mendelssohn’s 
response to the controversy but also as a response to Kant’s critical philosophy. 
Mendelssohn is shown to have held the very position that warranted, for the first time, 
being named a Nihilist, namely, a radicalization of Kant’s philosophy that denies all 
reality to the thing in itself. And yet, rather than being led to nihilist conclusions , it is this 
radicalization of Kant that stands at the basis of Mendelssohn’s ‘original proof’ for the 
existence of God. Implicit in this exegesis is a rearticulation of the challenge of Nihilism 
as a problem in the experience of the possible. If Kant had set out to establish the 
necessary conditions of possible experience, Mendelssohn, or so I argue, offers an 
account of the experience of possibility. This chapter thus sets out the philosophical 
core of the argument of this thesis. 
 
The second part of the dissertation – the third and fourth chapters – constitute an 
attempt to unpack, clarify, and show the practical implications of Mendelssohn’s 
philosophical position as outlined in Chapter Two. This is achieved by way of a 
chronological step backwards and a careful reading of the two parts of Mendelssohn’s 
Jerusalem, composed in 1783, before the pantheism controversy arose. As will become 
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clear, the basic positions behind Mendelssohn’s metaphysical arguments in Morning 
Hours are to be found already in Jerusalem, albeit here set out in a more concrete form 
in which their practical as well as theoretical implications are to be clearly discerned. 
 
Chapter Three offers a close reading of part one of Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem, where 
his metaphysical picture finds its proper place in the context of his practical philosophy 
and political theology. It is argued that what connects the metaphysical speculations of 
Morning Hours and the political theology developed in Jerusalem is an ontological 
picture of the divine, that is, the transcendent, figured not as what lies beyond and 
outside the worldly, secular plane of immanence, but as what prevents this terrain from 
closing in on itself, and thus opens the space for the creation of values and life forms. At 
stake is a view of internal division (whether on the level of the individual subject or that 
of society) as a positive condition of possibility for human action. Though subtle and 
careful (for two reasons: his position as a Jew in a Christian society, and his 
personality), Mendelssohn is presenting his understanding of the political-theological 
division, modeled after division in time, rather than in space, as an alternative to the 
commonly held (i.e. Christian) model. 
 
Chapter Four turns to the second part of Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem, where he 
discusses, amongst other things, his own religion, Judaism. Following Mendelssohn’s 
distinction between divine legislation and revelation, and his theory of media and 
language, Mendelssohn is shown to understand the difference between beliefs and 
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value systems or ways of life, not in terms of a difference in the contents of belief, but a 
difference in the manner, or form that belief takes. The positive and productive condition 
of all society, discussed in previous chapters of Jerusalem as a divided unity, can 
develop problematically in two directions, which Mendelssohn understands as two 
directions inherent in the structure of language. The Ceremonial Law given to the 
Jewish people is understood to counteract the two opposing tendencies, allowing 
adherents of Judaism to conjoin a radical freedom of thought with a fidelity to their 
tradition. Thus, Mendelssohn’s vision of Judaism as founded on no prescribed doctrine, 
not only offers an interesting and unique account of the peculiarities and particular 
history of Judaism and the Jewish people, but also suggests an alternative view as to 
the ideological or normative glue of society, one that is not restricted to a fixed, 






Part 1: Mendelssohn and The Pantheism Controversy 
	  
1. From Dusk till Dawn: Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours and 
the Eclipse of Enlightenment 
 
 
1.1 Mendelssohn and Kant, Style and Substance 
The intellectual history of the pantheism controversy (1785) has largely taken 
Mendelssohn’s role in it to be entirely reducible to the purely accidental, serving as the 
historical background for the emergence of consequential intellectual and philosophical 
developments. As we shall see, this is in part surprising, since Kant’s famous 
contribution to the controversy is in fact a deeply engaged response to Mendelssohn. 
Following Kant’s reading will allow us to shed some light on Mendelssohn’s contribution 
to the affair, and to the persistent problem of nihilism more generally. Mendelssohn’s 
contribution, as well as his seeming irrelevance to the debate at the time, we will 
proceed to argue, has to be understood in light of his arguments in Jerusalem, 
published in 1783, about reason, belief and revelation. This means that we are reading 
in reverse chronological order, or against the grain. We begin at the end, and then work 
backwards 
 
In his day, Mendelssohn was celebrated for his exceptional powers of expression.78 
Indeed, for Kant, just this was the mark of Mendelssohn’s genius, what made him 
                                                
78 See Willi Goetschel ‘Writing, Dialogue, and Marginal Form: Mendelssohn's Style of 
Intervention’ in R. Munk, Moses Mendelssohn's Metaphysics and Aesthetics (Springer 
Netherlands, 2011), 21-40. 
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exceptional.79 This is why Kant, who had a low opinion of the capacity of the ‘popular 
philosophers’ of the Berlin enlightenment circles for serious philosophical thought,80 and 
who considered his own powers to make complex philosophical ideas communicable to 
be limited, put so much stock in recruiting Mendelssohn as an ally to his new 
philosophy. Mendelssohn stood alone, in Kant’s estimation, as one in whom the powers 
of expression did not come at the expense of rigorous, critical thought, a master of 
common sense as Kant would come to define it in his third critique81: “Few men are so 
fortunate as to be able to think for themselves and at the same time be able to put 
themselves into someone else’s position and adjust their style exactly to his 
requirements. There is only one Mendelssohn.”82 
 
Today, it seems, Mendelssohn is more readily recognized as a skillful writer than as a 
lasting source of philosophical insight. Paradoxically, the peculiar difficulty entailed in 
reading Mendelssohn has to do with his clarity of expression. That is, the difficulty in 
                                                
79 Immanuel Kant and Arnulf Zweig, Correspondence, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 105-08. 
80 He described it as “mere misology, reduced to principles,” and “the euthanasia of false 
philosophy.” See Lewis Beck, White, Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors 
(Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1969), 321. 
81 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Hackett Publishing Company, 
1987), 86-90. Kant’s notion of common sense has been widely commented upon. He seeks to 
distinguish his notion from, well, the commonsensical notion of common sense – what he calls, 
healthy understanding, which he sees ultimately as perceived wisdom, a hindrance on 
independent thinking. Common sense as the faculty of taste is to be understood as the capacity to 
uncover universality in particulars, a capacity that requires taking the perspective of others into 
account in assessing one’s own pleasure. It is an account of the pleasure in judgement, what 
Mendelssohn, before Kant, had defined as the faculty of approval, mediating the faculties of 




interpreting Mendelssohn is not due to a density of idiosyncratic concepts, or a highly 
complex architectonic of the argument, but is rather linked to his straightforward style of 
expression and his tendency to treat his own speculative insights as if they were self-




1.2 Mendelssohn and the Crisis of Enlightenment: Intellectual Consequences of the 
Pantheism Debate 
Mendelssohn’s death in 1786 coincides, in more than one respect, with the end of the 
age of enlightenment and the emergence of the specter of nihilism, “that most uncanny 
of guests.”83 The school of philosophy in which he was brought up, the so called 
Leibnitz-Wolff school, was soon to become, along with him, a footnote in the history of 
philosophy, attached to the heels of the sweeping new critical moment of Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy, ushering in that most difficult and dense philosophical era, 
German Idealism and, more broadly, marking the moment when the optimism in the 
purging light of day associated with the enlightenment gave way to darker forces with 
the rise of romanticism and the age of revolutions. 
 
Fredrick Beiser describes this transitional period, which achieved its dramatic climax in 
the pantheism controversy, as the crisis of the authority of reason.84 As he notes, the 
                                                
83 See 'Nachgelassene Fragmente,' in F.W. Nietzsche, G. Colli, and M. Montinari, Sämtliche 
Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden, vol. XII (Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag), 125. 
84 Frederick C. Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
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identification of the era as the age of reason, or the age of criticism, is not a 
retrospective historical nomination, but belongs to the self-perception of its leading 
intellectual powers. Here is the definition Kant himself gave to his times in the preface to 
the first edition of his Critique of Pure Reason: 
 
Our age is the genuine age of criticism, to which everything must submit. Religion 
through its holiness and legislation through its majesty commonly seek to exempt 
themselves from it. But in this way, they excite a just suspicion against themselves, 
and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which 
has been able to withstand its free and public examination.85 
 
Enlightenment’s crisis was immanent, in that the principle of critical authority came to a 
crisis from within. Beiser is here worth quoting at length: 
 
The enlightenment was the age of reason because it made reason into its 
highest authority, its final court of appeal, in all intellectual questions. Its central 
and characteristic principle was what we might call the sovereignty of reason. 
This principle means that there is no source of intellectual authority higher than 
reason. Neither scripture, nor divine inspiration, nor ecclesiastical and civil 
tradition have the authority of reason. While reason judges the legitimacy of all 
these sources of authority, none of them stands in judgment of it. 
                                                





Paradoxically, the crisis of the enlightenment arose from within, and indeed, from 
its most cherished principle. The problem is that this principle is self-reflexive. If 
reason must subject all beliefs to criticism, it must be subject to its own tribunal – 
to criticism. To exempt its tribunal from scrutiny would be nothing less than 
‘dogmatism,’ accepting beliefs on authority, which is the very opposite of reason. 
The criticism of reason therefore inevitably became the meta-criticism of reason. 
If the enlightenment was the age of criticism, the 1790s were the age of meta-
criticism. All the doubts about the authority of reason, which are so often said to 
be characteristic of our ‘post-modern’ age, were already apparent in late 
eighteen-century Germany.86 
 
Let us note in passing the abundance of legal and political terminology in Beiser’s 
account: authority, tribunal, sovereignty, a semantic field that will become important in 
the ensuing chapters, as we move from the metaphysical to the political-theological. 
 
Kant was the decisive figure of the era included within the canon of philosophy, and his 
rise to that status was historically linked with Jacobi’s challenge.87 Beiser is unequivocal 
as to its significance: 
                                                
86 Frederick. C. Beiser, Hegel (Routledge, 2005), 22. 
87 Kant’s gain in popularity and respect was due, to a large extent, to Karl Leonard Reinhold’s 
presentation of Kant’s philosophy as the supreme rebuttal of Jacobi’s challenge, something Kant 
himself had not done, as we shall see when we discuss Kant’s contribution to the controversy. 
“The decisive breakthrough [of Kantinainsm] came sometime in the autumn of 1786. With 




Along with the publication of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft in May 1781, the most 
significant intellectual event in late eighteenth-century Germany was the so-
called pantheism controversy between F. H. Jacobi and Moses Mendelssohn.88 
 
The controversy began in the summer of 1783 as a private quarrel between Jacobi and 
Mendelssohn but, when it became public two years later it engaged almost all the best 
minds of late eighteenth-century Germany, including Kant, Herder, Goethe, and 
Hamman. While the interest of intellectual historians in the pantheism controversy has 
grown in recent decades, it is taken for granted in the existing literature that 
Mendelssohn’s role in it belongs squarely to an incidental dimension. What is historically 
consequential for post-Kantian philosophers and influential intellectual movements, 
such as romanticism, is the combined legacy of Kant’s critical philosophy, which, 
despite its radical critique and ensuing limitations on the possible scope of knowledge, 
had aimed to secure both knowledge and ethics in light of modern science, and Jacobi’s 
charge that such attempts are futile and that modern philosophical and scientific 
knowledge is, in principle, incompatible with ethics, freedom and religion. In the 
aftermath of the pantheism controversy, Mendelssohn could not be seen as having 
                                                
Reinhold had succeeded in making Kant's philosophy intelligible to a wider public. The Briefe 
had created – to quote a friend of Kant's – ‘a sensation.’ But it is important to note the secret 
behind Reinhold's success. He established the relevance of the critical philosophy to that dispute 
foremost in the public eye: the pantheism controversy.” Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German 
Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, 45. 
88 Ibid., 44. 
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anything of substance to offer. To return to Beiser’s commentary: 
 
It is difficult to imagine a controversy whose cause was so incidental – Jacobi's 
disclosure of Lessing's Spinozism – and whose effects were so great. The 
pantheism controversy completely changed the intellectual map of eighteenth-
century Germany; and it continued to preoccupy thinkers well into the nineteenth 
century. The main problem raised by the controversy – the dilemma of a rational 
nihilism or an irrational fideism – became a central issue for Fichte, Schelling, 
Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche.89 
 
Beiser, whose study aims to fill in a grave lacuna in intellectual history (in the English-
speaking world), puts the blame for neglect of critical attention on this crucial episode on 
its deceptive appearance as a personal affair: “The reason for this neglect primarily lies 
with the controversy itself, in that its deceptive appearance masks its underlying 
significance. It has an outer shell – the biographical issue of Lessing’s Spinozism; an 
inner layer – the exegetical question of the proper interpretation of Spinoza; and a 
hidden inner core – the problem of the authority of Reason.”90   
 
Although the nature and limitations of the present study force us to focus on the 
intellectual stakes of the debate, on authority and reason, it is important to note that 
                                                
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid., 47. 
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such a foreclosure is not inconsequential, and that at least in so far as Mendelssohn is 
concerned, it runs the risk of losing sight, in advance, of his position on the matters at 
stake. That one can hardly understand enlightenment, as a historical phenomenon as 
well as a political-philosophical project, without at least acknowledging the specific, 
highly entangled relationship between the personal, the public and political sphere, and 
the abstract theoretical sphere, is not a charge against Beiser; it is certainly legitimate, 
and indeed at times necessary, to emphasize intellectual debates at the expanse of 
their historical and cultural context. But the relations between these two spheres – the 
public and the private – belong to the debate not only as contextual, historical 
background but also as subject matter. Certainly, no understanding of Mendelssohn is 
possible without paying close attention at least to his views on this interconnection, as 
we shall see in chapters 3 and 4. For Mendelssohn, as we will come to see, belief is not 
a private affair; rather, it belongs in the overlap of the public and the private.91 
                                                
91 Reading the correspondences surrounding the affair, and comparing them with previous, 
heated debates in which Mendelssohn had partaken, leaves a strong impression of ethical decay, 
indicated, but not limited to, the dismissive, personal and at times even anti-Semitic character of 
the correspondence between Jacobi and his supporters in the controversy, such as Herder, Goethe 
and Hamann. It is quite striking to note how these writers and intellectuals, who had before 
treated Mendelssohn as a philosopher from whom one could learn and with whom one could 
passionately, yet respectfully, disagree, were all of a sudden happy to reduce him to a 
stereotypical representation of a ‘Jew,’ and even an ‘errant Jew’ (Erzjude), how all of a sudden, 
his arguments could be dismissed categorically and referred to as “rabbinic lectures” and ‘Jewish 
tricks’ (Pfiffe). See A. Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study (University of 
Alabama Press, 1973), 701-2. While it is doubtfully productive to focus too much on the 
interpersonal nature of the debate and the assessment of the respective characters at play (which 
in any case has been done rather exhaustively, if differently evaluated, by Strauss, Altman and 
Beiser), it is also wise not to disregard such elements, which both enabled and contributed to the 
“scandalous” effect of the controversy. Jacobi’s cynical use of Lessing’s and Mendelssohn’s 
public reputations to further his cause and to establish his public standing, his willingness, if not 
outright enjoyment in casting a shadow over a famed, and at the time, highly unlikely, personal 




There is hardly any dispute amongst scholars that the lasting, consequential stakes of 
the debate lie in the conjuncture of Kant’s critical philosophy and Jacobi’s proto- 
existentialist challenge. The present study does not seek to claim that Mendelssohn did 
in fact play a more significant role in the controversy than the standard accounts permit. 
There is no point in arguing against the course of historical development. There is, 
however, a great deal of interest in reading what was never written (to borrow 
Benjamin’s expression) in the history of these intellectual developments. On top of 
shedding new light on a much-researched topic, such a reading of what does not fall 
under the debate as it is framed has the added advantage of making visible the 
limitation of the established frame of reference. To do so, we trace an undercurrent of 
the controversy with the following two objectives in mind: (1) to allow for a 
reinterpretation of Mendelssohn’s role within it, pointing towards an alternative 
formulation of the problem; (2) to allow for an explication of the strong connection 
                                                
enlightenment, his lack of any genuine effort to communicate and debate with Mendelssohn, and 
his entirely combative ‘take no prisoners’ attitude, are not merely personal attributes of an 
historical figure, accidental or external to his philosophical attack on enlightenment’s pretense 
for objectivity, but are part and parcel of it. Most importantly, his generally dismissive attitude 
towards his “opponent” in the dispute, intimately linked with his proto-existentialist approach, 
and his arrogant assurance that Mendelssohn could not begin to fathom the depths of his insights 
seems to have had an unfortunate, lasting impact on the commentary and historical reception of 
the affair, as we have seen in the introduction. Leo Strauss, the first major figure to comment on 
the affair in the twentieth century, clearly adopts Jacobi’s point of view in the controversy, 
including his appraisal of Mendelssohn as both a naïve enlightener, incapable of appreciating the 
depth of faith and a second-rate philosopher, incapable of appreciating the ‘true significance’ of 
Spinoza’s philosophy as Jacobi had interpreted it. See his commentary on the affair in L. Strauss 
and M.D. Yaffe, Leo Strauss on Moses Mendelssohn (University of Chicago Press, 2012), 59-
145. And see Yaffe’s detailed interpretive essay as to the differences in the interpretations of the 
affair between Altman and Strauss. Ibid., 219-317. 
51 
 
between his interests and contributions in the controversy and his political theology as 
developed in his Jerusalem, which he had published just as the affair began to unfold, 
and which, in turn, will be shown to be his lasting, substantial contribution to the 
problem of nihilism. 
 
Kant’s intervention in the controversy not only makes possible, but indeed calls for such 
a reinterpretation. As we shall see, Kant’s contribution, contained in his essay ‘What is 
Orientation in Thinking?’ displays an intimate and far reaching engagement with 
Mendelssohn, much more than it does a response to Jacobi’s challenge. Thus, we shall 
make use of Kant as a reader of Mendelssohn, pointing towards the elements in 
Mendelssohn’s text that deserve renewed attention. Before we proceed to a reading of 
Kant, however, a brief account of the pantheism controversy,92 as well as a summary 
presentation of Jacobi’s challenge are in order. 
 
 
1.3 The Pantheism Controversy 
On March 25, 1783 Elise Reimarus, friend of Jacobi, Lessing, and Mendelssohn, and 
daughter of Herman Samuel Reimarus,93 wrote Jacobi from Berlin. Just the day before, 
                                                
92 In my survey of the affair in the following pages, I am deeply indebted to, and draw heavily on 
Beiser’s masterful account of it, as it is the most up to date, succinct account, and best sets up the 
intellectual stakes and consequences of the affair. See Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German 
Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, 61-74. My understanding of Mendelssohn’s behavior in the 
affair, however, differs somewhat from Beiser’s, and is closer to the one accounted for by 
Altman. Writing in a biographical context, Altman provides a wide context for the Jacobi-
Mendelssohn relationship, and a detailed assessment of their behavior in the ‘affair’. See Altman, 
593-653.  
93 Reimarus (1694-1768), a well-known Deist German philosopher of the enlightenment, was the 
author of an Apologie (‘an apologie for, or some words in defense of, reasoning worshipers of 
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she had learned from Mendelssohn about his plans to finish his long-promised work 
intended as a tribute to the character of his closest friend of thirty years, Lessing. After a 
few months delay, Jacobi wrote back to Reimarus on July 21,1783, asking her if 
Mendelssohn knew about Lessing's final religious views. He had something important to 
confide to her: “In his last days, Lessing was a committed Spinozist!” 
 
Such was Spinoza's reputation in eighteenth-century Germany that to be a Spinozist 
was also to be an atheist; the charge was explosive. As Mendelssohn was well aware, 
Lessing was not only his friend, but also a symbol – an ideal of the Enlightenment, his 
character viewed as personifying broadmindedness, liberalism and tolerance, whereas 
Spinoza, in sharp contrast, was associated with “danger and abomination”.94 
Mendelssohn now faced a serious challenge. To simply acknowledge Lessing's 
Spinozism would be bound to shock the public and defame rather than dignify Lessing's 
character, and along with him, the very image of the Enlightenment. To ignore or 
repress the claim of Lessing’s Spinozism, on the other hand, would open his intended 
biography to charges of dishonesty.  
 
Surface appearances notwithstanding, Jacobi's letter to Reimarus was disingenuous, a 
calculated, tactical move. His concern about discretion or the consequences of 
revealing Lessing's Spinozism to the public be taken as a genuine one, given that he 
                                                
God’), unpublished in his lifetime due its controversial study of the historical Jesus. Lessing had 
published parts of this work posthumously as “Fragments of an anonymous writer,” in his Zur 
Geschichte und Literatur in 1774-1778, giving rise to what is known as the Fragmentenstreit. 
94 See Omri Boehm, Kant’s Critique of Spinoza, (Oxford university press, 2014), 200.  
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would publish his intimate conversations with Lessing only two years later. Jacobi, 
evidence suggests, was laying a trap for Mendelssohn. He calculated that his 
information would compel Mendelssohn to doubt or deny the claim of Lessing's 
Spinozism, which was tantamount to calling his best friend an atheist. In response, 
Jacobi could then divulge the contents of his personal conversations with Lessing. 
Exposing Mendelssohn's ignorance of their mutual friend's most intimate opinions, 
would cast doubts as to the solidity and true extent of that famous friendship, and would 
position Jacobi as Lessing’s true friend and confidant.95 
 
Mendelssohn responded to Jacobi’s charge by asking for clarifications. He wanted to 
know what precisely Lessing meant, what did he, in the context, understand as 
                                                
95 Jacobi's eagerness to contest Mendelssohn's claim was already apparent in a previous, smaller 
literary clash that Jacobi had contrived with Mendelssohn only a year earlier, which foreshadows 
much of the later controversy. In his Etwas, das Lessing gesagt hat (1782), Jacobi cited 
Lessing’s critique of Protestant princes to support his attack on all forms of political and 
religious authority. Lessing the courage to criticize the Protestant princes as well as the Catholic 
popes had signaled to Jacobi that Lessing, unlike the Berlin “Enlighteners”, despised by Jacobi 
for being ready to abandon their intellectual ideals in order to compromise with the moral and 
political status quo, had the integrity to take a point to its logical conclusion, despite the moral 
and political consequences. Thus, Jacobi felt that Lessing was on his side in the struggle against 
every form of despotism, including the “despotism of the Aufklärung” in Berlin. After Jacobi's 
book appeared Mendelssohn made some critical comments on it, a few of which questioned 
Jacobi's understanding of Lessing. Jacobi then took the extraordinary step of fabricating an 
article against himself, consisting inter alia of Mendelssohn's remarks. He then published the 
article anonymously in the January 1783 issue of the Deutsches Museum. This remarkable ploy 
was intended to give Jacobi the opportunity to have a public debate with Mendelssohn. In this 
prelude to the pantheism affair, Mendelssohn was not lured into battle, as he did not consider 
Jacobi worth his time. Insulted and frustrated by it, Jacobi was determined not to allow 
Mendelssohn to slip away again. Gottlieb sees this early exchange as fundamental, as he 
understands the affair in general to have been of a political, practical character. See M. Gottlieb, 
Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn's Theological-Political Thought (Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 62-74. 
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Spinozism, what specific doctrines of Spinoza did he espouse, and what were the 
circumstances under which he had made such statements. Jacobi would have to clarify 
and expand. It is worthwhile noting that while Mendelssohn had deep suspicions as to 
Jacobi’s character and intentions, he never expressed any doubts as to the veracity of 
his claims, which is certainly one reason why such suspicions are usually excluded from 
the scholarship on the topic. I do not mean to argue that Jacobi was lying, only to point 
to the fact that such a possibility was not even entertained by Mendelssohn. 
 
Nonetheless, if it turned out that Jacobi was right about Lessing's Spinozism, 
Mendelssohn conveyed to Jacobi via Reimarus, he saw no reason to suppress this fact. 
“Even our best friend's name should not shine in a better light than it deserves,” 
Mendelssohn told Reimarus. Mendelssohn’s readiness to acknowledge and publicize 
Lessing's Spinozism, provided Jacobi managed to substantiate his allegation, was in 
part a sign of his confidence that, if Jacobi should justify his claim, he was in a position 
to properly interpret the meaning of Lessing's Spinozism, having the advantage of long 
conversations over the years with Lessing on philosophy in general and Spinozism in 
particular.  
 
A battle between Jacobi and Mendelssohn was now brewing. Reimarus sent a summary 
of Mendelssohn's letter to Jacobi requesting more information about Lessing's 
Spinozism. Two months later, on November 4, 1783 Jacobi wrote a long letter 
describing conversations in which Lessing allegedly made his confession of Spinozism. 
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This account of his conversations with Lessing would come to have an enormous 
impact on the cultural scene of late eighteenth-century Germany. 
Jacobi transcribed a conversation from the summer of 1780 concerning the young 
Goethe's then-unpublished poem ‘Prometheus’: 
 
Lessing: I find the poem96 good... The point of view in it is also my own…The orthodox 
concepts of the divinity are no longer for me. “One and All,” I know no other.  
Jacobi: Then you would be pretty much in agreement with Spinoza. 
Lessing: If I were to name myself after anyone, then I know no one better. 
Jacobi: Spinoza is good enough for me; but what a mixed blessing we find 
in his name! 
Lessing: Yes, if that's the way you look at it... But do you know anyone better? 
 
According to Jacobi, the conversation, interrupted at this point, continued the next 
morning when Lessing called on him: 
 
Lessing: I've come to talk to you about my “One and All.” You were shocked yesterday? 
Jacobi: You did surprise me, and I did feel some embarrassment. But you did not shock 
me. It surely wasn't my expectation to find you a Spinozist or pantheist; and still less did 
I think that you would lay down your cards so quickly, bluntly and plainly. I came for the 
most part with the intention of getting your help against Spinoza. 
                                                
96 Hans Blumenberg’s engagement with the controversy focuses on Goethe’s poem and the 
Prometheus myth.  See Hans Blumenberg, Work on Myth, (MIT Press, 1985), 403-429.  
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Lessing: You know Spinoza then? 
Jacobi: I believe that I know him like very few others. 
Lessing: Then there is no need to help you. You too will become his friend. There is no 
philosophy other than Spinoza's. 
Jacobi: That might well be. For a determinist, if he is to be consistent, must also 
become a fatalist. Everything else follows from there. 
… 
Lessing: So we won't be parting company over your credo [Spinoza]? 
Jacobi: We don't want that on any account. But my credo does not rest with Spinoza. I 
believe in an intelligent and personal cause of the world. 
Lessing: Oh, all the better then! Now I'll get to hear something completely new. 
Jacobi: I wouldn't get so excited about it. I get myself out of the business with a salto 
mortale. But usually you do not find any special pleasure in standing on your head? 
Lessing: Don't say that, as long as I do not have to imitate it. And you will stand on your 
feet again, won't you? So if it's no mystery, I'll have to see what there is to it. 
 
Lessing went on to defend fatalism, displaying an indifference to free will.  “I notice you 
would like to have your will free,” he told Jacobi, “I desire no free will.” Faithful to 
Spinoza’s Ethics, Lessing dismissed this notion as a dispensable human fancy. Lessing 
challenged Jacobi to offer a conception of the personality of God, that differs from that 
of Leibniz, since this philosophy, in the end, boils down to Spinoza's. Jacobi admitted 
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that there is indeed a correspondence between the philosophy of Leibniz and Spinoza,97 
as Leibniz’s determinism inevitably leads to the fatalism of Spinoza. Here the dialogue 
reached a crucial point, allowing Jacobi to present his unique, proto-existentialist 
philosophy.  Having admitted the identity of Spinoza's and Leibniz's philosophy, and 
having rejected the fatalism inherent in them, Jacobi, it seemed to Lessing, was turning 
his back on all philosophy.  
 
Lessing: With your philosophy, you will have to turn your back on all philosophy. 
Jacobi: Why all philosophy? 
Lessing: Because you are a complete skeptic. 
Jacobi: On the contrary. I withdraw myself from a philosophy that makes skepticism 
necessary. 
Lessing: And withdraw yourself – where? 
Jacobi: To the light, the light Spinoza talks about when he says that it illuminates itself 
and the darkness. I love Spinoza since, more than any other philosopher, he has 
convinced me that certain things cannot be explained, and that one must not close 
one's eyes in front of them but simply accept them as one finds them... Even the 
greatest mind will hit upon absurd things when he tries to explain everything and make 
sense of it according to clear concepts. 
Lessing: And he who does not try to explain things? 
                                                
97 It was Mendelssohn who had offered the first unbiased, philosophical appraisal of Spinoza. 
There he also argued for Leibnitz’s indebtedness to Spinozism. 
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Jacobi: Whoever does not want to explain what is inconceivable but only wants to know 
the borderline where it begins: he will gain the largest space for human truth. 
Lessing: Words, dear Jacobi, mere words! The borderline you want to fix cannot be 
determined. And on the other side of it you give free rein to dreaming, nonsense and 
blindness. 
Jacobi: I believe that the borderline can be determined. I want not to draw it, but only to 
recognize what is already there. And as far as dreaming, nonsense and blindness are 
concerned ... 
Lessing: They prevail wherever confused ideas are found. 
Jacobi: More where false ones are found. Someone who has fallen in love with certain 
explanations, will blindly accept every consequence. 
 
At this point, Jacobi summarized his philosophy in a few famous lines: 
 
Jacobi: As I see it, the first task of the philosopher is to reveal, to disclose existence. 
Explanation is only a means, a way to this goal: it is the first task, but it is never the last. 
The last task is what cannot be explained: the irresolvable, immediate and simple.  
 
Mendelssohn seemed quite impressed with Jacobi’s account. In a letter to Elise and 
Johann Reimarus, he praised Jacobi and even sent him his apologies for his previous 
brusqueness. He now could see that Jacobi was one of the very few who had dedicated 
themselves to thinking. Mendelssohn went even farther: such were Jacobi's merits that 
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he could understand why Lessing wanted to confide in him. (This had been seen as 
concession, tantamount to his recognizing that he alone did not have privileged access 
to Lessing's character, although, as we shall come to see, it is doubtful Mendelssohn 
could ever have had such pretense.) Having admitted the strength of his opponent, 
Mendelssohn decided to withdraw from the fray. As he explained: “The knight he had 
challenged to combat had removed his visor; and upon seeing his worthy foe, he now 
picked up his gauntlet.” If Lessing was guilty of Spinozism, his weakness and folly 
should serve as an example, a warning to “the devotees of speculation.”   
  
After apologizing to Jacobi and withdrawing his challenge, Mendelssohn had apparently 
abandoned the struggle, and the contest over before having ever started. Jacobi was 
“completely satisfied” and took “great joy” in Mendelssohn's statement that the example 
of Lessing could serve as a warning, as Elise Reimarus wrote to Mendelssohn a month 
later (December, 1783). If Jacobi was satisfied and joyous with Mendelssohn’s reply, it 
was not only because of Mendelssohn’s recognition of his intellect and merit, warranting 
him the title of Lessing’s friend and confidant. The talk about Lessing’s views serving as 
a warning had reaffirmed Jacobi’s deepest critique of the Berlin Enlighteners, their 
readiness to compromise in philosophy. Mendelssohn seemed to be admitting that 
reason, if it were not controlled by moral and religious guidelines, would end in the 
atheism and fatalism of Spinozism. And that was the essence of what Jacobi had 




The apparent truce between Jacobi and Mendelssohn lasted for the next seven months. 
Mendelssohn’s disarming letter might have been a delaying tactic, a way of bargaining 
for time, for, as he told Elise and Johann Reimarus, he needed more time to consider 
Jacobi's position. 
 
In July, 1785, Elise Reimarus wrote to Jacobi reporting a change in Mendelssohn’s 
literary plans.  Mendelssohn had told her he will set aside the book on Lessing's 
character for a while, in order to “risk a contest with the Spinozists”. Without 
Mendelssohn’s consent, Elise Reimarus had unwittingly resounded the drums of war. 
For Jacobi, A “contest against the Spinozists” could mean only one thing: an attack 
upon Jacobi himself, who claimed that all philosophy ended in Spinozism. A month 
later, Mendelssohn wrote to Jacobi directly for the first time, sending him his objections 
to his report on Lessing's conversations. Then, in a few dramatic lines, Mendelssohn 
made his challenge: “You have thrown down the gauntlet in chivalrous fashion; I will 
pick it up; and now let us fight out our metaphysical tournament in true knightly custom.” 
Jacobi replied directly to Mendelssohn, excusing his lack to reply to the objections to ill 
health, but promising to send him a detailed reply soon, and in the meanwhile enclosing 
a copy of his ‘Lettre a Hemsterhuis,’ a mock dialogue between Spinoza and himself, 
setting forth his own interpretation of Spinoza. Jacobi added, disingenuously, that he 
knew nothing about throwing down the gauntlet. But, if Mendelssohn thought it was 




Before Jacobi's reply arrived in Berlin, Mendelssohn made a consequential decision. He 
wrote Elise Reimarus on April 29, 1785 that he intended to publish the first part of his 
book without consulting Jacobi or waiting for the reply to his objections. Mendelssohn 
was tired of waiting for Jacobi's reply, and felt that if he stated his views formally and 
clearly, he could put the whole debate on more substantial footing. Although this 
seemed to be a perfectly reasonable decision, it was a questionable move considering 
Mendelssohn's delicate relationship with Jacobi, one bound to strain the already 
weakened trust between them. Though Mendelssohn had received permission to cite 
Jacobi's report, it was still understood that he would not make any use of it before 
consulting Jacobi. It was Jacobi who was the witness of Lessing's confession, and it 
was he who provided the information in the first place. However, Mendelssohn did not 
think that his decision would break this tacit agreement. He explained to Elise Reimarus 
that he would not mention Jacobi's conversations in the first volume of his book, 
eventually published as Morgenstunden (Morning Hours). Only the second volume 
would consider them; but there was still plenty of time for Jacobi to be consulted about 
that. In this way, Mendelssohn told Reimarus, he could give a formal statement of his 
position while still keeping his promise to Jacobi. 
 
Mendelssohn in all likelihood wanted to beat Jacobi to press, to get his version of 
events in first, and protect Lessing's reputation against any damaging allegations Jacobi 
might make about Lessing's Spinozism. True to his word, Mendelssohn did not mention 
anything about Jacobi's conversations in the first volume of his book, known to us today 
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as Morning Hours. But he did include a chapter on Lessing's pantheism, where he 
attributed “a purified pantheism” to Lessing, a pantheism he did not consider detrimental 
to the truths of morality and religion, the essence of which he had developed decades 
earlier. Such a chapter was probably designed in part to preempt Jacobi and to deprive 
him of much of the shock value of his revelations about Lessing's Spinozism. There was 
another reason for his resolve to go ahead with publication, one only strengthened by 
Jacobi's reply to his objections:  it was proving impossible to argue with Jacobi. They 
were speaking different philosophical languages and there seemed to be no common 
terms for debate. It would make no difference if Jacobi saw the manuscript, as his 
criticisms would be unintelligible anyway. 
 
Only at the end of April 1785, eight months after receiving Mendelssohn's objections, 
did Jacobi send Mendelssohn a reply. But rather than engaging with Mendelssohn's 
points, Jacobi told Mendelssohn in no uncertain terms that he had missed the point, a 
judgment that outlived both opponents in the brewing battle. This was indeed no basis 
for a dialogue. In an ominous tone, Jacobi prophesized in the letter a battle, casting the 
dispute in theological terms, a war of Good against Evil: “Perhaps we will live to see the 
day when a dispute will arise over the corpse of Spinoza like that over the corpse of 
Moses between the archangel and satan.” 
 
On July 21, 1785, Mendelssohn wrote a long overdue letter to Jacobi, informing Jacobi 
of his decision to publish his book. Mendelssohn honestly and bluntly told Jacobi that he 
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found everything he wrote incomprehensible. He then stated that by publishing his book 
he would be able to establish the statum controversiae, an ambiguous and ill-chosen 
Latin phrase in this delicate context; Mendelssohn did not explain how he wanted to 
determine the state of the controversy, leaving Jacobi – who was prone to paranoia – to 
guess whether he would refer to his conversations with Lessing. He did not mention his 
intention of referring to them only in the planned second volume because he reckoned – 
rightly – that Elise Reimarus had already informed Jacobi of his detailed plans. But 
months had gone by since she had done so. By waiting so long to write Jacobi directly, 
and then leaving his plans so vague, Mendelssohn had left too many gaps to be filled by 
Jacobi's feverishly suspicious imagination. 
 
Judging by Jacobi’s reaction to the letter, he had indeed assumed the worst and 
understood Mendelssohn’s decision to go public as a flagrant violation of his trust. For 
all he knew, Mendelssohn would portray him as the advocatus diaboli, that is, as a 
simple Spinozist who knew nothing about the standpoint of faith that transcended all 
philosophy. Jacobi was furious, and would not allow Mendelssohn to preempt him. In a 
frantic haste, Jacobi patched together his own book out of his own letters to Elise 
Reimarus and Mendelssohn, Mendelssohn's letters to him and Reimarus, and the report 
of his conversations with Lessing, all embellished with quotations from Hamann, Herder, 
Lavater, and the Bible. Jacobi compiled the book in a single month, titling it Über die 
Lehre von Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn. Since Jacobi did not want 
Mendelssohn to get wind of his plans, he did not ask him for permission to publish his 
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correspondence. This was unethical, but he felt that it was fair, tit for tat, given that 
Mendelssohn had made unauthorized use of his conversations with Lessing. Jacobi's 
strategy paid off. His Briefe appeared as early as the beginning of September, while 
Mendelssohn's Morgenstunden, due to publishing delays, did not come out until the 
beginning of October. By a narrow margin, Jacobi had won the publishing race. 
 
If Jacobi was angered by Mendelssohn’s move to publish, Mendelssohn was shocked to 
the point of disbelief by Jacobi’s publication. But the fact was that Jacobi had beaten 
him to press, which had a serious consequence: he could no longer be sure that 
Morgenstunden would protect Lessing's reputation; for Morgenstunden, unlike Jacobi's 
Briefe, did not openly discuss Lessing's confession of Spinozism. Mendelssohn was 
also disgruntled with Jacobi’s unauthorized publication of his private correspondence, 
and deeply hurt by Jacobi's insinuation that there had been no philosophical rapport 
between him and Lessing. This last point was driven home by Jacobi in the cruelest 
fashion. In the beginning of his Briefe he said that he once asked Lessing whether he 
ever divulged his true philosophical convictions (his Spinozism) to Mendelssohn. 
“Never” was Lessing's answer, Jacobi claimed. 
 
With this bitter climax, the dispute had come to its tragic close. In a desperate attempt to 
wipe out the blemish on Lessing's name and defend the integrity of his friendship with 
Lessing, Mendelssohn decided to write a riposte to Jacobi's Briefe. So, during October 
and November 1785, in a grim and restless mood, Mendelssohn wrote his final 
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statement on the controversy, his An die Freunde Lessings. This brief tract was 
intended as an appendix to Morgenstunden and a replacement for the second volume 
that Mendelssohn had been planning. The heart of Mendelssohn's tract is his analysis 
of Jacobi's intentions in publishing his conversations with Lessing. According to 
Mendelssohn, Jacobi's aim was to warn people of the dangers involved in all rational 
speculation – the atheism and fatalism of Spinozism – and to lead them back to “the 
path of faith.” Jacobi held up Lessing as an example of how reason leads us astray and 
into the abyss of atheism. Mendelssohn speculated that Jacobi initiated the 
conversations with Lessing in the first place, in order to convert him to his orthodox and 
mystical version of Christianity. Lessing, Mendelssohn was convinced, saw through 
Jacobi's proselytizing zeal but was had played along for the sake of his intellectual 
amusement. Lessing always took more pleasure in seeing a false belief defended 
competently than a true belief defended incompetently. Rather than confiding his deep, 
secret beliefs to Jacobi, Lessing was merely playing along, encouraging Jacobi to 
develop his argument. By suggesting that Jacobi had been duped, Mendelssohn not 
only questioned the depth of Jacobi's friendship with Lessing, but also aimed to 
establish his superior understanding of Lessing. This interpretation of Lessing tone was 
also meant to clear Lessing's name from the accusation of that dangerous brand of 
Spinozism that would have amounted to atheism.  
 
Mendelssohn completed his An die Freunde Lessings at the end of December 1785. In 
his eagerness to be done with the whole matter, Mendelssohn decided to deliver the 
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manuscript as soon as it was completed. On December 31, 1785, a bitterly cold day in 
Berlin, Mendelssohn left his house in a rush to hand over the manuscript to his 
publisher, and in his hurry forgot his overcoat, as it turned out, a fatal mistake. Upon his 
return, he fell ill. His condition rapidly declined, and on the morning of January 4, 1786 
he died. News of Mendelssohn's death spread throughout Germany and was met with 
almost universal regret and dismay. 
 
Mendelssohn's death became the subject of a huge scandal, which is one reason why 
the pantheism controversy attracted so much public interest. The scandal arose when 
some of Mendelssohn's friends suggested, and others baldly asserted, that Jacobi was 
directly responsible for Mendelssohn's death. According to reliable reports, 
Mendelssohn was so upset by Jacobi's Briefe that his health began to deteriorate. Even 
if Jacobi were not the incidental cause of Mendelssohn's death, he certainly had created 
its essential preconditions. As one report somewhat dramatically put it: “He became a 
victim of his friendship with Lessing and died as a martyr defending the suppressed 
prerogatives of reason against fanaticism and superstition.” The pathos of 
Mendelssohn’s mourning friends, which seems today so exaggerated, may be read as 





1.4 Jacobi’s Choice: Hyper Criticism or Hypocrisy 
What was it that made the stakes seem so high, a matter of life and death, if only 
figuratively? While the tension between faith and reason was certainly not a historical 
novelty, and in the eighteenth century the intellectual forces identified with the Sturm 
und Drang, such as Hamann and Herder, had already mounted a serious critical 
challenge to the enlightenments’ faith in reason’s authority, for the purposes of this 
study the pantheism affair has a privileged status for more than accidental, historically 
contingent reason – namely, Mendelssohn’s direct involvement in it. Jacobi had 
identified Spinozism with scientific naturalism, and therefore as the only thorough 
philosophy possible, leading inevitably to fatalism and atheism. This had two significant 
consequences: it brought faith into direct conflict with reason, and it did so precisely by 
applying the instrument of critical reason, by taking philosophy at its word, and pushing 
the claims of criticism to their inevitable, logical outcome. The authoritative, precise 
knowledge of philosophers and scientists was now seen not only as insufficient for a 
meaningful life, as it was, for example, for Hamann,98 but as directly detrimental to it. 
Jacobi had pushed his readers to an existential choice: either knowledge or life, either a 
lifeless theory, subjecting human life to the blind mechanism of nature, seeking to 
ground everything but unable, ultimately, to ground even itself, or a leap of faith over the 
abyss towards a life of faith and freedom. 
                                                
98 See Beiser, The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, 16-43. Whereas 
Hamman held that faith and reason are independent of each other so that reason neither 
demonstrates nor refutes faith, Jacobi argued that reason and faith are in conflict, so that reason 
refutes faith. Thus, he said that reason, if consistent, leads to atheism. Hamann was aware of the 




In his 1786 letter on the doctrine of Spinoza, Jacobi argued that reason – if it is only 
thorough, honest, and consistent – does not support but rather undermines morality and 
religion. The core of Jacobi’s attack on reason rests on his identification of rationalism 
with a complete scientific naturalism, and more specifically with the mechanistic 
paradigm of explanation.99 Jacobi saw Spinoza as the paragon of this new scientific 
naturalism because Spinoza had banished final causes and held that everything in 
nature happens according to mechanical laws. The fundamental principle of Spinoza’s 
philosophy, Jacobi argued, is nothing less than the principle of sufficient reason. 
Spinoza is to be praised because he, unlike Leibniz and Wolff, had the courage to take 
this principle to its ultimate conclusion: a complete scientific naturalism. This principle 
means that there must be a sufficient reason for any event, such that, given that reason, 
the event must occur and cannot be otherwise. If this principle holds without exception, 
Jacobi reasoned, then there cannot be: (1) a first cause of the universe, a God who 
freely creates it, and (2) freedom, the power of doing otherwise. For Jacobi, the first 
                                                
99 I largely follow here Beiser’s account of the significance and consequence of Jacobi’s 
challenge. According to this view, the significance for Jacobi of Spinoza was in the 
uncompromising, thoroughly consistent application of the principle of sufficient reason, or PSR 
as philosophers fondly call it. See ibid., 44-91. Paul Franks emphasizes the significance of the 
negative version of the PSR in Jacobi – nothing comes from nothing. This formula has 
historically been understood as the fundamental link of Spinozism and Kabballah, or Jewish 
mysticism. It is what Jacobi draws from this negative version that Franks holds to be most 
consequential for Hegel. According to Jacobi, for Spinoza, individual things are nonentities, and 
substance is indeterminate. As indeterminate, Jacobi argues, it is also a negation, and therefore 
lacks genuine being, which is always determinate. For him, only individuals can be actual. See 
Paul. F. Franks, ‘Nothing Comes from Nothing: Judaism, the Orient, and Kabbalah in Hegel’s 
reception of Spinoza.’ In D.R. Michael, The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza. 
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result means that Spinozism leads to atheism, the second implies that it ends in 
fatalism. 
 
Jacobi’s attack had the effect of bringing the enlightenment face to face with a dramatic 
dilemma: either a rational atheism and fatalism or an irrational leap of faith, a salto 
mortale. There was no middle path, no rational justification for our most important moral 
and religious beliefs. In sum, Jacobi was saying that the search for a natural morality 
and religion is futile, and what is worse – dishonest. Since reason cannot ground itself 
rationally, its self-assertion, its claim for authority, is no better than any other irrational 
act of self-determination. In fact, it is worse, since it claims a higher ground, it pretends 
to be impartial while in fact it is as self-interested as all other claims, and equally 
groundless. Jacobi’s meta-critique, or rather hyper-criticism, has found criticism to be 
hypocritical. The existential choice between atheism and faith is, naturally, far from a 
free one. It is the choice between authentic, irrational self-assertion, and the dishonest, 
veiled claim for power and superiority based on the critically uncritical confidence in 
reason’s capacity to set its own limits, transgress them, and have absolute authority 
over all other claims. The only honest choice seems to be to reaffirm one’s ungrounded 
freedom, and the immediacy and self-evidence of all that cannot be inferentially 
grounded, including the particularity of one’s life form, namely, what is received from 
tradition.100   
                                                
100 Jacobi uses in this context the Hebrew word Kibbel, with a clear allusion to Kabbalah, the 
tradition of Jewish mysticism with which Spinoza was identified by many, including Jacobi. See 
Franks, Nothing Comes from Nothing, 7. 
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Jacobi certainly did not intend to legitimize and popularize Spinoza’s philosophy. But its 
newly gained popularity was inseparable from the new existential pathos Jacobi had 
injected into the intellectual debate. It was in the service of preventing philosophy from 
collapsing into the lifeless despair Jacobi had associated with Spinozism that Herder, 
and later Schelling and others, would turn to Spinoza. Their Spinoza, however, would 
be the exact opposite of Jacobi’s; whereas he saw Spinoza’s monism as a lifeless, 
mechanical universe, they would come to see in it a vitalist one, bursting with life. 
Before we proceed on our ‘less traveled’ path, and follow Kant’s engagement with 
Mendelssohn, it is instructive to review the philosophical considerations that made 
Mendelssohn, if not immune, than at least to a large degree indifferent to what has been 
seen as fundamentally challenging in Jacobi’s interpretation of Spinoza. In chapter 3, 
we shall address what we may for now call Mendelssohn’s theological reasons for 
refusing Jacobi’s challenge (although, as we shall see, such a classification is not 
entirely appropriate). But the fundamental difference between Jacobi’s and 
Mendelssohn’s philosophical, and existential orientations, has to do with their different 
views of contingency, and the role it plays in Spinoza.   
 
1.5 Contingencies: Mendelssohn v Jacobi on Spinoza and Contingency 
Mendelssohn’s role in the pantheism affair is, as noted above, taken in the scholarship 
to be purely an historical accident. There are two persistent themes that we have seen 
emerge in the Nihilism debate, which converge, in the context of the pantheism 
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controversy, in Jacobi’s influential interpretation of Spinoza: contingency and 
immanence. 
 
The modern world, this goes without saying, is under the sign of contingency, and as 
such is trapped within an ‘immanent frame.’ This is precisely what makes Spinoza the 
first target of Jacobi’s attacks. In offering a naturalistic frame of explanation, Spinoza 
had left no room in the world for purposive pursuits, for the spontaneity (self-causation) 
entailed in divine creation as well as in human willing.101 Such a realm of immanence is 
contingent, in the sense that we are reduced to mere observers, unable to account for 
any meaningful agency. 
 
For various reasons (to be explored in the course of this study), Mendelssohn saw no 
such threat in Spinoza. Indeed, Mendelssohn ultimately parts ways from Spinozism 
because he believes it is incapable of accounting for contingency, which he deems the 
most fundamental aspect of human reality, and which he understands quite differently 
than Jacobi. Mendelssohn notes, quite presciently, that Spinozism seems to lend itself 
just as easily to causally mechanistic accounts as it does to more vitalistic accounts,102 
                                                
101 Dieter Henrich emphasizes in his account of the Jacobi’s critique of Spinozism the 
impossibility of transition, within a closed network of reasons, between nothing and being, 
between the infinite and the finite. See D. Henrich and D.S. Pacini, Between Kant and Hegel: 
Lectures on German Idealism (Harvard University Press, 2008), 98. 
102 Moses Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, trans. Daniel. O. 
Dahlstrom and Corey. Dyck (Springer, 2011), 84. Spinozism is a “two-headed Hydra… one of 
these heads bears the heading: Everything is one; the other: One is everything.” That is why, 




as indeed would be championed by Herder and later Schelling. More importantly, it fails 
to account for contingency. 
 
Mendelssohn distinguishes between two senses of the contingent. What we call 
‘accident,’ he says, aims to cancel intentional, final causes. What we call ‘chance’ is 
more radical, as it aims to cancel efficient causes as well. This sense of contingency 
emerges on the plane of history, rather than nature, and may indeed be what 
distinguishes the two. We shall return to this second sense of contingency and its link to 
history in chapter 4. 
 
Through the use of ‘accident’ we want merely to cancel the influence of final 
causes on the entity acting, and through the use of ‘chance’ we want solely to 
cancel the immediate effect of events upon one another, without denying that 
each of these events depends on its own series of causes. Of course, only for 
historical truths, for ‘news,’ as we call it, is the conditioning of events itself 
ascribed to chance. Things that take place only a single time in the course of 
history and perhaps may never or at least never under the same circumstances 
recur, can join together without being immediately brought forth, or even only 
occasioned, by one another.103 
 
                                                
103 Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 66. Compare with Althusser’s 




Mendelssohn begins his discussion of contingency in the context of Epicureanism and 
ends it in the context of his reply to Lessing’s (refined) Spinozism. He first notes that in 
Hebrew, which was his first philosophical language, there is no word for contingency, 
and the word used to translate it carries almost the opposite meaning, that of a happy 
encounter, a mark of providence.104  While in the early stages of his discussion 
Mendelssohn seems to subscribe to the view that contingency is ultimately an 
illusion,105 arising from the limits of our finite (in Kantian terms, discursive) intellect, he 
breaks with this view on a decisive point. Contingency, he argues, cannot be grasped in 
its conceptual opposition to the necessary, for such an opposition ‘reifies’ contingency 
itself, and thus makes it ‘pass into its opposite,’ to use an appropriate Hegelian 
anachronism, and become itself necessary. 
 
The contingent being is not on hand on account of the fact that its dependence 
on a necessary being makes the opposite unthinkable, for then it would, indeed, 
have to be necessary and immutable itself. What follows in a necessary way from 
a necessary truth must itself be necessary. Thus, the reason for a contingent 
being’s existence or its dependence upon the necessary cannot be found in its 
property of being an object of knowledge. If this were the case, then it would not 
itself come to actuality merely somewhere and at some time, but instead would 
                                                
104 Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 65. Mendelssohn probably had 
in mind the Hebrew word mizdamen, which is a reflexive form of the root zmn, which means 
time, and carries in its semantic horizon the sense of invitation of summoning, as well as chance 
occurrence. 
105 For an historical account of contingency, focused on it being an illusion, see I. Hacking, The 
Taming of Chance (Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
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necessarily remain immutably the same for all time; for, as an object of 
knowledge, it is immutable and eternal. Its dependence upon a necessary being 
will therefore have to be sought rather in the fact that it has become an object of 
the faculty of approval.106 
 
Mendelssohn’s appeal here to God’s volition seems to immediately position him on the 
side of tradition. But that should not make us overlook his reasoning, which is anything 
but ‘old news.’ The core of Mendelssohn’s argument lies in the insight that the notion of 
contingent existence does not rise from its abstract opposition to necessary being, nor 
is it explained through it, but is conceptually linked rather to the self-limitation of the 
necessary being – not to the knowledge of God, but to his act of will. Mendelssohn’s 
turn to God here is not a frightened escape from the abyss of contingency, but an 
attempt rather to save the phenomenon, so to speak. God’s will here is not a deus ex 
machina solution to put a stop to philosophical and existential anxieties, but rather an 
attempt to account, on both a conceptual and existential level, for our sense of reality as 
profoundly, fundamentally contingent. 
 
This becomes clear in Mendelssohn’s rejection of the ‘refined’ Spinozism he attributes 
to Lessing. Mendelssohn’s notion of refined Spinozism is the idea that the Spinozistic 
ontological picture is plausible (and, in the context of the pantheism controversy, not a 
threat to morality and religion) as a picture of the ideal existence in God’s mind, the 
                                                
106 Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 70. 
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world as a realm of non-actualized potentiality. It should not be taken as a mere 
exercise in apologetics, an attempt to ‘smooth over’ the scandal of (Lessing’s) 
Spinozism, as it is commonly conceived, but rather as expressing some of 
Mendelssohn’s most profound metaphysical and existential insights. For what the 
Spinozist deus sive natura cannot account for, according to Mendelssohn, is precisely 
contingency. Knowing ourselves to be contingent is, for Mendelssohn, the fundamental 
human experience. Contingency, Mendelssohn believes, is to be understood not as a 
mechanical, causal determinacy, but as ‘falling short’ of the ideal, the sense that things 
could, and should, be perfected, actualized and articulated.107 Falling short of the ideal 
reality that is in God means for Mendelssohn that contingent reality is under-
determined, not fully actualized and articulated, as it is in God’s mind. It is the gap 
between the ideal and the real that Mendelssohn takes to be fundamental; the world we 
inhabit, in its actuality, is ‘the best,’ in a very specific, paradoxical sense – in that it can 
be better. And it is precisely in this, in reality ‘falling short’ of the ideal, failing to rise to 
(its own) notion, that Mendelssohn sees divine providence – God has left room for 
improvement, for perfection. 
 
It is in light of his view of contingency that, as we shall see, Mendelssohn’s idea and 
experience of God do not fall easily under the rubrics of immanence or transcendence. 
For Mendelssohn, God’s transcendence is not understood as his existing outside me, or 
                                                
107 Boehm advances a similar argument as to the meaning of contingency as a possibble Kantian 
rebuttle of Spinozism, one however, never explicitly formulated by Kant himself. See Boehm, 
Kant’s Critique of Spinozism, 174-183.  
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outside the world, but rather, in preventing the earthly world, the plane of immanence, 
from closing in on itself entirely. This uniquely Mendelssohnian view comes to light most 




1.6 Reorientation: Kant as a Reader of Mendelssohn 
As the scandal was unfolding, Kant was pressured to take sides.108 Both parties had 
expected his support, and actively attempted to enlist him to their cause. He was finally 
persuaded to participate and address the core issue: not the correct interpretation of 
Spinoza but the relation of knowledge and faith, truth and reason.109 
 
Kant’s intervention in the controversy is contained in his essay ‘What is Orientation in 
Thinking?’ and has received, outside the context of the controversy, fragmentary yet 
privileged treatment by the likes of Heidegger,110 Lyotard111 and Derrida,112 and this is 
perhaps because it seems to offer a certain snapshot of the Kantian critical enterprise in 
                                                
108 See Beiser, The Fate of Reason : German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, 113-26. See also 
Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, 685, 705-7, 50-2. 
109 See Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, 751. 
110 M. Heidegger and J. Stambaugh, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein Und Zeit (State 
University of New York Press, 1996), 101-2. 
111 J.F. Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime: Kant's Critique of Judgment, [Sections] 
23-29 (Stanford University Press, 1994). 
112 J. Derrida and G. Bennington, The Beast and the Sovereign, 2 vols., vol. II (University of 
Chicago Press, 2011), 60-73. 
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becoming.113 While written before the publication of the second and third critiques, 
readers familiar with the Kantian enterprise are struck by its “extemporaneity” – one can 
clearly see not only the germs of the ensuing critiques but also their systematic 
relations. Since we will not be able to treat this fully here, we shall only mark that not 
only does the text address directly the relation of the theoretical and practical or moral 
realms, i.e., the subject matters of the first and second critiques,114 it also touches upon 
issues that Kant will deal with in the third: the purposiveness of nature, the notion of an 
archetypical being or intellect, and common sense. 
 
Kant develops in the essay an account of how the theoretical and practical realms are to 
be articulated from the critical, transcendental point of view. It is his first attempt to show 
that the limitations imposed upon human cognition by his transcendental philosophy in 
fact make room for a belief that is, nevertheless, by no means exempt from the criticism 
of reason, and is rather a ‘rational faith.’ 
 
                                                
113 More recently, two ambitious, and to some extent opposing interpretations of Kant have put a 
lot of emphasis on Kant’s ‘Orientation’ essay. See, firstly, A. Nuzzo, Ideal Embodiment: Kant's 
Theory of Sensibility (Indiana University Press, 2008), 131-45. And secondly, A. Goldman, Kant 
and the Subject of Critique: On the Regulative Role of the Psychological Idea (Indiana 
University Press, 2012), 158-86. For Nuzzo, ‘Orientation’ provides ground to argue for the 
essential embodiment of the Kantian subject, inclusive of its practical pursuits, i.e., in the 
supersensible domain of freedom, whereas for Goldman, ‘Orientation’ serves to argue for a 
privileged, retroactive and semi-constituent role played by the psychological idea, i.e., the 
unified subject which is beyond sensible experience in the Kantian critique. 
114 Kant had published his Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, just a year prior, in 1785, 
but would not publish the second critique until 1788, and the third until 1790. 
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From the standpoint of intellectual history, in light of the influence that Jacobi’s 
challenge has evidently had on post-Kantian philosophy, it is usually taken for granted 
that herein lies Kant’s response to that very same challenge. And yet, as we shall 
argue, that does not seem to be the case. Kant, we shall see, is much more engaged 
with Mendelssohn’s intervention than with Jacobi’s challenge, and we shall take 
advantage of his perspicuity to provide us with an orientation for our reading of 
Mendelssohn in the next section. 
 
Before we take up a closer reading of Kant’s intervention, however, some preliminary 
clarifications are in order. To begin with, Kant’s critical philosophy had been configured 
in the first critique as a response to both skeptics and dogmatists, indeed, as the only 
way out of the deadlock between them. For Kant, skepticism arises because of 
dogmatism; dogmatists go too far, assume too much, to which skeptics react with a 
doubt that turns out to be no less dogmatic. A naïve or dogmatic empiricist like Locke 
leads to the skepticism of a Hume. Though a simplification, we can say that Kant’s 
critical, or transcendental philosophy is closer to the theoretical orientation of the 
skeptics (it is famously Hume who woke him from his dogmatic slumber) and to the 
practical orientation, the aim and purpose of the dogmatists. Critical reason should align 
itself with the radical doubts of the skeptic and put our knowledge under the harshest 
scrutiny, but do so in order to secure knowledge and experience. The Kantian 
breakthrough lies in seeing the critical limitations of our capacities of knowledge as 
productive. What both skeptics and dogmatists fail to acknowledge is that the critical 
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examination and limitation of our ways of knowing is the only way to yield and secure 
knowledge. 
 
As we shall see, Kant is faithful to this strategy in his essay on orientation in thinking. 
He will aim to show that the dogmatist, Mendelssohn, while well intentioned, had 
assumed too much, and thus his position inevitably leads to that of the skeptic. Setting 
aside for the moment the correctness of this appraisal, a question arises as to its 
suitability to the challenge at hand. For what is at stake is not the possibility of 
theoretical knowledge taken in isolation, but the charge that theoretical knowledge as 
such, if only thorough and consistent, is destructive, and leaves no room for freedom 
and God. In other words, while Hume’s skepticism did not commit him to nihilistic 
consequences, our ‘skeptic’ here, namely Jacobi, is not one who claims we cannot 
know but rather that, if we realize what our knowledge amounts to, we cannot want to 
know. Indeed, we cannot want at all, or rather, our knowledge would not be able to 
account for our spontaneous, subjective position as free agents. Kant seems not at all 
impressed by Jacobi’s challenge. Kant’s third antinomy in the first critique had forcefully 
shown that freedom and a causally determinate nature are incompatible; but that had 
just marked the limits of our understanding, of what we can theoretically know, and did 
not amount to a positive claim as to the reality of either opposing claims. From the 
position of practical, ethical reason, for Kant Jacobi’s position amounts to an 
endorsement of heteronomy, the subjection of our will to pathological motivations, and 
thus, the very opposite of freedom as Kant understands it, namely autonomy, a self-
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subscripted legislation, a submission to one’s reason alone. In short, Jacobi’s position 
does not pose a philosophical challenge, in Kant’s estimation. His engagement with 
Mendelssohn’s position, on the other hand, is far more extensive and complex. It is in 
Mendelssohn that he finds both the “material” to be worked out conceptually and, we 
shall argue, a philosophical challenge, albeit one that he does not fully respond to. 
 
 
1.7 The Figurative: Mediating Intelligibility and Sensibility 
In the essay, Kant aims to show that the limitation of our knowledge of empirical 
experience, of the sensible, is what opens up the space for the proper relation to the 
supersensible. He does so by taking up a figure of thought from Mendelssohn’s Morning 
Hours – the figure of orientation in thinking – and its related theme, the idea of common 
sense. 
 
However exalted we may wish our concepts to be, and however abstract we may 
make them in relation to the realm of the senses, they will continue to be 
associated with figurative notions. The proper function of these is to make such 
concepts, which are not in other respects derived from experience, suitable for 
use in the experiential world. For how else could we endow our concepts with 
sense and significance if we did not attach to them some intuition (which must 
ultimately always be an example derived from some possible experience)?115 
                                                
115 ‘What Is Orientation in Thinking?’ in I. Kant and H.S. Reiss, Kant: Political Writings 




Kant takes this meditation on the figure of thought as an opportunity to account for the 
role of the figurative in critical thinking. The primary function of the figurative, to which 
he eludes here, is that of schematism, that is, of mediating between the realms of the 
sensible and the intellectual, which Kant had severed.116 Building on this fundamental 
(transcendental) cognitive function, of mediation between the sensible and the 
intellectual, everyday figurative language, always rich with and bound to spatio-
temporal, empirically specific features, is shown to be necessary for the illumination of 
concepts for which we in principle have no adequate representation, that is, ideas. 
                                                
116 Transcendental idealism, in assigning a constitutive role to human cognition, breaks with both 
traditional empiricism and Idealism. While cognition in general is deemed synthetic, in the sense 
that it is the product of both the intellect and sensibility, the two realms or dimensions must first 
be radically separated. It is the failure to first properly distinguish these realms, by means of the 
transcendental reflection on the conditions of possibility, that is the fundamental mistake (or the 
source of the profound confusion, amphiboly) shared by the two dogmatic schools. As Kant 
famously put it, the idealists’ mistake is that they “intellectualize the senses” and the empiricists’ 
mistake that they “sensualize the intellect.” One can discern two opposing lines of critique 
charged against Kant, stemming from this double gesture of severing and uniting intelligibility 
and sensibility. From Hamann to Heidegger, Kant’s severing of the two domains is seen as a 
philosophical abstraction, disregarding the pre-philosophical unity in which they are given to us 
in the concrete totality of our life forms. See Johann Georg Hamann ‘Metacritique of the Purism 
of Reason,’ in G.G. Dickson, Johann Georg Hamann's Relational Metacriticism (De Gruyter, 
1995), 517-34.  For Heidegger, Kant “shrank back” from the investigation of the common root of 
intelligibility and sensibility that he had initiated. Heidegger sees their common root in Kant’s 
transcendental imagination. See M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Indiana 
University Press, 1997), 112-20. Already in Faith and Knowledge, Hegel also criticizes Kant for 
failing to realize his own accomplishment in his doctrine of transcendental imagination as 
mediating the heterogeneous domains of sensibility and understanding. But for Hegel, Kant’s 
problem is that he had remained too empirical, that he “shrank back,” as it were, from his own 
insight as to how overcome the finitude of cognition. See G.W.F. Hegel, H.S. Harris, and W. 
Cerf, Hegel: Faith and Knowledge: An English Translation of G. W. F. Hegel's Glauben und 
Wissen (State University of New York Press, 1988). For a succinct discussion of Hegel’s critique 
of Kant along these lines see Goldman, Kant and the Subject of Critique: On the Regulative Role 




If we then subtract the figurative associations from this concrete act of the 
understanding – first those of fortuitous sense-perception, and then the pure 
sensuous intuition itself – we are left with the pure concept of the understanding, 
but with its scope now enlarged so as to constitute a complete rule of thought… 
and in the application of our understanding and reason there may still lie hidden 
certain heuristic methods of thought which, if we could carefully extract them 
from experience, might well enrich philosophy with a useful maxim, even in 
abstract thought.117 
 
Therein lies the heart of the Kantian promise, and the possible answer to both skeptics 
and dogmatists: a careful examination of (the conditions of) our experience can not only 
secure the validity of experience, but it can also be the source of maxims to guide our 
use of reason beyond the confines of experience. If we rigorously examine what it is 
that we do in understanding, that is, if we discover the rules that govern and set limits to 
our experience (constitutive, transcendental – the rules without which there would be no 
experience) we can extract (a different kind of) rules that will help guide us in our 
abstract theoretical and, more importantly, in our practical, moral thought, valid even in 
the absence of experiential material to rely on. And it is in this context that Kant 
declares his qualified, critical, allegiance with Mendelssohn in the debate: 
 
                                                
117 Kant and Reiss, Kant: Political Writings, 237. 
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To this category [of useful maxims for abstract thought] belongs that principle to 
which the late Moses Mendelssohn expressly declared his allegiance – but only, 
so far as I know, in his last writings [i.e. Morning Hours]… namely, the maxim 
that it is necessary to orientate oneself in the speculative use of reason [which 
Mendelssohn, on other occasions, credited with considerable powers of cognition 
of supra sensory objects, and even with the power of conclusive proof] by means 
of a certain guideline which he sometimes [namely, in Morning Hours] described 
as common sense, sometimes as healthy reason and sometimes as plain 
understanding. Who would have thought that his admission would not only have 
such disastrous effects on his favorable opinion of the power of speculative 
reasoning in theological matters (which was in fact inevitable) but also that even 
ordinary healthy reason, given the ambiguous position to which he relegated the 
use of this faculty in contrast to speculation, would risk becoming the basic 
principle of zealotry and of the complete subversion of reason? And yet, this is 
what happened in the controversy between Mendelssohn and Jacobi, particularly 
as the result of the important conclusions reached by the perceptive author of the 
Resultate.118 
 
Kant is here referring to and relying on an essay published by Thomas Wizenmann (at 
the time anonymously),119 which argues that in allowing common sense to instruct 
                                                
118 Ibid., 237-8. 
119 See Beiser, The Fate of Reason : German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte, 109-13. For a 
different view, highlighting the difference between Jacobi’s and Mendelssohn’s views of 
common sense, see Paul Franks, ‘Divided by common sense: Mendelssohn and Jacobi on Reason 
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reason, as Mendelssohn seems to do in his Morning Hours, he had already conceded 
the main point of the debate to Jacobi, who utilized an expansive notion of common 
sense, as entirely authoritative over the claims of speculative, or inferential reason. 
Jacobi had indifferently appealed to the authority of both Thomas Reid and David Hume 
to justify his use of “faith” (Glaube),120 our intuitive confidence in the objectivity of the 
given. As Wizenmann, and following him Kant, saw it, Mendelssohn, who had sought to 
secure the authority of reason by putting a stop to its aimless wandering, had appealed 
to the very same sub-rational faculty that allowed Jacobi to dethrone reason. We shall 
attend to Mendelssohn’s anything-but-commonsensical notion of common sense in the 
next chapter. For now, let us continue to be guided by Kant. 
 
 
1.8 Common Sense: The Dogmatic Error 
Mendelssohn, Kant suggests, was on the right track in arguing that speculative reason 
needs to be orientated, but, in the ambiguous relation he established between common 
sense and reason, in violating the strict autonomy of reason, he had made himself, 
unwittingly, an ally to Jacobi’s irrationalism. Mendelssohn needed to be rescued from 
himself. While supplying some useful if vague coordinates for thinking, he has both 
limited reason too much and given it too free a reign. This is what happens if we do not 
                                                
and Inferential Justification.’ In Munk, Moses Mendelssohn's Metaphysics and Aesthetics, 203-
16. 
120 For Jacobi, sense perceptions are “apprehensions,” that is, they take hold of an object and are 
judgment-like events, implicitly rational from the beginning. See George Di Giovanni, ‘Hume, 
Jacobi, and common sense: an episode in the reception of Hume in Germany at the time of 
Kant,’ Kant-Studien, 89 (1998), 44–58, 47, 53. 
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first critically determine the limits of knowledge. Nonetheless, Kant argues, the solution 
is to be found along Mendelssohn’s path. 
 
I shall also show that it was in fact reason alone which Mendelssohn 
recommended as a necessary means of orientation – not a supposed sense of 
truth of a mysterious kind or an effusive intuition in the name of faith to which 
tradition or revelation can be grafted on without the consent of reason, but as he 
staunchly affirmed with righteous fervor, human reason pure and simple. But if 
this is so, the latter can no longer make lofty claims for its speculative powers, or 
claim in particular that they possess exclusive authority as the means of 
demonstration; and in so far as it is speculative in character, it will be left with the 
sole function of purging the ordinary concept of reason of contradictions, and of 
defending the maxims of healthy reason against the sophistical attacks of 
speculative reason itself… if the concept of orientation is extended and defined 
more precisely, it may help us to cast light on the various ways in which the 
maxim of healthy reason is applied to the cognition of supra-sensory objects.121 
 
By appealing to healthy reason or common sense, Mendelssohn could surely not mean 
for anything but reason alone to act as guide, and Kant will proceed to develop the 
notion along those lines. The concept of reason that will result will be more suitable to 
offer guidance, but as a result suffers some severe limitations as to its speculative 
                                                
121 Kant and Reiss, Kant: Political Writings, 238. 
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pretensions. Kant then proceeds along a much more careful path than the one taken by 
Mendelssohn. He first defines orientation according to its most basic, ordinary usage – 
geographic orientation, and then gradually “climbs up the ladder” of abstraction. 
 
To orientate oneself, in the proper sense of the word, means to use a given 
direction – and we divide the horizon to four of these – in order to find the others, 
and in particular, that of sunrise. If I see the sky in the sun and know that it is now 
midday, I know how to find south, west, north and east. For this purpose, 
however, I must necessarily be able to feel a difference within my own subject, 
namely that between my right and left hands. I call this a feeling because these 
two sides display no perceptible difference as far as external intuition is 
concerned. I orientate myself geographically purely by means of a subjective 
distinction; and if all the constellations, while in other respects retaining the same 
shape and the same position in relation to each other, were one day miraculously 
transposed so that their former easterly direction now became west, no human 
eye would notice the slightest change on the next clear night…122 
 
There is here, at the zero level of the figure’s signification, not only a figurative allusion 
to but also, in a nutshell, the basic coordinates of the Kantian Copernican revolution, the 
reorientation of philosophical inquiry to the subjective, a priori conditions of experience: 
                                                
122 Ibid., 239. 
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without a purely subjective contribution, something that cannot be attributed to the world 
outside us,123 there would be no such ordered world to begin with.124 
 
 
1.9 The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Supersensible: How to Get There, Where to Go, and 
What to Do 
Gradually, Kant “turns off the lights,” leading us from orientation in the sensible world to 
the darkness of the supersensible. 
 
I can now extend this geographical concept… to signify any kind of orientation 
within a given space, i.e., ...in a purely mathematical sense. In the darkness, I 
can orientate myself in a familiar room so long as I can touch any one object 
whose position I remember… finally, I can extend this concept even further if I 
equate it with the ability to orientate oneself not just in space… but also in 
thought, i.e., logically. It is easy to guess by analogy that this will be the means 
whereby pure reason regulates its use when, taking leave of known objects (of 
                                                
123 Nuzzo offers extensive context for Kant’s usage of incongruity in his pre-critical and critical 
writings. See Nuzzo, Ideal Embodiment: Kant's Theory of Sensibility, 23-6, 32-40, 50-1, 68, 133. 
124 Heidegger’s criticism of Kant in Being and Time harks on this point precisely. What Kant 
calls orientation is in fact a reorientation. Kant presupposes a conception of space as the domain 
of objects ‘out there’ as fundamental. In positing an external standpoint, in which the subject 
seeks orientation in a world that stands, as it were, in front of him, he neglects or disregards our 
always already being-in-the-world, our prior, pre-philosophical, everyday familiarity with the 
world around us and the objects in it, what Heidegger calls our “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) into 
a world of meanings, in which our possibilities of action are manifest. A prior involvement 
which alone allows for the reorientation, which Kant takes as his starting point. We have been in 
the room, “dwelled” in it, before the lights were turned off, so to speak. See Heidegger and 
Stambaugh, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, 101-2. 
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experience), it seeks to extend its sphere beyond the frontiers of experience and 
no longer encounters any objects of intuition whatsoever, but merely a space for 
the latter to operate in. It will then no longer be in a position, in determining its 
own faculty of judgment, to subsume its judgments under a specific maxim with 
the help of objective criteria of knowledge, but only with the help of a subjective 
distinction. This subjective means which still remains available to it is simply the 
feeling of a need which is inherent in reason itself. It is possible to remain secure 
against all error if one does not venture to pass judgement in cases where one’s 
knowledge is insufficient for the judgment in question. Consequently, while 
ignorance is in itself the cause of the limits of our knowledge, it is not the cause 
of the errors within it.125 
 
We can only know what experience permits us to know. Our knowledge is limited to the 
sensible world, but this in itself does not undermine it, only the haphazard transgression 
of these limits leads to error. Reason has thus far led us to recognize the limits of our 
knowledge. From this point on, although we depart from knowledge, we are not leaping 
into blind faith. Beyond the limits of knowledge, reason can still think, and it is in fact 
only here that its function as a guide assumes its full significance. From this point on, 
beyond knowledge, reason’s proper function is strictly regulative. 
 
                                                
125 Kant and Reiss, Kant: Political Writings, 239-40. 
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But if it is not just a matter of indifference whether one wishes to make a definite 
judgement on something or not, if this judgement is made necessary by a real 
need (in fact by a need which reason imposes on itself), and if we are at the 
same time limited by lack of knowledge in respect of factors essential to the 
judgment, we require a maxim in light of which this judgment can be passed; for 
Reason, must sooner or later be satisfied. But if it has been established in 
advance that no intuition of the object is possible here, and that it is not even 
possible to find something of a similar kind which might enable us to provide our 
extended concepts [of the object in question] with a representation appropriate to 
them and hence also with a guarantee of their own real possibility, only two 
further steps remain to be taken. Firstly, we must carefully examine whether the 
concept with which we wish to venture beyond all possible experience is itself 
free from contradiction; and secondly, we must reduce at least the relationship 
between the object in question and the objects of experience to pure concepts of 
the understanding. In so doing, we certainly do not turn the object into an object 
of the senses; but we do at least think of something which is itself supra-sensory 
as capable of being applied by our reason to the world of experience. Without 
these precautions, we would be unable to make any use whatsoever of such a 
concept, and would indulge in fantasy instead of thinking.126 
 
                                                
126 Ibid., 240. 
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Taking measured, precise steps, guided by the figure of orientation, has allowed Kant to 
open up a space of thinking beyond the limits of experience. It is a dark, empty space, 
abstracted even from space itself. But how is thinking to take even one step in such 
utter darkness? With analogy to the feeling of right and left, reason, devoid of the 
experiential material of the senses, can use its own special need – special, in that it is 
self-imposed – as a compass. But what is this need of reason? It cannot be a 
psychological need, for, in Kantian terminology, that would merely be an inclination, a 
pathologically (causally determined) induced, impulse. The need Kant is addressing 
here must in some sense be rational, belong to reason itself. Reason needs unity, it 
aims at totality.127 This is what causes the historical errors of reason, its inherent need 
to grasp the totality. This need cannot be satisfied in the theoretical realm, since totality 
and unity are not objects of experience. Reason cannot know the absolute; but this 
need for the absolute, denied for theoretical knowledge, is permissible, even necessary, 
in the practical realm. We may say that for Kant, reason has a problematical but not 
unreasonable need to move beyond the confines of understanding. The principle of 
healthy reason, or common sense, has the negative function of shepherding away idle 
speculation. The issue for Kant, however, will not be merely to deny reason’s need, but 
rather to find the terrain and the conditions for its satisfaction. Reason is to be denied 
                                                
127 For an exposition of reason’s demand for unity see Stephan Engstrom’s introduction to I. Kant 
and L.W. Beck, Critique of Practical Reason (Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), xv-Iiii. 
See also S.P. Engstrom, The Form of Practical Knowledge (Harvard University Press, 2009). 
Dieter Henrich speaks of the primacy of unity over being as what distinguishes between the 
platonic and Aristotelian traditions. It is the former idea, the issue of unity, which he calls 
henology, that he finds crucial for understanding the philosophy of the period. Henrich and 
Pacini, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on German Idealism, 85-92, 96-7. 
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this need in the realm of theoretical knowledge, since in looking for it there it can only 
find its own phantasy, what it projects there. 
 
Since objects of the senses do not exhaust the entire field of possibility, it is possible to 
think of various things in the supra-sensory world, even if reason feels no need to 
extend its scope to include them, let alone assume that they exist. Reason finds enough 
to do with those causes within the world that reveal themselves to the senses without 
needing to concern itself with the influence of beings of a purely spiritual nature; on the 
contrary, to assume such an influence would hinder its operations. For since we know 
nothing of the laws by which such beings may operate, whereas we know – or can at 
least hope to discover – a great deal about the former (i.e. the objects of the senses), a 
presupposition of this kind would in fact undermine the use of reason. To search for 
such influences, or to play with such imaginings, is therefore not a need at all, but 
merely a kind of inquisitiveness which leads only to empty dreaming.128 
 
In steering reason away from such idle activity, the path is cleared to the positive 
function of the principle of common sense, which is to supply reason with the faith it 
requires in pursuing its aims. Kant has not only sharply divided the sensible from the 
intellectual; he has also sharply divided the theoretical from the practical. We can only 
attribute existence to what is present, or at least can be represented by our senses and 
our a priori conditions of experience. But this, for Kant, does not amount to denying 
                                                
128 Kant and Reiss, Kant: Political Writings, 241. 
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altogether the realms of supersensible objects such as God, or the soul. Such objects 
remain thinkable, and in some sense, indispensable. Their proper status only comes to 
light once we deny them as objects of cognition. While speculating as to the nature of 
the spiritual world is ‘empty dreaming,’ the concept of some such beings, far from an 
idle play of the imagination, is not only permissible but, indeed, fulfills a profound need 
of reason. Such ideas, however, must not only be devoid of contradiction, that is, 
thinkable, but must be fully in accord with our empirical use of the understanding lest 
our efforts at thought divulge into enthusiasm. 
 
But it is quite a different matter with the concept of an original archetypical being, 
both as the supreme intelligence and as the highest good. For not only does 
reason itself feel a need to make the concept of the unlimited the basis of the 
concept of everything limited – and hence all other things, this need in fact also 
extends to the assumption that the unlimited exists, for without this assumption, 
our reason can find no satisfactory basis for the contingent existence of worldly 
things, let alone for the purposiveness and order which are evident to such a 
remarkable degree in everything (in the small even more than in the large, since 
the former is closer to us). Without the assumption of an intelligent creator, no 
explanation can be given for this circumstance – or at least no intelligible 
explanation – without falling into complete absurdities; and even if we cannot 
prove that this purposiveness is impossible without an intelligent first cause – for 
we would in that case have sufficient objective grounds for this assertion and 
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would have no need to appeal to subjective ones – we are still, despite our lack 
of insight, subjectively justified in assuming that this is so because reason needs 
to make this assumption. That is, in order to explain the phenomenon in 
question, reason needs to presuppose something which it can understand: for 
nothing else to which it can attach a concept is able to remedy this need.129 
 
This argument is only fully developed in the third critique, but the core idea is here 
already present in the essay on orientation in thought. Regulative ideas, in the 
(practical) service of theoretical knowledge, are justified by reason; reason must 
assume the concord of its sought-out objects with its ways of knowing. That is, it must 
assume the intelligibility of that which it investigates, i.e., nature, even though it cannot 
know in advance that it is in fact intelligible, that is, suitable for our ways of knowing.130 
 
Readers familiar with Kant’s critical enterprise will recognize in this passage not only the 
germ but also the systematic interconnectedness of the elements to be developed in his 
second and third critique. As Kant would go on to argue in these two critiques, the 
concept of God is ultimately necessary, not only for the interests of morality, to make 
freedom possible, as it were, but also for the interests of the empirical study of nature, 
                                                
129 Ibid., 241-2. 
130 As Kant will go on to argue in the third critique, not only the phenomenon of living nature 
brings to mind a certain teleology, but also, the very concept of nature presupposed by empirical 
research relies on at least the possibility of the multitude of empirical laws cohering under the 
unity of the concept of nature. Such an order within diversity seems to follow a teleological, 
purposive, or part/whole logic. But since purpose is not a category of the understanding, the 
investigation of nature must not assume its purposive structure, only behave as if it had one. 
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i.e., to make the concept of nature (as knowable by us) possible. While we cannot here 
go into the details of the arguments later developed in the ensuing critiques, it is 
worthwhile noting that these developments are here, in a long and difficult footnote, 
explicitly connected to Mendelssohn’s original proof for the existence of God in his 
Morning Hours – a proof in which Kant took a great deal of interest and which we will 
address in chapter two. Before we move on to Mendelssohn, however, let us conclude 
our reading of Kant’s essay. 
 
The need of reason, Kant continues, can be regarded as “twofold in character.” It has a 
theoretical use and a practical use. The first, which we have just discussed,   
is merely conditional – that is, we must assume that God exists “if” we are interested in 
judging, if we are to conceive of the systematic unity of empirical laws, and so view 
nature as teleological. Passing judgment on such affairs is the special interest of the 
peculiar animal that is the speculative philosopher. Not everybody is concerned with 
thematizing the relation of the sensible and the super sensible. The practical use is 
much more important, and indeed, “unconditioned,” because in our moral lives “we must 
pass judgment.” Here, in our moral life, we need the idea of a supreme intelligence to 
confer “objective reality” on the idea of the “highest good,” understood as the 
“proportional distribution of happiness to morality,” that is, divine justice and retribution, 
or providence. This is necessary in order to prevent the “highest good,” and along with it 
morality as a whole, from being seen as merely ideal.131 
                                                




God, the highest good (for freedom Kant reserves the status of a fact of reason) is an 
idea without which reason would have no guidance, no compass, in its most important 
pursuits. Kant terms such necessary presuppositions, responsive to the need of reason, 
‘rational beliefs.’ They are distinguished from dogmatic beliefs in that they do not claim 
insight. That is, they are beliefs, properly distinguished from knowledge, in that they do 
not claim anything about their objects apart from indispensability for the practical 
pursuits of reason, in its theoretical and more importantly, in its practical use. 
 
Kant goes on to suggest that in order to be guided by reason in either the theoretical or 
practical realms, we do not need to be explicitly aware of the role that such 
metaphysical ideas play in our judgment. The person “who has common but (morally) 
healthy reason can use it to plan his course, for both practical and theoretical 
purposes.”132 And the speculative philosopher can use such rational beliefs to “orientate 
himself on his rational wanderings in the field of super sensory objects.” But Kant says 
little in this essay about how speculative orientation takes place, or how our 
commitment to such metaphysical pursuits offers us such a “signpost.” 
 
 
                                                
132 Ibid., 245. 
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1.10 Rational Beliefs: How to Believe Without Believing 
To recap, the healthy use of reason or common sense is charged with providing 
guidance to reason in both its theoretical and practical pursuits. In theoretical pursuits, it 
has a negative and positive role; it is to steer reason away from idle speculation, that is, 
from seeking knowledge beyond the sensible realm, and, in its ‘wandering’ in the 
supersensible, it is to supply reason with the presuppositions that are useful and 
necessary for its advancement. Here it is to provide (moderate) uplift and 
encouragement, rather than strictures and limitations. In the practical realm, the maxim 
of common sense or healthy reason offers the same positive encouragement as it does 
the philosopher in his speculative pursuits, only here this service is absolutely 
indispensable for it is not a privileged activity, of interest to some, but something we all 
must engage in. 
 
Despite the conceptual rigor displayed by Kant, here as elsewhere, the main ideas 
developed – rational belief and common sense – remain rather elusive. Kant’s critical 
achievement in the first critique is hard to deny; there is a striking, fundamental, 
difference between the critical and the dogmatic, or pre-critical position when it comes 
to claims of knowledge. After the transcendental critique, all metaphysical claims – 
claims about reality in itself, and the existence of anything beyond the limits of our 
experience – are to be treated with extreme suspicion, if not direct dismissal. Kant has 
definitely secured a potion that is neither skeptical nor dogmatic. But this difference, and 
much of Kant’s achievement, is to a large extent eroded here. On the one hand, the 
difference between asserting a ‘rational belief,’ say, in the existence of God, that is, 
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arguing for it being a proposition necessary for the use of reason, and the dogmatic 
assertion of such an existence, is not a huge one; the critical position articulated here is 
definitely not oceans apart from the dogmatic position. Considering Kant’s suggestion, 
that such ‘rational beliefs’ may function properly and effectively without an explicit 
understanding as to their ontological status as merely regulative, as in the case of ‘the 
common man,’ it becomes harder still to see the marked distinction from dogmatic 
beliefs. Indeed, one gets the sense that what we have here is the dogmatic belief, with 
the addition of a disclaimer, at once affirming and denying the belief. To push things a 
bit in the direction of absurdity, it is almost as if for Kant the distance between dogmatic 
and rational, critical beliefs is the distance between the assertion “There is a God” and 
the assertion “I believe there is a God,” where the addition “I believe” serves a double, 
paradoxical function, distancing the belief from the believer by adding the subjective 
qualification. It is as if in saying “I believe” what one really says is “I believe but I don’t 
really believe,” or, more fully articulated: “I believe, but I also know that my belief does 
not amount to knowledge, but is only a belief,” which is to say “I don’t believe, that is, I 
know that I cannot know this, and only believe in it, but nonetheless, I believe it”.   
 
If Kant’s positon here comes awfully close to good old fashioned dogmatics, it has the 
added disadvantage of simultaneously rubbing against the “skeptic.” The criterion of 
reason’s need, despite Kant’s intentions and efforts, leans far too much in the direction 
of the skeptic. Reason’s claim for authority cannot rest easily on a ‘rightful need.’ For if a 
need of reason can justify a belief, why not a need of faith? If reason is justified in being 
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guided by a quest for meaning, it is harder to assert the superiority of its pursuit over the 




2. Mendelssohn and the Experience of Possibility 
 
2.1 Morning Hours – A Post-Kantian Text? 
Having traced Kant’s engagement with Mendelssohn in his ‘Orientation’ essay, we now 
begin the turn from Kant to Mendelssohn. Morning Hours, which was composed in part 
as Mendelssohn’s response to the pantheism controversy, was also a response to 
Kant’s critical philosophy, as was evident to contemporaries, including Kant, but is no 
longer evident today. In order to see what it was that Kant and others understood as a 
response to the ‘critical turn,’ we will have to part ways with Kant’s more dismissive 
remarks relegating Mendelssohn’s contribution to its exemplification of the merits, but 
mostly the shortcomings of the dogmatic philosophy, now rendered obsolete by Kant’s 
transcendental idealism. As we shall see, Kant and Mendelssohn are more familiar with 
each other’s thinking, and more susceptible to each other’s influence, than is usually 
assumed. But their most productive influence on each other lies in their points of 
misunderstanding, where each “mistranslates” a line of thought from the other and, 
thereby, unwittingly alters his own. In order to shed light on Mendelssohn’s 
(mis)readings of Kant, we shall take one further step guided by Kant’s – perhaps equally 
productive – (mis)reading of Mendelssohn, paying close attention, specifically, to the 
themes he brings out in response to Mendelssohn’s only claim for originality in Morning 
Hours, his proof for the existence of God. 
  
Published in Berlin in the summer of 1785 as a series of lectures held at dawn, Morning 
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Hours is the most sustained presentation of Mendelssohn’s epistemological and 
metaphysical views,133 all elaborated in the service of presenting proofs for the 
existence of God (of which one, in particular, namely Mendelssohn’s only ‘original’ 
proof, will occupy our attention in the pages below). Mendelssohn presents Morning 
Hours as a report of the oral instruction he has given to his son and a friend of the 
family in philosophical matters, held at dawn, while his mind was still fresh. The 
seventeen lectures, intended to summarize Mendelssohn’s philosophical views in the 
service of proving the existence of God, contain, due to the historical circumstances of 
its composition, an independent literary unit (lectures 13-15), dealing with Lessing’s 
alleged Spinozism, with which we have dealt with briefly in the previous chapter. In what 
follows we will limit ourselves to those elements of the text pointed to by Kant. 
 
Mendelssohn’s self-effacing presentation of his position certainly bares some of the 
responsibility for its continuous neglect. He presents the work as if it is already 
outdated. If Mendelssohn had a moment, he seems to be saying, it is now behind him. 
His health has prevented him from pursuing the latest developments in metaphysics, his 
life-long passion. The present belongs to Kant, who he nicknames “the all-quashing.” 
These are the very opening lines of his introduction to the work: 
 
                                                
133 As Altman puts it, unlike his other great works, this was “wholly Mendelssohnian.” His best 
seller Phaedon was, in part, a reworking of the Platonic dialogue, while Jerusalem was 
particularly complex, responding to various immediate challenges. See Altmann, Moses 
Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, 672. 
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The following discourses on God’s existence contain the result of everything that 
I previously read and myself thought about this important object of our research. 
For 12–15 years I find myself utterly incapable of expanding my acquaintance 
[with ongoing research]. A so-called neurological infirmity to which I have 
succumbed during this time prevents me from any mental exertion and, what the 
doctors find particularly strange, reading others’ thoughts aggravates me almost 
even more than my own reflections do. Thus, I am acquainted with the writings of 
great men who have distinguished themselves in metaphysics during this time… 
even the all-quashing Kant, only from insufficient reports of my friends and from 
learned reviews that are rarely more instructive. For me, then, this science still 
stands at present where it stood around 1775, for this is as long as it has been 
that I have been compelled to keep my distance from it. Indeed, in better times it 
was my most faithful companion, my only consolation amidst all that is repugnant 
in this life, and now I had to evade it like a mortal enemy on every path I trod. Or, 
what is even harder, I had to shun it like a contaminated friend who herself warns 
me to avoid all contact with her. I did not have enough self-denial to obey her. 
From time to time clandestine breaches ensued, albeit never without remorseful 
atonement.134 
 
Mendelssohn had previously communicated similar sentiments to Kant in private. On 
April 10, 1783, he had written to Kant: 
                                                




For many years, I have been as though dead [wie abgestorben] to metaphysics. 
My weak nerves forbid me every exertion and I amuse myself with less stressful 
work of which I shall soon have the pleasure of sending you some samples. Your 
Critique of Pure Reason is also a criterion for my health. Whenever I flatter 
myself that my strength has increased I dare to take up this nerve-juice 
consuming book, and I am not entirely without hope that I shall still be able to 
think my way through it in this life.135 
 
Somewhat discouraged, Kant had not abandoned hope that Mendelssohn would be of 
aid in promoting his difficult work. In August 16, 1783, he wrote to Mendelssohn: 
 
That you feel yourself dead to metaphysics does not offend me, since virtually 
the entire learned world seems to be dead to her, and of course, there is the 
matter of your nervous indisposition (of which, by the way, there is not the 
slightest sign in your book, Jerusalem). I do regret that your penetrating mind, 
alienated from metaphysics, cannot be drawn to the Critique, which is concerned 
with investigating the foundations of that structure. However, though I regret that 
the Critique repels you, I am not offended by this.136 
 
                                                
135 Immanuel Kant, Correspondence, trans. Arnulf Zweig (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
190-1. 
136 Ibid., 202. 
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Either doubting or simply disregarding Mendelssohn’s medical excuses, Kant was 
gracious enough not be offended by the repulsion he attributed to Mendelssohn; it was 
understandable, since, despite the rigorous thought and twelve years of labor that had 
gone into the work, it had had to be completed hastily “with the greatest attentiveness to 
its content but less care about its style and ease of comprehension.”137 It is because of 
this (perhaps unavoidable) weakness in the manner of presentation, that Kant had put 
so much stock in enlisting Mendelssohn to his philosophical cause. 
 
The capacity to both think for oneself and at the same time take into account the 
position of others, which as we saw in the last chapter, Kant attributed to Mendelssohn, 
would come to be the very definition of Kant’s last word on common sense, or sensus 
communis, in his third critique.138 After complementing Mendelssohn for his singular 
capacity to communicate complex ideas without dumbing them down, Kant writes that 
Mendelssohn might encourage others to examine the validity of three crucial points: (1) 
the distinction between analytical and synthetic judgments, and the difficulties involved 
in synthetic judgments a priori; (2) the contention that synthetic judgments a priori are 
possible only about the formal conditions of any possible experience; (3) the view that 
the only speculative cognition that is possible a priori is confined to objects of our 
experience and does not include the things in themselves. The precision with which 
Kant here laid the salient points of his work must have given Mendelssohn a more 
distinct view of the work as a whole, even if details still remained blurred. 
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Already Mendelssohn’s introduction to Morning Hours shows, at the very least, a 
recognition of the consequences of Kant’s critique, namely, the destruction of the 
metaphysical edifice upon which he has relied, and he also seems to be willing to pass 
the torch, to entrust to Kant the task of rebuilding what he has destroyed. While 
philosophical speculation has sunk into ill-repute, Mendelssohn does not have the 
pretense of being capable of revitalizing it himself, the condition of his mental powers 
being what it is. That business “may be left to better heads, to the profundity of a Kant 
who will hopefully build up again with the same spirit with which he has torn down. I 
content myself with the limited intention of leaving behind to my friends and posterity an 
accounting of what I have held to be true.”139 
 
Despite Mendelssohn’s insistence that he could not come to terms with Kant’s 
philosophy, and had only second hand knowledge of it, contemporaries had their 
doubts. In a review of Morning Hours in the Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, Christian 
Gottfried Schütz, who had become one of Kant’s earliest followers, after recalling 
Mendelssohn’s proclamations of outdatedness and weakness of mind, commented: 
  
One nevertheless believes… [that Mendelssohn’s work shows] traces of the fact 
that he had before him the famous work by Herr Kant: on the other hand, these 
lectures show no traces of nervous debility. One might be tempted to regard what 
                                                
139 Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, xx. 
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Herr Mendelssohn says about it as Socratic irony, were it [the nervous debility] 
not otherwise reliably known.140 
 
Others were willing to go further, so far even to suggest, in clear opposition to 
Mendelssohn’s proclaimed intentions, that Morning Hours had not only come to terms 
with the Kantian critique, but, in fact, offered a decisive response to it.141 And it was 
perhaps this triumphant tone that triggered Kant to respond in such a dismissive tone, 
presenting Mendelssohn as the supreme exemplar of the dogmatic philosophy his 
critique was meant to undermine. 
 
Nevertheless, while Kant was eager to dismiss all talk of Mendelssohn’s work as a 
serious response to his critique, he nonetheless regarded it as a challenge: 
 
Although the work of the worthy Mendelssohn is to be considered in the main as a 
masterpiece of the self-deception of our reason… it is [nevertheless] an excellent 
work. Apart from the sagacious and novel things stated with exemplary clarity in 
the “preliminary notions” on truth, appearance and error – things that can very well 
be used in every philosophical lecture – it will prove of considerable value for the 
                                                
140 Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, 675. 
141 As may be gathered from a letter written to Kant by Ludwig Heinrich Jakob, his disciple and 
admirer in Halle: “Mendelssohn deserves to have his book favorably received…. But right away 
I heard some triumphal songs… that celebrate a victory that Herr Mendelssohn, according to his 
own statements, never even had in mind. Yes, one could even make out from certain reviews that 




critique of human reason by its second section. For since the author… eventually 
arrives at the conclusion that nothing is conceivable unless it is actually conceived 
by some being and that no object can be real unless it be conceived; and since, 
moreover, he concludes that an infinite and active intellect must be real… this 
extremely sharp witted pursuance of the chain of our conceptions, to the extent 
that they embrace total being, offers a splendid opportunity, as well as a challenge, 
to subject our capacity of pure reason to a radical critique… as a result, pure 
philosophy is bound to gain, even assuming that after examination it turned out 
that illusion had interfered… one may also regard this final bequest of dogmatizing 
metaphysics as its most perfect product…. and as an enduringly valuable 
monument to the sagacity of a man who knows and controls the whole force of the 
mode of thinking that he has adopted…142 
 
Kant’s characterization of Mendelssohn has stuck, as has Mendelssohn’s 
characterization of Kant. Mendelssohn’s sharp and vivid act of naming would propel 
Kant’s reputation as the “all destroyer,” unleashing a restless dynamic of criticism. 
Kant’s dry, antiquarian handling of Mendelssohn would have the effect of embalming 
him in amber and cataloguing him in the museum of antiquated viewpoints. Focusing on 
Kant’s substantive engagement with Mendelssohn, rather than his sweeping 
proclamations and dismissive tone, should allow us at least to shake up some dust from 
this pristine exemplar of yesterday’s dogmatism. 
                                                





2.2 God is Unconscious – Mendelssohn’s Original Proof for the Existence of God 
In uncharacteristic fashion, Mendelssohn’s makes one claim for originality in his book, 
an original proof for the existence of God. As we shall see, Mendelssohn’s original proof 
of God’s existence, which attracted Kant’s critical attention, incorporates, and revises, 
significant Kantian themes. 
 
 Kant was greatly intrigued by Mendelssohn’s proof. In a letter to Gottfried Schütz dated 
November 1785, he called it “an extremely penetrating pursuit of our chain of concepts” 
that “provides us with a splendid opportunity as well as a challenge to subject our 
capacity of pure reason to a total critique.”143 Kant’s response to the challenge is to be 
found in his essay on ‘Orientation,’ albeit buried in a footnote. It is interesting, not to say 
symptomatic, that Kant refrains from pointing his reader directly to Mendelssohn’s only 
claim for originality in the text. 
 
In his essay on ‘Orientation,’ Kant dedicates a long footnote to Mendelssohn’s proof, 
although without making the reference to Mendelssohn’s text sufficiently explicit. 
Indeed, for readers unfamiliar with Mendelssohn’s text the footnote seems not only 
opaque but unwarranted, as it is unclear from Kant’s text in itself what prompts this 
dense and difficult remark. Having stated in the body of the text that reason has a real 
                                                
143 M. Mendelssohn and M. Gottlieb, Moses Mendelssohn: Writings on Judaism, Christianity, 
and the Bible (Brandeis University Press, 2011), 233. 
108 
 
need not only for the concept of an original, archetypical being, but also to assume its 
existence; as without the assumption of the existence of the unlimited, reason can find 
no basis for the contingent existence of worldly things, let alone for the purposiveness 
and order evident in the world around us, Kant attaches the following long footnote. 
 
Since reason needs to assume reality as given before it can conceive of the 
possibility of anything, and since it regards those differences between things 
which result from the negations inherent in them simply as limits, it finds itself 
compelled to take a single possibility – namely that of an unlimited being – as 
basic and original, and conversely, to regard all other possibilities as derivative. 
Since even the general possibility of each particular thing must necessarily be 
present within the totality of existence as a whole – or at least since this is the 
only way in which the principle of universal determination allows our reason to 
distinguish between the possible and the actual – we find a subjective ground for 
this necessity, i.e., a need on the part of our reason itself to base all possibility on 
the existence of an utterly real (supreme) being. This is the source of the 
Cartesian proof of God’s existence, in as much as subjective grounds for 
presupposing something for the use of reason (whose use always remains 
basically confined to experience) are treated as objective: in other words, a need 
is regarded as insight. This proof is like all the other proofs of the worthy 
Mendelssohn in his Morgenstunden [Morning Hours]: they accomplish nothing in 
the way of demonstration. But they are not for this reason by any means useless. 
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For on the one hand, such highly perceptive accounts of the subjective 
conditions under which our reason operates give us an excellent incentive to 
perfect our knowledge of this faculty (and in this respect, they remain exemplary): 
and on the other hand, when we are compelled to pass judgment but lack 
objective grounds for doing so, a conviction of truth based on a subjective aspect 
of the use of reason continues to be of great importance. We must simply refrain 
from claiming that what is only a necessary presupposition is in fact a free 
insight, so as not to show our adversary in dogmatism needless weakness which 
he can exploit to our disadvantage. It probably did not occur to Mendelssohn that 
dogmatizing in the supra-sensory sphere with the help of pure reason leads 
straight to philosophical zealotry, and that only a critique of this same faculty of 
reason can thoroughly cure this evil.144 
 
At the end of the previous chapter we pointed out the ambiguity in Kant’s notion of 
‘rational belief’ and cast some doubt on the sharp distinction Kant wants to draw 
between such warranted, rational beliefs, based on reason’s need, and the 
unwarranted, dogmatic insight. But in this footnote Kant seems to take a further step 
“backwards,” returning to his own pre-critical proof for the existence of God,145 which in 
                                                
144 Kant and Reiss, Kant: Political Writings, 242. 
145 I. Kant, D. Walford, and R. Meerbote, Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770 (Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 107-202. For a brief exposition of the proof, in the larger context of 
Kant’s philosophical position, see. P.W. Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental 
Arguments, and Skepticism in German Idealism (Harvard University Press, 2005), 32.  In the 
Critique of Pure Reason, Kant speaks of this proof as illusory. But in his response to 
Mendelssohn he comes to see it as necessary demand of reason. Franks points to this change in 
Kant’s position as significant not only for Kant’s thinking but for the development of German 
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the critique he had discarded as illusory. And while he now qualifies it as a need of 
reason, he nonetheless assigns it a crucial, if not constitutive role in his own 
transcendental edifice. The assumption of God’s existence, Kant tells us, is necessary 
for us to distinguish between the possible and the actual, between the intelligible and 
the sensible,146 a distinction the significance of which can hardly be overstated for the 
Kantian edifice.147 
 
                                                
idealism in general, in the direction of what he calls derivative monism, which for him is central 
to the German Idealist ideal of the system. The context, namely Kant’s reply to Mendelssohn, 
serves Franks as evidence that this change in Kant’s thinking had occurred earlier than 
presumed. As to Mendelssohn’s possible role in prompting this change, Franks remains silent. 
146 Kant ends his shorter (and overall dismissive) reply to Mendelssohn’s Morning Hours thus: 
“To be sure, it seems strange that we are only able properly to determine our concepts of things 
in themselves by first reducing all reality to the concept of God… yet that is merely the means of 
separating everything sensible and of what pertains to the appearance from what can be 
considered through the understanding as belonging to things in themselves. Hence even with all 
cognitions that we might ever have of things through experience, the question: what their objects 
might be as things in themselves? Cannot at all be considered meaningless.” See I. Kant, G. 
Zöller, and R.B. Louden, Anthropology, History, and Education (Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 181. In this short essay, Kant takes issue with Mendelssohn on two accounts: (1) 
Mendelssohn’s reduction of philosophical disputes to verbal disputes and, more significantly, (2) 
Mendelssohn’s assertion that the thing in itself is a meaningless concept. We shall discuss both 
of Mendelssohn’s claims below. 
147 See Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in 
German Idealism, 66. “According to the Critique of Pure Reason, ‘our concepts of things in 
themselves’ are ultimately derived from the a priori structure of the understanding. In the 
negative sense, our indeterminate concept of things in themselves is an abstract concept of a 
thing in general or a transcendental object. In the positive sense, our concepts of things in 
themselves are categories that are extended to the unconditioned. But according to this 1786 text, 
‘our concepts of things in themselves’ – presumably, of things in themselves in the positive sense 
– are derived from the idea of God, hence from an idea of reason. Clearly, a shift in Kant’s 
thinking has occurred. And this shift creates a new possibility: the possibility of a metaphysical 
deduction of the categories whose first principle is not the concept of a finite, discursive 




Since we here intend to make use of Kant only in order to shed new light on 
Mendelssohn, we will not be able to fully unpack this difficult footnote, and shall restrict 
ourselves to only a few remarks, aiming not so much to offer an interpretation or critique 
of Kant, but rather to enable us to measure the distance and proximity between him and 
Mendelssohn, to see where there is a possible meeting of the minds, and where the 
lines of communication short-circuit. As it turns out, it is in the case of the latter that new 
insights are gained. 
 
The distinction between possibility and actuality, which Kant here makes dependent on 
the rational belief in God’s existence, is a key presupposition in the establishment of the 
legitimate sphere of knowledge and experience.148 The distinctive feature of our finite, 
discursive understanding, according to Kant, is the gap we encounter within it between 
our concepts, or intellect, on the one side, and on the other, the sensible material which 
supplies them with particular content, and is empirical in nature, is given, that is to say, 
from ‘outside.’ Our concept of a chair does not in itself determine all the particulars that 
pertain to this or that, actual, empirical chair. Our understanding entails the subsuming 
of particulars (sensible appearances, empirically given) under universals. In that sense, 
                                                
148 This is an essential element of Heidegger’s critique of Kant. Heidegger points to a 
methodological circularity in Kant’s critique, which, in his view, helps clarify its limits. See M. 
Heidegger, What Is a Thing? Translated by W.B. Barton, Jr., and Vera Deutsch, with an Analysis 
by Eugene T. Gendlin (1967). As Avery Goldman makes clear, in the case of the modal principle 
of possibility such circularity is especially clear: possibility is distinguished by Kant as an a 
priori condition of experience; and yet experience itself is defined by this conception of 
possibility, which limits experience to what can be sensibly given to a perceiving consciousness. 
In her impressive study, Goldman follows Heidegger’s critical insights with the aim of defending 




our possible cognition is dependent on it being actualized empirically. For us, therefore, 
there is always a gap between appearances and things themselves. For our cognition, 
things in themselves are empty abstractions, concepts from which we abstract all 
phenomenal material, thinkable but not knowable, and yet, as we have seen in the 
essay on ‘Orientation,’ they also have a positive extension in the unconditioned, 
supersensible realm. In his Famous Section 76 in the third critique, Kant juxtaposes our 
discursive understanding with an intellectual intuition or intellectus archtypus – which he 
speaks of in ‘Orientation, and in the context of which he here makes his footnote – that 
forgoes this distinction. Such a hypothetical divine intellect forgoes the distinction 
between the form and matter of cognition, intelligibility and sensibility, universal and 
particular, and indeed, possibility and actuality; such a mode of thinking determines its 
objects down to the last detail, and is thus a cognition of things in themselves rather 
than appearances. For it, as it were, there is no gap between the possible and the 
actual, the thinkable and the real: what it thinks possible is immediately actualized. The 
ultimate ground, what is most real (most necessary, highest in the hierarchy of 
grounding),149 is not the most actual, but what, in transcending this (and other, related) 
distinction(s), establishes them for us. While Kant is here reiterating the gist of his pre-
critical (only possible) proof for the existence of God, which emphasizes the necessary 
being of God (although, in the qualified, critical inclination of a necessary 
presupposition), the basic matrix of the argument is identical with that of the deservedly 
                                                
149 It is in this light that Franks interprets Kant’s famous assertion that “to be” is “not a real 
predicate.” See Franks, All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism 
in German Idealism, 50. 
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famous Section 76 of the third critique. In both cases, a being, or an intellect that 
forgoes the distinction between possibility and actuality is needed in order to properly 
delineate the limits of our experience, for which that distinction is fundamental. That is, 
for our conceptual distinction to hold an exception to it has to be stipulated. The setting 
of our boundaries entails their transgression. In any case, Kant finds himself compelled, 
in response to Mendelssohn’s text, to reconsider the necessity of delineating the realm 
of the possible. In his work on modality, we are led to understand, Mendelssohn is 
acting on a justified need of reason, and there is nothing mistaken in his “pursuit of our 
chain of concepts,” nothing, that is, besides one crucial misstep: that he mistakes the 
need of reason for a “free insight,” in other words, an unjustifiable, dogmatic, 
metaphysical assertion.   
 
Taking a closer look at Mendelssohn’s “proof,” we shall continue to be guided by Kant’s 
response to Mendelssohn. That is, we shall see what use Mendelssohn is making of the 
modalities (possibility and actuality), and to what extent Kant’s criticism hits its mark, 
namely, is Mendelssohn guilty of an illegitimate move from a need of reason to a free 
insight? As we shall see, Mendelssohn develops these key notions in a way that is not 
quite captured by Kant’s account, which results in undermining Kant’s sharp distinction 
between reason’s need and insight. But he only gets there through his own 




2.3 The Cogito’s Shadow: From Conditions of Possible Experience to the Experience of 
Possibility. 
Let us now Attend to Mendelssohn’s proof: 
 
I will attempt to conduct this proof in another way as well, in a way that, as far as I 
know, no philosopher has touched on. Hence, take notice, my sons! …. 
In addition to the immediate feeling of my own existence (that is, as we have seen, 
beyond all doubt), I also presuppose the following perception as indubitable: I am 
not merely what I distinctly know of myself or, what amounts to the same, there is 
more to my existence than I might consciously observe of myself; and even what I 
know of myself is in and for itself capable of far greater development, greater 
distinctness, and greater completeness than I am able to give it. This observation 
is, it seems to me, no less undeniably evident [than the consciousness of my own 
existence]. As a perception of the inner sense, it has its subjective certainty and 
since, with respect to myself, my own ‘I’ is also the subject of thoughts, the 
predicate ‘Immediately known’ can be attributed to me as well. That I do not know 
everything that pertains to my existence can be no deception of the senses, no 
illusion. For in the first place we are not transposing something known internally 
onto an external object; we have no intention of connecting the make-up of one 
sense with that of others, of inferring from often to always, all of which were 
sources of sensory illusion…. in fact, it would not be possible for either our body or 
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our soul to be on hand if they were merely what we distinctly observe of them.150 
 
Note, first, Mendelssohn’s move from less to more, from the lack in our knowledge to 
the assertion that there is more to know: “I am not merely what I distinctly know of 
myself or, what amounts to the same, there is more to my existence than I might 
consciously observe of myself.” Therein lies the crux, easily overlooked, of 
Mendelssohn’s argument, as well as his implicit reception of Kantian ideas. 
 
It is quite plausible that Kant saw the extent to which Mendelssohn’s proof was a 
response to his critique of the Cartesian cogito. Indeed, Mendelssohn understands 
Descartes achievement – the certainty of the ‘cogito’ – in a way that departs from 
Descartes himself, and is best clarified by Kant’s critique and development of this 
certainty as that of the transcendental ‘I’ or the unity of apperception. In recasting the 
‘cogito’ as the unity of apperception, Kant famously criticized Descartes for privileging 
the certainty of the ‘I’ as content or object of a thought (cogito as my thinking of myself), 
and had put the focus on the formal, if implicit, self-consciousness involved in cognition 
regardless of its object. Since the ‘I’’s spectral presence accompanies all cognitions as 
a formal condition of the unity of apperception,151 the ‘I’ that appears as an object of 
knowledge has no privileged status, and is to be known like all other objects of 
                                                
150 D.O. Dahlstrom, C. Dyck, and M. Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence 
(Springer Netherlands, 2011), 103. 
151 Several commentators have pointed to Mendelssohn’s argument in his best seller Phaedon 
(1767) that unity is a feature of the soul, rather than reality, as foreshadowing Kant’s unity of 




experience, as receiving its material from the outside, that is, empirically. In contrast, 
the transcendental ‘I’ itself, as a formal condition of experience, is not an object of 
experience. This is one of the crucial differences between Kant’s transcendental 
idealism and pre-critical idealism. To the extent that idealism as it is commonly 
understood runs the risk of the self-enclosure of the mind, or solipsism, that is, a picture 
in which we have ideas in our mind, and the world ‘out there,’ with no way to connect 
them, no way to guarantee that our ideas are ‘about’ the world, with Kant that divide is 
both overcome and radicalized. In transcendental idealism, there is no longer any worry 
that we are alone, trapped in our minds, as there are necessary, universal features 
which all human minds share that are constitutive of the world (the conditions of 
possible experience). Yes, causality, for example, is not to be found ‘in the world,’ it is a 
contribution of the mind, but it is a necessary, constitutive one – without it there would 
just be no experience. All experience, and all knowledge, is a s synthesis between our 
concepts of the understanding, not derived from experience, and the passive input of 
experiential ‘matter.’ Thus, the mind/world gap had been significantly reduced, if not 
entirely collapsed. But the very same gesture that had brought the world ‘out there’ 
within reach, had driven an insurmountable gulf within subjectivity. The same dualism 
that holds for our access to the world out there (empirical/transcendental), now holds for 
our access to our ‘inner’ world as well. 
 
Like Kant, Mendelssohn notes that the certainty of the ‘I’ lies not in the particular act of 
consciousness (I think), but in this ‘I’’s shadowy, or implicit, underlying presence in all 
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cognitive acts broadly construed. 
 
The philosopher [Descartes] could have said with equal right: I hope, therefore I 
am; I fear, therefore I am, and so forth. Only, according to his theory, all those 
alterations that transpire within us possess the common characteristic that he calls 
‘thought.’ He thus included them all in the general phrase, I think.152 
  
Mendelssohn, as he so often does, minimizes the distance between philosophical 
positions. He did so in regards to Lessing’s ‘refined Spinozism,’ and seemed to think 
that, in general, much in philosophical dispute is terminological rather than 
substantive.153 While, like Kant, he sees the certainty of the cogito not in its content, but 
in its form, he simply attributes that insight to Descartes himself.154 Consequently, he 
subtly denies the possibility of deriving existence from this certainty, just like Kant, and 
instead offers a deceivingly commonsensical definition of existence: 
 
And existence? If we begin from ourselves, as we must necessarily do in all our 
                                                
152 Dahlstrom, Dyck, and Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 29. 
153 As he puts it in Morning Hours: “I fear that, in the end, the famous quarrel among 
materialists, idealists, and dualists would amount to a merely verbal dispute, more something for 
the linguist than the speculative philosopher.” Ibid., 42. Kant was greatly irritated by this 
position. “I am, however, of a completely opposite opinion and assert that in matters over which 
one has quarreled for a long period of time, especially in philosophy, there has never been at the 
bottom a quarrel of words but always a true quarrel over things.” See Kant, Zöller, and Louden, 
Anthropology, History, and Education, 179. Below we shall have the opportunity to explain 
Mendelssohn’s position in regards to philosophical beliefs and quarrels. 
154 Here, and elsewhere, Mendelssohn’s seems to apply the equivalent of Davidson’s 
hermeneutical ‘charity principle’ pushed ad absurdum. It seems that for Mendelssohn, novelty in 
philosophy depends on treating the old as already addressing the challenges of the new. 
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knowledge, then existence is merely a common word for acting and undergoing. 
We are conscious of acting or undergoing something every moment of our life and 
the characteristic that these two have in common we call ‘existence.’ I have 
concepts and sensations; therefore, I am a conceptualizing and sensing being. I 
act or undergo something; therefore, I am actually on hand.155 
 
Note that existence belongs on neither side – neither in acting nor in undergoing, 
neither the active nor passive, neither in thinking nor in substance.156 What is beginning 
to be teased out here is a paradoxical notion of existence (Daseyn), which is 
understood neither as a ‘whatness,’ or essence, nor as a ‘thatness,’ or pre-conceptual 
existence, but lies rather in their co-dependence or co-articulation. It is, as Mendelssohn 
so disarmingly puts it, a ‘common word’ for what, as he will proceed to argue in his 
original proof, is in human beings never unified.157 
 
                                                
155 Dahlstrom, Dyck, and Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 29-30. 
156 See M. Mendelssohn and B. Rosenstock, Last Works (University of Illinois Press, 2012), 208-
9. The editors explain the misunderstanding between Jacobi and Mendelssohn along the lines of 
their opposing views of existence. Mendelssohn, they argue, understands being, or existence, in 
terms of “whatness,” while Jacobi Understands it in terms of “thatness.” As we shall see, for 
Mendelssohn, the very distinction is abstract, and yields no concept of existence, or being. 
Mendelssohn’s view can more profitably be compared with Agamben’s modal ontology, his 
recent attempt, at the closure of his Homo Sacer project, to rejoin the modern. See G. Agamben 
and A. Kotsko, The Use of Bodies (Stanford University Press, 2016), 146-75.  As we shall see, 
Mendelssohn’s thinking is best understood in light of his interest in the primacy of what lies in-
between essence and existence, that is, their co-articulation. 
157 Indeed, to say that Mendelssohn’s definition of existence [Daseyn] as what acting and 
undergoing have in common is deceivingly commonsensical is an understatement. Developed 
speculatively this is nothing short of the unity of being, as both substance and subject of change. 
Being is neither attributed to activity nor passivity, neither subjectivity nor objectivity but what 
they have in common. 
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Mendelssohn pushes Kant’s limitation of our knowledge beyond Kant’s intentions. Using 
Kant’s language, which identifies knowledge with conceptual, or discursive 
determination, Mendelssohn dismisses all residual talk about the thing in itself as 
nonsensical, in its implicit reliance on something like an unknowable knowledge. To ask 
for the thing in itself is to: 
 
…demand to know something that is in no way an object of knowledge. We stand 
at the boundary not only of human knowledge, but of all knowledge in general; 
and we want to go further without knowing where we are headed. If I tell you 
what a thing does or undergoes, do not ask further what it is. If I tell you what 
kind of a concept you have to make of a thing, then the further question ‘What is 
this thing in and for itself?’ is no longer intelligible.158 
 
Mendelssohn denies an external perspective, a knowledge of an entirely different 
kind.159 We are now in a position to appreciate why Mendelssohn is so certain that the 
lack of self-knowledge cannot be a mere illusion, as it belongs to what Kant would have 
called the transcendental status of the ‘I.’ But Mendelssohn draws very different 
conclusions from this gap at the heart of subjectivity. While Kant might be right in 
assigning an empirical status to the knowledge I do possess about myself, the absence 
of knowledge is not easily confined to the empirical. While it might make sense to 
                                                
158 Dahlstrom, Dyck, and Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 41. 
159 Whereas Kant, in his response to Mendelssohn, is moving precisely in that direction, to be 
most fully articulated in his mature conception of intellectual intuition in the third critique. 
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subject all contents of thought to the same criteria of understanding, the lack of self-
transparency in itself raises the issue of the ontological status of self-knowledge, and by 
extension, of knowledge in general. 
 
If Descartes vacated all phenomenal contents in order to reach the purely formal, but 
certain, position of the cogito, Mendelssohn begins his own, original, journey to God by 
taking hold of that very void. What matters for Mendelssohn in Descartes is not so much 
the ‘I think’ as the hollowed out, formal ‘I.’ The very assertion of the ‘I’ as the site of 
enunciation opens a gap that all subsequent enunciations cannot quite suture. 
Whatever follows ‘I’ hovers in indeterminacy. This lack of knowledge or indeterminacy is 
not merely a psychological, empirical state – susceptible to deception and the illusion of 
the senses – but, understood along the lines of the Kantian gap between the 
transcendental ‘I,’ the condition of possibility for the unity of apperception and the 
empirical, psychological ‘I,’ it is a formal condition, a result of the gap between the ‘I’ 
and subsequent predicates, and therefore ‘immediately known,’ as certain as the 
Cartesian cogito. Indeed, it is the very form of the ‘I,’ stripped from all phenomenality 
and presuppositions, taken as its own content. The space of reflection is not opened up 
by self-transparency, but rather by the formal inaccessibility of the subject to itself. 
 
While not reducible to empirical, psychological experience, it is important to 
Mendelssohn that this formal aspect is not a mere abstraction from experience, but 
rather accompanies everyday experience elusively yet palpably, just as the unity of 
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apperception does. Mendelssohn both radicalizes and threatens Kant’s 
transcendental/empirical divide by, so to speak, internalizing it even further. The very 
gap between the ‘I’ that thinks and itself as an object of experience is taken as an 
immediate, if elusive, object of experience. It is what accompanies immediacy by always 
eluding it, the elusive immediacy of the immediately elusive. In other words, it is the 
paradoxical empirical experience of our abstract, formal, transcendental aspect, that 
can never become an object of empirical knowledge. 
 
For Mendelssohn, to know oneself as unknown is not merely to determine the limits of 
(self) knowledge, to declare ‘this is as far as one can go’; it is already to assert the 
reality of a privation. The knowledge that consciousness is barred is not merely a 
statement of limits, a recognition of the limits of human understanding, but also, at the 
same time, the assertion of the unknown as real, or rather, as we shall see, as 
something to be realized. 
 
 
2.4 Surplus Knowledge 
What warrants Mendelssohn’s move from the lack of self-knowledge to the existence of 
God? Is such a move not precisely what Kant had characterized as a leap from a need 
(of reason) to a free insight? While Mendelssohn moves swiftly, giving credence to 
Kant’s sense that a leap is involved, it is possible to slow him down, as it were, and 
attend to his implicit chain of reasoning, in which Kant found no fault. Let us first note 
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that Mendelssohn had already fundamentally digressed from the Kantian coordinates of 
reason’s need. Recall that, for Kant, reason is in need of overstepping the boundaries of 
what it can know, it has a justified need for unity and totality that cannot be located 
within the realm of experience, of theoretical knowledge, and must be sought, instead, 
in the practical realm. For Mendelssohn, the act or recognition of limitations already 
yields a special kind of knowledge; indeed, the lack and surplus in knowledge coincide; 
the recognition of absent knowledge is already the assertion, if only unconsciously, that 
the knowledge which lacks in me is real somewhere else. Since what I do not know of 
myself is irreducible to empirical knowledge, it cannot simply be taken to be ‘out there,’ 
waiting to be empirically discovered (even if that ‘out there’ is understood, in 
contemporary, modern terms, as ‘internal’ in the sense of the specific make up of one’s 
brain, it is still, in the important sense, ‘out there,’ that is, in principle given to 
knowledge, present and actual). The knowledge that lacks in the subject is essentially 
elusive, never simply present. And yet it is ‘mine,’ it lacks in me, setting my project of 
knowledge in motion. 
 
According to Mendelssohn, it is because the lack in (self) knowledge is immediately 
present that I must assume that knowledge in God. God is not in possession of an 
entirely different kind of knowledge, the understanding of which is necessary for 
philosophically delimiting our own, (as seems to be the case for Kant), but the very site, 
the holder of such knowledge that I do not presently possess.160 God is He who knows 
                                                
160 Very much like the Lacanian notion of the subject supposed to know, the presupposition that 
the other holds the knowledge I lack, which sets psychoanalytic transference in motion. That is, 
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what alludes me. This is Mendelssohn’s reasoning. If it is true that we know that we 
don’t know, in the sense articulated above: 
 
…then it obviously follows that an entity must be on hand which represents to itself 
in the most distinct, purest, and most thoroughgoing manner everything that 
pertains to my existence…. there must therefore be a thinking being, one intellect 
that thinks in the most perfect way the sum total of all possibilities as possible and 
the sum total of all actualities as actual.161 
 
At first glance, Mendelssohn’s argument, to which he, against his nature, attributes 
originality, contains not a speck of novelty. It seems as if Mendelssohn is merely 
rehashing the old Aristotelian notion of the active intellect, as that which actualizes 
potential knowledge or thinking, in the post-Cartesian, modern vain of a ‘proof,’ which 
takes it starting point in the subject’s project of knowledge162 and then reaches to God. 
                                                
it is the unconscious assumption that the other, say, the analyst, holds the key to one’s 
unconscious. While strictly speaking such an assumption is of course erroneous, it is a necessary 
precondition for analytic work, and thus, in a different register, it is true: only in going through 
this erroneous assumption can interpretive insight be gained. 
161 Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 104. 
162 Leo Strauss saw this as the deep blind spot of modernity, what made it ultimately blind to all 
authentic religion. Taking as it starting point the project of knowledge as fundamental, seeking, 
as it were, to ground everything on reason, modernity was incapable of even properly 
comprehending the past it had strayed away from, in which the relation is reversed: philosophy is 
to be grounded in revelation. This is his reading of Maimonides, for example. Maimonides’ 
problem, he argues, is not the philosophical justification of religion, but the political-theological, 
legal justification of philosophizing. See. L. Strauss, Philosophy and Law: Contributions to the 
Understanding of Maimonides and His Predecessors (State University of New York Press, 
1995). Despite Strauss’ portrayal of his own dissertation on Jacobi as a “disgraceful 
performance” there are reason to believe that Strauss remained committed to his early 
engagement with Jacobi throughout his career. See Rodrigo Chacón, “On a Forgotten Kind of 
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This impression is augmented by Kant’s interpretation: 
  
 [Mendelssohn]… eventually arrives at the conclusion that nothing is conceivable 
unless it is actually conceived by some being and that no object can be real unless 
it be conceived; and… concludes that an infinite and active intellect must be 
real…163 
 
Kant’s reading seems sound, and not at all unfair. And yet, if we follow Mendelssohn’s 
argument closely some crucial differences do emerge. Mendelssohn’s most likely 
source for his Aristotelian idea is Maimonides, whose work he studied with great 
passion and dedication, at a young age, and was his first introduction to philosophy. 
 
For Maimonides, the active intellect – the Arabic term ‘aql translated the Greek nous – 
was the particular incorporeal form that causes the potentiality of the rational faculty to 
turn into actuality.164 The active intellect causes potential to become actual both in mind 
and in nature: 
                                                
Grounding: Strauss, Jacobi, and the Phenomenological Critique of Modern Rationalism,” The 
Review of Politics, Vol. 76, Issue 4, October 2014, 589-617.  
163 Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, 684-5. 
164 In this sense, the young Hegel, criticizing Kant for failing to acknowledge the homology, if 
not identity, between his transcendental imagination, actualizing cognition, as it were, in 
mediating the sensible and the intelligible, and his intellectual intuition, which, on a higher plane, 
does the same, mediating also between (practical) reason and the understanding, was not only 
philosophically astute, but, in a proper Hegelian fashion, displayed at the same time an acute 
sensibility to the history of philosophy. It is as if in ‘naturalizing’ the cognitive function of the 
active intellect in the first critique, getting rid of a superfluous metaphysical, or quasi-




The active Intellect[’s]… existence is indicated by the facts that our intellect passes 
from potentiality to actuality and that the forms of the existents that are subject to 
generation and corruption are actualized after they have been in their matter only 
in potential. Now everything that passes from potentiality to actuality must have 
necessarily something that causes it to pass and that is outside it. And this cause 
must belong to the species of that which it causes to pass from potentiality to 
actuality.165 
 
While Mendelssohn does not here use the term active intellect, his pointing to God as 
‘the holder’ of our potential knowledge does seem to accord with this traditional view. Is 
Mendelssohn to be understood in light of this tradition of philosophy, which had 
obviously played a part in shaping his views, or should he be understood in light of the 
momentous present to which he belonged, but according to his own testament, did not 
fully understand? It is precisely in the tension between these options that his position 
can come to light; it is here that his position subtly, yet decisively breaks both with the 
Aristotelian tradition and the Kantian position. For Mendelssohn’s accent is placed not 
on the actualization of possible knowledge but, rather, on its very potentiality. God, for 
Mendelssohn, is not required in order to account for the passage from potential to actual 
knowledge; all to the contrary, God is necessary for keeping possibility and actuality 
apart, that is, to account for the phenomena of possibility itself. In this emphasis on the 
                                                




distinction between the possible and the actual, Mendelssohn is closer to Kant than he 
is to Maimonides, as Kant seemed to have sensed. But, as we shall see, the two 
modern thinkers part ways in their understanding of what is required in order to account 
for our experience, in which possibility and actuality are distinct, and in regards to the 
role God has to play in this division. 
 
For Kant, the idea of a primary existent (in the pre-critical period, only possible ground, 
reiterated in what is orientation), and that of the intellectual intuition (as archetypical, 
Section 76 of Critique of Judgment), both serve the same purpose: they are limit 
concepts that serve to account for the particularity of our, discursive knowledge, for 
which the distinction between possibility and actuality is fundamental. For us there 
emerges an unsurpassable limit to our possible knowledge: possible knowledge is 
possible experience, i.e., what can be ‘filled’ with sensible material. The ‘identity’ of 
possibility and actuality is the sovereign exception, so to speak, to our mode of 
understanding. In transgressing the limits, it establishes them. What Mendelssohn’s 
argument drives at, as we shall see, is close to Kant, but also markedly breaks with him. 
 
We may begin by noting that while we shall attend in more detail to Mendelssohn’s 
conception of the divine in the following chapters, we may already now make note of 
one important facet of Mendelssohn’s thought: God is not thought in accordance with 
the logic of a sovereign exception, transgressing and setting our limits, but as 
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something that, in its transcendent withdrawal,166 allows and makes room for human 
determination, articulation and actualization. 
 
For Mendelssohn, the strange factuality of our non-knowledge is the very source of our 
experience of potentiality or possibility; and for that very reason, it is doomed to 
dissipate if we take the limits of possibility as a given/entirely determined and knowable. 
                                                
166 Speaking of a divine withdrawal is to evoke the Kabbalistic idea of Zimzum, attributed to 
Isaac Luria (1534-1572) and his followers. In this doctrine, a significant clinamen from the 
traditional neo-Platonic doctrine takes place: the act of creation is no longer understood in terms 
of divine overflow, where the divine, infinite intellect’s act of (necessarily, self-reflective, there 
is nothing outside it) thought brings into reality it’s finite counterpart, the created world; on the 
contrary, creation is understood as an act of divine self-limitation. Mendelssohn’s association of 
Cabbalism with enthusiasm and superstition seems, on the face of it, to make it beyond 
implausible that the ideas associated with the mystical tradition could have been influential on 
him. In chapter 4, however, we will see that his relation to mysticism is not one of dismissal, and 
more importantly, that his criticism of mysticism or enthusiasm has nothing to do with the 
content of their beliefs, with the ideas held by them to be true, but with the way they are 
believed. Scholarship in the last decades has done much to undermine the distinction between the 
mystical tradition, the philosophical, and the rabbinic in Judaism as ideological, a product of 
modern Jewish – that is, post-Mendelssohnian “Jewish studies” – attempts to distinguish 
themselves from the irrational orientalism associated with the mystical tradition. See, for 
example, Gil Anidjar’s, “Jewish Mysticism Alterable and Unalterable: On Orienting Kabbalah 
Studies and the “Zohar of Christian Spain,” In Jewish Social Studies (Indiana University Press) 
and G. Anidjar, “Our Place in Al-Andalus”: Kabbalah, Philosophy, Literature in Arab Jewish 
Letters (Stanford University Press, 2002). Thanks to this critical scholarship we can now better 
appreciate how historical figures in Judaism could be, at the same time, rabbinic legal scholars, 
philosophers and mystics. However, this critique is usually limited by its own framing as a 
‘critique of modernity’: at the same time that it makes some, premodern, figures more 
understandable historically, it makes other figures – like Moses Mendelssohn – much less 
understandable. The possibility that Mendelssohn could have been a harsh critic of the mystical 
tradition and at the same time incorporate some of its key ideas does not seem thinkable. And yet 
by Mendelssohn’s time Kabbalistic doctrines have become widespread, semi-official, Jewish 
“theology.” Indeed, Mendelssohn’s theories of religion are crucial for any serious attempt to 
account for the very status of the mystical tradition in Judaism; they raise the possibility that it is 
because Judaism is not organized around a dogma, as Mendelssohn argues, but in a sense, around 
the resistance to dogma, that its theology is developed in a subterranean, esoteric, and perhaps 
explosive, eruptive way – everything that Freud had understood as the “unwritten” side of 
tradition, especially potent, in his reading, in Judaism. See S. Freud and K. Jones, Moses and 
Monotheism (Knopf, 1939). 
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Such a limit must, as Mendelssohn conceives of it, sink into the background of our 
experience, as it were, withdraw from consciousness. For Mendelssohn, God is 
required in order to maintain the boundary between the possible and the actual, which, 
as we shall see, turns out to be a rather complicated matter (and one, ultimately, that 
does not afford a conception of God as simply external to this world). 
 
For Mendelssohn, we have argued above, the problem is not the passage from 
potentiality to actuality, but their correlation. Mendelssohn brings back to the surface the 
(historical and essential) link between privation and potentiality.167 “Potentiality… does 
not merely indicate contradiction-free thinkability; such thinking is already implied in 
essence, in cognition. For potentiality, in contradistinction to thinkability, the concept of 
time comes into play: we understand potential to be that which is not yet actual. Thus, 
privation and potentiality conjoin.”168 In beginning with the Cartesian Cogito, and 
affirming the lack in our knowledge as equiprimordial or co-present with any moment of 
consciousness, the relation between potential and actuality is radically altered. Every 
present, any given actuality of thinking, is marked by the ghostly reality of what is 
absent from it. For Mendelssohn, it is only on account of the reality, however elusive, of 
what is absent in the present actuality that a notion of possibility emerges.169 
                                                
167 “Privation is Necessarily attached to all potentiality.” M. Maimonides and S. Pines, The Guide 
of the Perplexed, vol. I (University of Chicago Press, 2010), 128. 
168 H. Cohen, A.S. Bruckstein, and R. Gibbs, Ethics of Maimonides (University of Wisconsin 
Press, 2003), 97-8. 
169 In a Hebrew commentary on Maimonides treatise on Logic written in 1760, Mendelssohn 
points out the strange ontological status of unrealized potentials, their odd relation to non-being: 
“if the causes have occurred by virtue of which Ezra actually became a scribe, then the 





2.5 The Actuality of Possibility 
From this perspective, Mendelssohn radicalizes Kant’s limitation of our knowledge, 
rather than simply disregards it. Mendelssohn rejects the idea of a meta-language, or 
meta-knowledge – to limit knowledge to representation by means of concepts does not 
leave room for any sense of existence devoid of conceptual articulation. We can call this 
Mendelssohn’s theory of intelligibility: to seek to know is to assume not only that such a 
knowledge is possible, but that it is actual – since that is what possibility itself implies. 
To speak of a possible, hypothetical knowledge, that is impossible for us, is for 
Mendelssohn a patent, though understandable mistake, arising from the difficulty of the 
notion. 
                                                
favor of Ezra’s being a scribe, as opposed to his not being a scribe. Nevertheless, it cannot be 
described as a necessary proposition, as long as its contrary, ‘Ezra is not a scribe,’ has not ceased 
to be possible. That is why the logicians have appropriated a special name and designated it an 
‘actual’ proposition or an ‘existential’ proposition, i.e., as a possible proposition that has become 
actual by the causes that have brought it from potentiality to actuality. For there are possible 
things that never become actual; of this sort is the possible that has no potential at all. 
Nevertheless, it is, since no contradiction is contained either in it or in its contradictory… If it is 
still potential – regardless of whether it has a remote or an immediate potential –, then it stands 
as it were in the middle between existence and nothingness. But if it has passed from potentiality 
to actuality, it resembles the necessary and is called ‘actual’ or ‘existential.’” Interestingly, 
Mendelssohn is exploring this spectral dimension of potentiality by evoking the very same figure 
to which Agamben gives pride of place in tracing a history of potentiality from Aristotle to 
Melville’s Bartleby, the figure of the scribe. See G. Agamben and D. Heller-Roazen, 
Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy (Stanford University Press, 1999). In Agamben’s 
reading, from Aristotle through Avicenna and up to Bartleby, the figure is associated with the 
capacity of the scribe to write, retaining the idea of the unwritten, the tabula rasa. For 
Mendelssohn, it is a matter of destination, Beruf, of not becoming a scribe – indeed, 
Mendelssohn’s own destiny, as a son of a scribe, whose elegant handwriting had in all likelihood 




…everything actual must not only be thinkable but also thought by some being or 
other. To every real existence, there corresponds an ideal existence in some 
subject or other; to each thing, a representation. Without being known, nothing is 
knowable; without being noticed, no characteristic mark, without a concept, no 
object is actually on hand. 
 
The counterintuitive idea, that there must be an actual knower of everything we hold as 
knowable, loses much of its absurdity if one stops and reflects, as Mendelssohn does, 
on what is implied in knowability, that is, in describing something as a possible object of 
knowledge. Consider the far more readily acceptable Kantian idea, eluded to in his 
‘Orientation’ and developed in the third critique, that in order to investigate nature 
empirically we must on some level assume that it is purposive, i.e., suitable for our 
understanding, that it can accord with our concepts or be conceptualized. In that 
context, Kant also develops his notion of purposiveness without purpose, what is 
required for aesthetic, reflective judgment if it is to reflect on particulars as such, i.e., not 
through the lens of a concept. Mendelssohn’s idea of the actuality of possible 
knowledge can be understood in this light. To approach something as a possible object 
of knowledge is to assume that it has that kind of organization that we can only 
understand as resulting from an act of cognition, or to put it in linguistic terms, and using 
the linguistic analogy of translation, to bring something into one’s language is to treat 
that thing as being in a foreign language, in principle available for translation because it 
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is in a language; we can call this, in a Kantian vein, meaningfulness without meaning, a 
sense for sense, as it were.170 This is where the Kantian picture of our understanding as 
constitutive of reality finds the most resonance with Mendelssohn. Things are, can be 
said to exist, only in so far as they are conceptually, or linguistically constituted. For 
Mendelssohn, to speak of something being the object of possible knowledge is already 
to presuppose, or sense, that it is meaningful, that is, in some way conceptually 
articulated, only not yet by us. 
 
For Mendelssohn, as for many post-Kantian philosophers, the idea of the thing in itself, 
apart from our perspective, is unsustainable, and yet, he also asserts it as a real, if 
shadowy experience. While as a rule, in principle, there can be no meaning to a thing 
that does not accord with a concept, that is precisely what the fundamental experience 
of subjectivity attests to. It is an exception where no exceptions are permissible or 
thinkable. 
 
[The] agreement between a thing and its concept knows no exception… My own 
existence is undeniable for me. It is equally impossible for me to deny the fact that 
inherent in my actual existence are characteristics and constitutive features that I 
do not consciously know and that even those of which I am conscious do not by far 
have in my conception the perfection that pertains to them in the thing…. in a 
                                                
170 Compare with Benjamin’s early essay on language, in which naming, bringing into language, 
is understood as an act of translation. See ‘On Language as Such and the Language of Man,’ in 




word, between concept and thing, if I look merely at my knowledge of myself, the 
most perfect harmony is not to be found, the necessity of which we have just 
proven.171 
  
It is first and foremost in our self-relation that we encounter the thing in itself, in the 
discrepancy we sense as a need, a demand or an urge for realization and articulation. 
The paradox emerges as a result of Mendelssohn’s understanding of possibility as 
arising out of the privation of knowledge, and therefore, of necessity assuming, or 
presupposing, its own actuality. Whatever is known to be unknown – our very selves – 
is, as such, as an object eluding knowledge, inescapably imagined as an object of 
knowledge of the other. 
 
With this, we come to see that Mendelssohn’s claim for originality in his proof is not as 
pretentious and vain as it first seemed. God is not merely the site of the knowledge we 
lack, something we presuppose in asking questions, in seeking to know. God, for 
Mendelssohn, is responsible for keeping that knowledge as possible for us. The 
emphasis is not on God as actualizing our potential knowledge, but on maintaining 
possibility and actuality conjoined in their very separation. The problem for 
Mendelssohn, then, is not how to pass from possibility to actuality, but how to establish 
their relation so that possibility does not collapse into actuality. As we shall see, such a 
collapse might result not only from failing to separate these domains, but also from 
                                                
171 Dahlstrom, Dyck, and Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 106. 
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separating in such a way that makes any contact between them unthinkable, separating 
them too much, so to speak. 
 
As Mendelssohn understands it, there are two ways in which potentiality may collapse 
into actuality. Possibility and actuality may collapse into one another, either by being 
conceived as entirely separate, or by failing to be kept sufficiently apart. Mendelssohn 
takes up this paradoxical status of possibility, in what seems to be an ‘ordinary 
language’ investigation: 
 
It seems to me that here the word ‘can,’ thanks to its multiple meanings, once 
again introduces confusion into the concepts. We must steer clear of the word if 
we want to avoid its snares. If it is said of a thing, that it is capable of something, 
can do something or can suffer something, that it has a capability, facility, 
predisposition for something, does this not mean a certain possibility that we 
ascribe to it?… it nonetheless still remains ‘a mere possibility,’ as the logicians call 
it, a possibility, nothing of which has yet become actual. For example, elasticity or 
the capability to be stretched is attributed to the air that surrounds us, in as much 
as it is not yet stretched. The capacity of standing up is ascribed to me as I sit 
here, before I actually exercise it. Thus, in all these cases, mere possibilities are 
asserted as predicates of subjects. But how can mere possibilities be on hand as 
actual predicates?... do we not contradict ourselves if we attribute to a thing that is 
actually on hand, as part of its make-up, something that is not actually on hand, if 
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we hold a mere possibility to be a predicate of something actual? And 
nonetheless, the complete set of everything with which human beings are 
acquainted is full of these apparent contradictions, of possibilities, dispositions, 
capacities, that are remote or near, larger or smaller capabilities, talents, and so 
forth, by means of which things actually on hand are designated and distinguished 
from one another. How does this happen? Should we reproach the entire mass of 
human knowledge as absurd on account of this?… it is a mere difficulty with the 
words…172 
 
Mendelssohn is here bringing to view the difficulties lurking behind our everyday 
understanding of possibility. In saying that something ‘can,’ we mean to draw a 
distinction between its present state and what is possible for it; possibility is to be 
distinguished from actuality. But we also seem to attribute possibility as a predicate, an 
attribute of things as they are. What is it then? Is it the opposite of actuality, or is it 
reducible to it? 
 
Possibility, for Mendelssohn, is the ability to see how things could be different than they 
are. It cannot then, be understood as an intrinsic property of a thing as it is, that is, 
reducible to actuality, nor can it be a complete abstraction from things as they are, 
possible, as it were, only insofar as it is never actualized. Such a complete opposition 
between possibility and actuality seems to allow for no contact between them, and thus 
                                                
172 Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 104-5. 
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the sense of the possible is lost. One could even say that such a notion of possibility – 
arguably, the status of Kantian regulative ideas – is possible not because it is thinkable, 
but because it can be thought only in its opposition to actuality, that is, only insofar as it 
is in reality impossible. It is only thought as possible, retaining its ideal status as a 
feature of thought, insofar as it is not realized. It seems that the experience of possibility 
can disintegrate in two directions; either by failing to be distinguished from actuality, 
from things as they are, or by being defined in contradistinction to the real. 
 
Possibility, as such, must have some reality for Mendelssohn. We have seen that for 
Mendelssohn the transcendental ‘I,’ in that it continuously does not become an object of 
experience, does form a special kind of what we might call virtual experience. It is not, 
in never becoming an object of experience, that is, never passing into actual 
experience, a mere abstraction, but rather, it is what drives, in its perpetual ‘flight’ from 
experience, the very pursuit of knowledge. 
 
For Mendelssohn, the pursuit of knowledge, either of nature or of the self, is not so 
much a matter of the reassurance that it is there to be known, as it were, suitable for our 
knowledge, but rather has to do with a sense of the object – either nature or the self – 
as “inexhaustible”: 
 
The human soul is as inexhaustible [unerschöpflich] as nature; mere reflection 
cannot possibly establish everything about it, and everyday experience is rarely 
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decisive. The happy moments in which we, as it were, catch nature in the act 
never escape us as easily as when we want to observe ourselves. At such 
moments, the soul is much too preoccupied with other concerns to be able to 
perceive what transpires in it.173 
 
Counterintuitively, for Mendelssohn, what makes possible the pursuit of knowledge, and 
indeed any engaged activity, is not the assumption that the object pursued is real, if by 
that we understand fully actual, or given. On the contrary, what makes knowledge – and 
indeed, anything – possible is also what makes it necessarily possible, so to speak, 
namely, its elusive character, the actuality of the unrealized. 
 
We could say then that in Mendelssohn’s conception of possibility there is a certain 
miraculous quality assigned to reality, but on the provision that miracles happen all the 
time, indeed that the most miraculous is the everyday experience of possibility. 
 
It is not the concept of God that is decisive for Mendelssohn, what and how we think of 
God, but the function God is seen as performing, whether we know it or not. Indeed, in 
some sense, the idea of God developed here is of an essentially unconscious God;174 
                                                
173 M. Mendelssohn and D.O. Dahlstrom, Moses Mendelssohn: Philosophical Writings 
(Cambridge University Press, 1997), 169. 
174 Mendelssohn had in fact developed, without using the word, a concept of the unconscious. In 
the 1780s Mendelssohn was engaged in the establishment of Karl Philipp Moritz’s magazine 
‘Know thyself, or Magazine of experiential psychology, a reader for the learned, edited with 
support of some friends of the truth by Karl Philipp Moritz.’ An important study that 
Mendelssohn contributed to the magazine was occasioned by a pathological experience reported 
by the famous Spalding, who had been attacked by a sudden incapacity to write and speak; he 
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being constantly aware of God as the holder of our potentials is an anxiety filled 
experience, one that would undermine the very function it takes note of. For God to fulfil 
the task Mendelssohn sees him as performing, that is, to make possible our experience 
of possibility, he must rather sink into the background, as it were, relied on in the same 
way one relies on one’s feet to carry one. God, for Mendelssohn, is not so much a 
necessary presupposition as the very necessity of presupposing, the minimal 
presupposition entailed in the project of knowledge: that there is something to know. 
While in some sense such a presupposition is indeed necessary, it seems that already 
in conceiving it as such, as a necessary presupposition, its function and purpose is 
undermined. For if all I have to guarantee that there is something to know is my knowing 
that I need to so presuppose, that need has to be frustrated as soon as it comes to 
mind. For Mendelssohn, rather, insofar as you experience the absence of knowledge as 
an opportunity to discover, and (as we shall see in subsequent chapters) the gaps and 
inconsistencies in reality as an opportunity to act, then there is a God for you, or rather, 
God is there for you. 
 
                                                
felt a “tumultuous disorder” in one particular region of his mind, though his capacity for 
speculative thinking functioned properly as before. Whereas Spalding had tried to account for it 
in purely physiological terms, Mendelssohn offered a psychological account. In a manner that 
vaguely anticipates elements of Freudian thinking, Mendelssohn explained the stuttering as 
resulting from “unwelcome ideas” that were “strangers” in the soul. Mendelssohn’s essay here 
introduced, with remarkable emphasis, the concept of the “unconscious” in two senses of the 
term: (1) as the zero of awareness in purposive actions that, as a result of expertise, proceed 
almost mechanically; (2) as repressed (“dislodged”) ideas that, being as yet “unwelcome,” have 
been consigned to oblivion but become effective in dreams. The recalcitrant character of these 
ideas and the disturbing effect they have on the proper functioning of the ego, certainly call to 




Implicit in Mendelssohn’s ‘proof’ for the existence of God is an alternative, and rather 
illuminating, if depressing, account of what Nihilism, or the death of God, amounts to. 
For being God forsaken would be the loss of the experience of possibility; the oscillation 
between the reduction of possibility to actuality, and their utter separation. The condition 
under which experience is either trivial or impossible.175 Recall that for Mendelssohn the 
evidence for this other site of knowledge, which can properly distinguish and separate 
actualities and potentialities, is the gap in self-knowledge – it is the immediacy of lack 
here, the experience of not knowing myself fully. If what I do not know of myself is 
merely an illusion, I am reduced to what is immediately present in consciousness. But 
this immediacy includes, for Mendelssohn, a certain lack: I immediately know that I do 
not know all there is to know about myself. By denying this, all possible knowledge to be 
gained by any process of articulation is robbed, in advance, of any sense of discovery. 
There is ultimately nothing we can learn, even about ourselves. Experience is entirely 
trivial, for what is unknown is robbed of its potency. 
 
The term nihilist was first made popular as a name for extreme Kantians, those who, 
                                                
175 The Lacanian notion of the real as unrealized can be of service here. Reality is constituted 
against the background of what is missing from it. The Lacanian real is the unrealized, which, in 
dropping out of the frame, so to speak, is constitutive of reality. There are, at bottom, two 
anxieties in regards to the minimal gap between reality and the real (as unrealized). Either the 
real collapses into reality, thereby collapsing reality as we know it, allowing for the ‘real 
unthing,’ as Mendelssohn calls it, free reign, a psychotic reality where everything is possible, or 
we collapse the real into reality, in which case there is really nothing more to what we do not 
know. Reality itself thus becomes a suffocating real, where nothing is possible. To sustain the 
distance between reality and the real, Mendelssohn is suggesting, we must assign possibility its 
own reality. Paradoxically, the possible, to be worthy of its name, must be impossible, in the 
sense that is must be irreducible to the actual or given field of possibility, but, as impossible, it 
must have real baring on our actuality, it must be realizable. 
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unlike Kant himself, denied the existence of the thing in itself.176 Mendelssohn, we have 
seen, rightfully earned this dubious honorific. But it is no accident, no mere historical 
oversight, that he fails to be so named. For Mendelssohn, strangely, finds God precisely 
where, along with any sense of reality, he ought to have vanished. 
 
Mendelssohn views God as maintaining the split in subjectivity as a positive condition, 
allowing for the experience of possibility (note that in the post-Kantian tradition this 
“dualism” is precisely what everybody wants to overcome). As we shall see in the 
following two chapters, this view is in accord with his political-theological imagination, in 
which God’s transcendence is not to be imagined as a site beyond this world, but as 
what prevents this world from closing in on itself. Yet Mendelssohn is keenly aware that 
this experience of God is not directly evident, nor guaranteed, and indeed, keeping it in 
view and being responsive to it is the main task of his political theology. Belief, for 
Mendelssohn, is a practical more than a theoretical problem. But this is a problematic 
oversimplification. As we shall begin to see presently, Mendelssohn’s views as to how 
the practical and the theoretical relate to each other follow a similar logic to the one we 




                                                
176 M.A. Gillespie, Nihilism before Nietzsche (University of Chicago Press, 1996), 65. 
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2.7 Mendelssohn’s Clash of the Faculties: The Division and Unity of Cognition and 
Desire 
For Mendelssohn, the existential or psychological are not in opposition to rational 
argumentation, but rather, the two coincide. They are distinct, but inseparable. We have 
seen this at the plane of metaphysical argumentation. We shall now see that this 
structure pertains to Mendelssohn’s explicit reflections as to how the theoretical and 
practical relate to each other, first, in what directly follows, on an individual level, and 
then, in the next chapter, on the collective level, as theorized in his political theory. 
 
Already in the introduction to Morning Hours we get the sense that, for Mendelssohn, 
theoretical disputes are to be understood not only at the level of the explicit issues in 
dispute, but that one should also pay attention to what is implicit in the manner in which 
they are argued in practice. This is how Mendelssohn describes the intellectual climate 
in which he composed his book: 
 
I know that my philosophy is not the philosophy of the times... In recent times, 
Germany’s best heads speak of all speculation with contemptuous disdain. One 
presses for facts, clings merely to the evidence of the senses, gathers 
observations, heaps up experiences and experiments, perhaps with all too great 
a neglect of universal principles. In the end the mind accustoms itself so much to 
touching and gawking that it deems actual only what lets itself be treated in this 
manner. Hence, the penchant for materialism that threatens in our days to 
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become so universal and, from the other side, the desire to see and touch what, 
given its nature, cannot befall our senses, the penchant for fanaticism.177 
 
Mendelssohn’s analysis of the intellectual arena in which he seeks to intervene makes a 
connection between two opposites: the materialists (naturalists, bent on exorcising 
spirit) and the fanatics (irrational spiritualists). What allows for this connection is not a 
shared belief, but a certain underlying figure of thought, not a shared understanding or 
interpretation, but an underlying metaphorical horizon, disclosed in their attitude towards 
the real, rather than in their understanding of it. What is real, so they imagine – whether 
spirit or matter – is to be sensed, touched. Mendelssohn’s analysis of the spirit of his 
time renders the dispute over the principle underlying all reality – dead, mechanistic 
matter or divine spirit – secondary to the manner in which the relation and accesses to 
this substratum is imagined. At issue for Mendelssohn is not so much what the bickering 
parties respectively believe to be the underlying ground of reality, the point of their 
discord, but rather the identity in their attitude towards it. While they differ in the 
contents of their philosophical beliefs, something in their disposition betrays that they 
share the form, they believe in the same way. 
 
The very nature of the heated debates on such abstract questions reveals that there is 
more at stake here then the objective nature of things. The issue is not so much what is 
                                                
177 Dahlstrom, Dyck, and Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, xx. 
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the real, but the desire shared by opposing parties to touch and be touched by it. With 
this fundamental shared frame of reference, the choice is not between scientific 
materialism or religion, but between a spiritualized materialism and a materialistic 
spiritualism.178 What both sides lose touch with, so to speak, is the untouchable reality 
of thinking as such (indeed, its strange, uncanny materiality). What neither side can 
conceive, nor imagine, is a reality that is untouchable, with which no contact is 
possible.179 
                                                
178 It is interesting to compare Mendelssohn’s treatment of materialism and spiritualism with 
Kant’s. Only three pages after Kant’s ‘refutation’ of Mendelssohn’s proof of the persistence of 
the soul, Kant explains the significance of his refusal as a doctrine of rational psychology, i.e., a 
dogmatic thesis as to the unity of the soul, as a way to avoid both materialism and spiritualism. If 
there is a segment we are entitled to speculate Mendelssohn had read through, at least, it is this 
one. “Thus there is no rational psychology as doctrine that might provide us with an addition to 
our self-consciousness, but only as discipline, setting impassable boundaries for speculative 
reason in this field, in order, on the one side, not to be thrown into the lap of a soulless 
materialism, or on the other side not to get lost wandering about in a spiritualism that must be 
groundless for us in life; on the contrary, it rather reminds us to regard this refusal of our reason 
to give an answer to those curious questions, which reach beyond this life, as reason's hint that 
we should turn our self-knowledge away from fruitless and extravagant speculation toward 
fruitful practical uses, which, even if it is always directed only to objects of experience, takes its 
principles from somewhere higher, and so determines our behavior, as if our vocation extended 
infinitely far above experience, and hence above this life.” Here, in a nutshell, is Kant’s thesis 
elaborated in his ‘Orientation’ essay. Note that Kant’s concern is to avoid two extremes: soulless 
materialism and a groundless spiritualism. For Mendelssohn, the two have much more in 
common than they would care to avow; both are incapable of imagining, or thinking, of the 
reality of something that is untouchable. See Kant, Guyer, and Wood, Critique of Pure Reason, 
452-3.   
179 Daniel Heller Roazen, shows touch, the sense of contact, to be the principle elusively 
underlying the history of sensus communis, what is common to all senses, from Aristotle to 
modernity. See. D. Heller-Roazen, The Inner Touch: Archaeology of a Sensation (Zone Books, 
2007). There might be, however, a way to think of contact without entirely subordinating it to the 
sensible. Such an attempt is carried out by Agamben in offering an interpretation of the Platonic 
idea as the unpresupposed, that is, as a move away from propositional, representational language 
– the fundamental, seemingly inescapable presupposition of language of a world of which it is 
about – to an idea of language that touches. “Only by extinguishing the presuppositional power 
of language is it possible for it to let the mute thing appear: the thing itself and language itself are 
in contact at this point – united only by a void of signification and representation. A word can 




Like Jacobi and Kant, for Mendelssohn, there is a built-in tension between our 
conception of the truth, or objectivity, and our investment or appraisal of it, or our 
subjectivity. And yet, this tension, for Mendelssohn, is not to be overcome by their 
possible concord or unification (as in Kant), nor by the subordination of one to the other 
(as in Jacobi). It is a productive tension. 
 
We begin to see the nature of this productive tension in lecture 7 of Morning Hours. 
Mendelssohn here argues that the customary division of the faculties into those of 
cognition and desire has to be enlarged. The sentiments of pleasure and displeasure, 
which were usually lumped together with desire, formed a group of their own. He here 
elaborated what he had noted as early as 1776 in a short essay entitled, ‘On the Ability 
to Know, the Ability to Feel, and the Ability to Desire,’180 where he develops the idea of 
aesthetic “disinterested pleasure,” to use Kant’s phrase in the Critique of Judgment 
(1790), which may well be indebted to Mendelssohn.181 Between cognition and desire, 
Mendelssohn suggested, there lay the act of approbation, of approving, the satisfaction 
of the soul. 
 
                                                
is a word that does not denote but ‘touches.’ That is to say, as happens in contact, it manifests the 
thing and at the same time also itself – recall in De Anima 423b 15, the definition of touching as 
that which perceives not ‘through a medium’ [metaxy] but ‘at the same time [ama] as the 
medium.’” Agamben and Kotsko, The Use of Bodies, 132. 
180 Mendelssohn and Dahlstrom, Moses Mendelssohn: Philosophical Writings, 307-10. 
181 See Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, 678. 
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We consider the beauty of nature and art with pleasure and satisfaction, without 
the least stirring of desire. It seems rather to be a particular characteristic mark of 
beauty that it is considered with tranquil satisfaction, that it pleases even if it is 
not in our possession… it seems more fitting to me to designate this satisfaction 
and dissatisfaction of the soul, which is without a doubt a seed of desire but not 
yet desire itself, with a particular name and distinguish it from the restlessness of 
the mind associated with desire. I will call it the faculty of approving in order by 
this means to separate it from knowledge of truth as well as from the longing for 
the good. It is, as it were, the transition from knowing to desiring, and it combines 
these two faculties through a gradation so fine that it only becomes noticeable 
once we have gained a certain distance. We can accordingly consider the soul’s 
knowledge in diverse respects.182 
 
Based on his division of the faculties, Mendelssohn distinguishes the true and the false 
as the “matter” of cognition from the beautiful and the ugly, the good and evil, as the 
“form” of cognition. Truth is analogous to matter in that it has the binary structure of an 
either/or, which we tend to associate with the presence or absence of matter. Things 
are either true or false, in the same objective sense that a stone is either there or it is 
not. While there could be no more or less in true and false, the objects of approval and 
disapproval are essentially subject to comparative evaluation. Unlike the material, 
binary aspect of knowledge involved in the ascertainment of truth, the formal aspect of 
                                                
182 Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 43. 
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evaluation is seen as the expanse, or the spectrum between extremes. Value 
judgments differ from fact judgments, in that they do not seek to – and cannot – 
determine that something is good or bad, beautiful or ugly, but only how good or bad it 
is. Evaluating differs from ascertaining truth, or determining a fact, since nothing ever is 
The Good, or The Beautiful. Evaluation is therefore intrinsically subjective and relative, 
assessing its subject matter in light of given circumstances and subjective preferences. 
Having divided the faculties in theory, Mendelssohn’s hylomorphic language now seems 
to see them as unified in practice. 
 
Every item of knowledge, if considered fundamentally, already conveys with itself 
a kind of approval. Every single concept, insofar as the concept is merely 
thinkable, has something pleasing to the soul, something that occupies its 
activity.183 
 
Insofar as something occupies or attracts our attention, it already conveys an approval, 
a preference. Our preferences and evaluations color all our activities, including our 
thinking and knowing. Yet Mendelssohn’s dualistic, hylomorphic unity, is soon 
complemented, and complicated, by a diametrically opposed view, that of a split unity. 
 
I will give you a more notable distinction between these different respects of 
                                                
183 Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 43.   
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knowledge, a distinction which seems to me to have important consequences. 
Both faculties – the faculty of knowledge as well as the faculty of approving – are, 
as we know from psychology, expressions of one and the same power of the 
soul, though they differ with regard to the goal of their striving. The former faculty 
proceeds from things and comes to an end in us, whereas the latter faculty takes 
the opposite path, proceeding from us and having external things as it goal. By 
virtue of the drive for truth, we seek to bring our knowledge into agreement with 
the immutable truth, without regard for satisfaction or dissatisfaction. This is not 
the case with the expression of the approval drive. When this drive is set into 
motion, its goal is not within us but rather is to be found in things outside of us, 
and in the same things it proceeds to make actual those predicates that agree 
with our approval, our satisfaction, and our wishes. The former drive wants to 
reshape human beings according to the nature of things, the latter drive wants to 
reshape things according to the nature of human beings.184 
 
As in the sketch of 1776, Mendelssohn also differentiates here between the objectivity 
of cognition and the subjectivity of approval, in the sense that in searching for true 
knowledge we seek to adapt our thinking to reality as it is, whereas the act of 
approbation tends to make reality conform to our standards. Both cognition, the faculty 
of knowledge, and approbation, the faculty of evaluation, are understood by 
Mendelssohn as drives, indeed, subjectivity and objectivity are imagined as two 
                                                
184 Ibid. p. 44. 
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opposing vectors of one and the same drive, revolving around, and at the same time 
establishing the inner/outer relation; one direction strives to make outer reality conform 
with our preferences, the other to make us conform to what is conceived as external. 
What is important to note is that in this view the fundamental distinction between inner 
and outer is not something static, or given in advance, but the product of the crossing of 
these two vectors, or more precisely, it is the very tension between the objective 
tendency, which assumes the external, or objective as given, and seeks to make us 
accord with it, and the subjective, which sees outer reality as amenable to the given, 
inner reality. 
 
There is a certain, perhaps productive tension between Mendelssohn’s two, successive 
accounts. The first, hylomorphic and metaphoric, gives the impression of what might be 
described as a static dynamics: understood as the formal and material aspects of 
knowledge, the faculties are always operative together, but their relationship seems 
static; the second account complicates this static picture with what in the previous 
picture seemed given and pre-established: the division of the subjective and objective, 
inner and outer, is here seen as the outcome, always tenuous, of a field of struggle, or 
as the force field between two poles of attraction. In other words, Mendelssohn first 
gives an account of the division from an objective (or, in his terms, material) 






2.8 Divided by Common Sense: Jacobi, Kant, Mendelssohn 
To bring to view Mendelssohn’s complex view of how the theoretical and the practical 
relate to each other, it is useful to compare it Jacobi’s notion of common sense, which 
Kant, we have seen, thought Mendelssohn failed to distinguish himself from, and to 
Kant’s own, critical notion, which he begun to develop in his essay on ‘Orientation.’ 
 
For Jacobi, common sense implies an immediate form of knowledge, one that is not 
fully translatable to conceptual language, and is superior to it in that it affirms those vital 
realities that inferential reason can never fully grasp: the existence of a reality outside 
me, the crucial sense of individual existence, and even the existence of God. This 
immediate relation to reality is superior to inferential, conceptual reason, not only in that 
it surpasses it in what it can know, so to speak, but perhaps more importantly, in its 
affirmative nature; it connects, rather than severs us from our life worlds. Common 
sense and faith are one and the same. Immediate knowledge has primacy over 
mediated, reasoned knowledge, not only in that it is superior, but also in that it 
determines it, colors what we know conceptually whether we are aware of it or not. 
 
We have seen some of Kant’s criticism of such a notion of common sense in his essay 
on ‘Orientation.’ In that essay, Kant’s amended common sense was to serve a double 
function: it was to prevent the understanding from overstepping its boundaries, and to 
guide and support reason in its practical pursuits. Kant will go on, in his third critique, to 
develop a notion common sense that is to mediate between the faculties of cognition 
and desire, bringing them into contact by keeping them apart.  To serve that purpose it 
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would have to be sharply distinguished from the vulgar notion of ‘healthy’ or ‘sound’ 
human understanding, which is understood by him as the uncritical reliance on what is 
commonly held to be true, on accepted, received views, the very opposite of a critical 
stance.185 If Jacobi’s common sense celebrates immediacy, Kant’s common sense had 
the role of a mediator. 
 
We shall presently examine Mendelssohn’s notion of common sense, as it emerges in 
Morning Hours. But from what we have seen so far, in Mendelssohn’s division of the 
faculties, in comparison to the views of common sense sketched above, there emerges 
something quite perplexing. In seeing approbation as the form of cognition, 
Mendelssohn seems to go a long way in Jacobi’s direction, in so far as it seems there is 
no position of purely objective knowledge, our knowing is always embedded in 
preferences and inclinations. On the other hand, Mendelssohn describes the faculties in 
dynamic terms as standing in tension, pulling in opposite directions. 
 
Mendelssohn is often described in the literature as a proponent of ‘good practical 
sense,’186 of the sort Kant had suspected cannot but collapse into the irrationalism of 
                                                
185 Instead, Kant develops the notion of common sense as what, in being neither a judgment of 
desire nor a judgment of cognition, emerges an independent realm, the training ground of 
judgment as such. 
186 The notion of pragmatic common sense lies at the core of Gideon Freudenthal’s reading of 
Mendelssohn. See Gideon. Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry: Mendelssohn's Jewish 
Enlightenment (University of Notre Dame Press, 2012). Sorkin, while highlighting the 
distinction as fundamental, takes the notion of practical knowledge, or wisdom, to be 
unproblematic. See D. Sorkin, Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment (Halban, 
2012). Gottlieb has a more nuanced approach, but he offers no account of this dimension of 
Mendelssohn’s thinking. Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn's Theological-
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Jacobi, ultimately subordinating and limiting reason’s freedom received wisdom. But is 
this so? Can Mendelssohn, who, with his hunched back, the result of many evenings 
studying Maimonides’ philosophy – literally embodying the disfiguration of the body by 
study, by theoretical activity – have had such a low opinion of the merit and value of the 
realm of theory?187 Could Mendelssohn, who as we saw took great pains to both 
distinguish the theoretical and practical realms, and give an account of their interaction 
that avoids subordinating one to the other, simply advocate acting in accordance with 
popular doxa? In light of what we have seen so far it seems clear, at least, that in his 
view this relation – between the practical and the theoretical – is far from static and 
unproblematic. 
 
Indeed, for Mendelssohn there is nothing more mysterious than common sense. 
Benjamin’s maxim in his essay on surrealism is here particularly instructive: “we 
penetrate the mystery only to the degree that we recognize it in the everyday world, by 
virtue of a dialectical optic that perceives the everyday as impenetrable, the 
impenetrable as everyday.”188 Although the tone of this remark by Benjamin seems far 
removed from Mendelssohn’s style, it does shed light on the core of his sensibility. For 
                                                
Political Thought. Rosenstock draws comparisons between Mendelssohn and the Wittgenstein of 
the Philosophical Investigations, often read as a philosophy of ‘everyday language.’ Bruce .B. 
Rosenstock, Philosophy and the Jewish Question: Mendelssohn, Rosenzweig, and Beyond 
(Fordham University Press, 2010). 
187 There is in Mendelssohn’s life a continuous thread of theoretical affairs baring heavily, and 
grimly, on his health. From the nervous breakdown following the Lavater affair, to his letters to 
Kant, in which he measures his health by his (in)capacity to engage with Kant’s critique. 
188 Surrealism. In W. Benjamin et al., Walter Benjamin - Selected Writings, 1927-1930 (Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 216. 
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Mendelssohn, the problem of relating common sense – that intuitive, practical, everyday 
understanding in the midst of things – and theoretical, speculative reason, is the 
fundamental mystery. Significantly, in his Morning Hours he stages their relationship in 
a dream. 
 
Kant’s point of departure in ‘What is Orientation?’ – the figure or orientation in thinking –  
is taken from the most famous – in large part, because of Kant – segment of Morning 
Hours, namely a dream Mendelssohn reports on. While Kant doesn’t address the dream 
directly, he does present his own procedure as a way to avoid the collapse of thinking 
into mere dreaming. Indeed, before his presentation of the dream, Mendelssohn takes 
up the old Cartesian problem of distinguishing dream from reality. 
 
 
2.9 The Object of Thought – Between Dream and Reality 
For Kant, we should recall, the only way to avoid metaphysical dreams is to clearly limit 
our pursuit of knowledge to the realm of possible experience, that is, for what can be 
supplied empirical, sensible material as support. Knowledge is grounded in, and 
restricted to, empirical reality. It is this restriction that also supplies the criterion to 
distinguish between dream and reality; dreaming is projecting into reality what cannot 
be found in it, the products of our own desires and wishes. Not paying enough care to 
the distinction between our subjective needs and objective reality is what makes 
dogmatic metaphysicians, of the likes of Mendelssohn, mistake dreaming for thinking. 
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Mendelssohn presents a different picture: 
 
Rational knowledge and the order in which it serially places concepts one after 
another holds no other interest for the soul than the interest proper to this resolve 
[to meditate]. It follows this series of thought because it seeks to obtain a 
determinate end by this means. For the most part this resolve, this final purpose, 
is a supersensory object that is seldom mighty enough to resist the charm of the 
imagination’s rich imagery. Hence, the soul would not long remain faithful to its 
resolve if an obscure consciousness of the present did not restrain it from its 
wayward path. But it is also necessary that the consciousness of the present not 
be mighty enough to captivate the soul entirely and render obscure the concept 
of the resolve [to meditate] along with the thoughts that lead to it. The present 
should merely remind the soul of its actual state and, by this means, of its resolve 
so that, undisturbed, it can pursue the order of reason. The impression of the 
present must be neither too strong nor too weak, neither too lively nor too feeble, 
if the soul is to be able to maintain itself in a disposition conducive to meditating. 
All-too-strong impressions of the present overpower rational knowledge too 
much; by contrast, those that are all-too weak abandon the soul to the play of the 
imagination, and it takes flight into reveries… Where have we come to? Indeed, 
have I not through my own example just confirmed the very doctrine I wanted to 
present? I began by stating the difference between subjective and objective 
representations in order to find the identifying marks by which we can distinguish 
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the state of being awake from a dream. Without having fully attained this final 
purpose, the soul has followed the path of the imagination, engaged in describing 
rapture and enthusiasm, and slipped away from these to the requirements of 
meditation: and just now I was of a mind to digress even further into the rule of 
lyric poetry.189 
 
It is hard to define Mendelssohn’s poetic-philosophical gesture here: he declares 
himself to have exemplified the very failure to distinguish, to supply a criterion for 
distinguishing between reality and dream – the final purpose set before reason, to 
clearly delineate the realm of actuality. Instead, he himself drifted in reverie. But in the 
unsteady course of his line of thought, some significant conceptual work in fact has 
been achieved. It is a rather special case of example, one indeed that teaches 
something very different from what it pretends to. A sort of self-effacing performative 
paradox, where the very declaration of failure in attaining his goal masks the way in 
which he had indeed attained it. Such a gesture, easy to miss, allows a glimpse at 
something so close to the surface it is nearly undetectable: an elusive object 
produced/attained in the very failure to reach one’s purpose. 
 
Instead of supplying us with a clear-cut criterion to distinguish dream from reality, 
Mendelssohn gives an account of what we may call presence of mind, or wakefulness, 
which, paradoxically, seems to situate presence of mind between dream and reality. 
                                                




The capacity to contemplate (meditate, to hold on to an object in thinking) is under the 
influence of two vectors of influence. Too strong of a draw to the empirical, to the 
immediate, to what is taken to be actual and concrete and reason becomes subservient 
to reality, incapable of pursuing its quest, and its object disintegrates. Too weak a pull, 
and reason might lose all ground in reality and drift in reverie. (In a sense, the very 
insistence on purging dream from reality is what brings these two vectors into play.) The 
same principle we saw in play in Mendelssohn’s division of the soul’s faculties is 
operative here as well; dream and reality are not distinguished once and for all, but can 
be seen as two vectors of power, pulling in opposite directions. Going all the way in 
either direction is to lose both; they only remain in relative separation in so far as 
something – here, thinking – can position itself in between them. 
 
In this more dynamic imagery, a reality purified of all dream elements turns out to be 
something quite different from objective observance; it is a kind of passion for the real, a 
fanaticism, an infatuated dream of a reality devoid of all semblance. It makes 
contemplation impossible. Pure speculation, without any concern with brute reality, with 
the factual and the given, becomes itself a flight of fancy. Thus, presence of mind is not 
the criterion to distinguish between dream and reality, but the very edge, practically 
keeping them from collapsing into one another, by avoiding positioning itself on either 
side. With this paradoxical performative distinction in mind we can assess 





2.10 The Dream of Common Sense 
Historical materialism bases its procedures on long experience, common sense, 
presence of mind, and dialectics.190 
 
In the dream, Mendelssohn finds himself among a group of travelers in the Swiss Alps. 
The group has two guides. One is described as a rash young man, quick to act, 
equipped with “a muscular built, but not the sharpest intellect.” The other is a woman, 
“With a deeply introspective look and a visionary physiognomy; dressed in a fantastic 
manner, she had something on the back of her head that looked similar to wings.”191 
Both serve as guides for the group, which includes amongst them Mendelssohn, our 
dreamer. After a while, the group comes to a fork in the road. There the two guides split 
ways, and the group remains stuck, unsure who to follow. Then, an elderly matron 
approaches from behind, with measured steps. She consoles the group, assuring them 
they will not be stuck for long. She also explains the allegorical meaning of their guides, 
naming one, the rash young man, “common sense,” and the other, the mysterious 
looking woman, “contemplation.” She explains: “Sometimes they part ways for a short 
time, often for insignificant reasons. If those traveling with them are steadfast enough to 
wait at the fork in the path and to follow neither of them, they come back to let me 
                                                
190 W. Benjamin and R. Tiedemann, The Arcades Project (Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1999), 476. 
191 Dahlstrom, Dyck, and Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 59. 
Mendelssohn’s characterization of the two guides appears as a splitting in two of the traditional 
figure of Kairos, the God of the right time or opportunity, who was depicted as a young man 
rushing forward with only a single lock of hair on its forehead, as if to suggest that an 




resolve their dispute.” In most cases, common sense tends to be right and, she 
continues, “contrary to what one might expect, the female person tends to let herself be 
instructed. On the other hand, if, as sometimes also happens, she is in the right, then 
he, the obstinate one, cannot be brought to yield. In the face of the most convincing 
reasons, he laughs at me in his peasant manner, mumbles some rustic platitude, and 
stubbornly goes his way once more.” With this, the travelers turn to the old matron, and 
ask for her name: “What then is your own name, you who decide their dispute?” “On 
earth”, she replies, “I am called reason; in heaven…” Here, suddenly, she is interrupted 
by “an awful clamor… a fanatical swarm of locals from the region has gathered around 
the lady, contemplation, and resolved to drive away both common sense and reason. 
“Shouting and raging, they pressed upon us, we were in a state of fright – and I 
awoke.”192 
 
Here, again, it is the plain, straightforward nature of the dream that poses the challenge. 
Freud believed dreams in which the secondary process manages to come up with a 
narrative “faultlessly logical and reasonable” the toughest to interpret: “Dreams which 
are of such kind have been subjected to a far-reaching revision by this psychical 
function that is akin to waking thought; they appear to have a meaning, but that 
meaning is far removed as possible from their true significance.”193 Mendelssohn’s 
dream goes even further in self-interpretation – the dream is not only coherent, but it 
                                                
192 Mendelssohn, Morning Hours: Lectures on God's Existence, 59. 




even offers its own explicit interpretation of its allegorical significance. 
 
The dream ends abruptly, and points to a mystical, divine interpretation. What we call 
reason goes by another, secret, name in heaven. What could it be? We are left 
guessing. But before we search for solutions in the heavens above we can note 
something far closer to the surface. While contemplation, the young, dreamy lady, is 
powerless to part ways with common sense, and tends, instead, to let herself be guided 
by his far inferior intellect, conforming along the way to the traditionally enforced 
patriarchy, reason, whose sole advantage over speculation seems to be her old age, is 
capable of reversing the relations of power and exercise authority even over the brutish 
young man. Could it be that reason is an older version of contemplation? 
We may begin to appreciate what it was that drew Kant to Mendelssohn’s dream here, 
and also why he felt he had to correct it. The speculative identity of reason and 
speculation is much closer to Kant than he is ready to admit; indeed, perhaps too close 
for comfort. It is our power to abstract, to ‘rise above’ the immediacy of experience that 
can judge against our inclinations. But the dream ‘stages’ a difficult, and threatening 
question: given the tyrannical power of common sense, how is reason to raise itself 
above it? What is threatening in this picture is the realization that our ordinary 
judgments are not merely bound to the empirical as ‘sense data,’ but also to our 
causally determined inclinations, and above all, that the very separation between the 
two (the theoretical and practical) is not a primordial (or empirical) fact, given to 
reflection, but itself the precarious product of an abstraction, that remains just that, an 
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empty abstraction, unless it is capable of a remarkable feat – to give up on its 
abstraction. Reason is to be realized. 
Mendelssohn’s admission that our cognition is far more intuitive than we might like to 
think, embedded as it is in a rich fabric of prejudice and assumptions, is not meant to 
give common sense the upper hand. All to the contrary, it suggests something quite 
daring: that the test of reason is to take a counter intuitive step against the forceful 
restrictions of the reality principle that is common sense, and also, that in order to be 
able to do this, it must age, gain experience, suffer constraints and pressures that are 
foreign to its nature, that is, it will have to lose something of its lofty opposition with 
common sense. It will have to lose quite a lot by way of self-image and dirty its hands. 
Bearing in mind Mendelssohn’s positioning of presence of mind at the very site of the 
division between dream and reality, we can also gain a better understanding of the 
dream’s abrupt end, and offer a solution for the mysterious, heavenly name of reason. 
Reason’s name, the deep secret of the dream that otherwise is insistent on interpreting 
itself, the one thing reason is not allowed to disclose, is given in awakening. Awakening 
is the divine name of reason, since Mendelssohn’s reason only emerges through 
dreaming – it is what emerges at the point of contact between dream and reality. 
 
 
2.1 Figures of Mind 
But it is not only reason that is driven away by the crowd; along with it disappear both 
speculation and common sense. The faculties of the mind, which in Kant gain so much 
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precision, disappear twice over. They disappear in the dream, as it reaches its 
nightmarish excess, and they disappear altogether in awakening. Figures of thought, in 
particular the figures of thought itself, those metaphors without which thinking cannot be 
imagined or gain any reality,194 disappear as abstractions, mere fictions: there is no 
room for their reality from the stand point of a reality that is to be truly devoid of all 
dream elements. They are colorful ways of talking, but amount to no more than wishful 
thinking. But neither are they to be celebrated in the enchanted landscape of the dream. 
Indeed, their moment of truth is their vanishing point, right at the nightmarish edge 
between dream and reality. The dream is capable of thinking what consciousness 
cannot. The deep anxiety disclosed in the dream is the confrontation with the 
unthinkable – the utter destruction of all thinking, the reign of senseless violence. A 
reality without thinking cannot even be represented in the dream, only as its limit. It is 
from this impossible thought that the dream escapes to reality. It is in reality as we 
ordinarily perceive it, not in the dream, that we can escape this, because even if we 
banish all figures of thought from it as unreal, we do so only in the service of assuring 
ourselves of the well-ordered, comprehensible – indeed, reasonable – nature of reality 
as we know it. The secret name of reason is awakening, not in the sense of finally 
leaving our dreams behind, but because reason has its particular reality only at the 
impossible juncture between dream and reality, and is doomed to disappear when they 
are kept entirely apart. The ultimate phantasy – shared by both ‘dreamers’ and ‘realists’ 
– is the separation of dream from reality, of viewing the dream as devoid of all reality, 
                                                
194 Such as those that Hans Blumenberg called ‘Absolute Metaphors.’ See H. Blumenberg and 
R.I. Savage, Paradigms for a Metaphorology (Cornell University Press, 2010). 
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and reality as the sober opposition to the dream. It is not only that the dream touches on 
something very real that reality can only shy away from – the possible dissolution of all 
coherent reality, the dissolution of thinking – and that reality can only dream of 
coherence. Both dimensions are only perceivable from the point of their overlap. 
 
While it is true that Mendelssohn is an advocate of common sense, his view of it is 
neither commonsensical nor entirely abstract. Mendelssohn’s figures of thought do not 
serve to exemplify an abstract idea, to bring to understanding what eludes it, nor do 
they serve to inspire or provoke feelings, to promote the self-congratulatory assertion of 
one’s intuitions and wishes. They serve a very precise function, namely to interrupt the 
most concrete of abstractions: the abstract opposition of the abstract and the concrete, 





Part 2: Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem	  
 
 
3. Reading Jerusalem	  
 
We have established that Morning Hours, Mendelssohn’s intervention in the pantheism 
controversy, can be read as contributing to post-Kantian philosophical discussion. In 
this last work, Mendelssohn was responding to fundamental issues that arose in the 
aftermath of Kant’s transcendental turn. The basic lesson of our reading is that, while 
Mendelssohn internalizes, and even radicalizes, fundamental Kantian ideas (such as 
the thing in itself, and the transcendental/empirical divide) that were and are seen as 
having disastrous consequences for both reason and faith, in Mendelssohn’s hands 
they serve to strengthen faith rather than shake it. But this is not to say that 
Mendelssohn’s faith is unshakable, nor that he is blind to fundamental problems that 
pertain to the relation of faith and reason. In the second half of this thesis we turn from 
Morning Hours to his earlier, political-theological work, Jerusalem. Here we shall find 




3.1 Refusing the Challenge – Mendelssohn and Jacobi 
Mendelssohn is rarely seen as having offered a meaningful response to Kant’s 
philosophy. In Part I we tried to amend this perception by suggesting that his reception 
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of Kant, while in many ways a “mistranslation,” is nonetheless insightful and relevant for 
still ongoing debates. But another reason for the neglect of Mendelssohn in the context 
of the pantheism controversy is that he is commonly perceived as having failed entirely 
to appreciate, let alone come to terms with, Jacobi’s challenge. 
 
Rather than assume, as did Jacobi, and as has much of the historical commentary, that 
Mendelssohn was philosophically incapable of understanding the profundity of Jacobi’s 
critique, and, at the same time, was also too much of a rationalist to grasp the meaning 
of Jacobi’s existential challenge, we shall rather take Mendelssohn at his word and 
attempt to understand why he believed Jacobi’s challenge to be a specifically Christian 
problem. 
 
Mendelssohn regarded Jacobi’s salto mortale as “a salutary device of nature,” which is 
understood by Altman as a disillusionment form vane metaphysical pursuits and a 
return to common sense. After having indulged in abstruse speculation for a while, one 
was well advised to return to normal by using one’s common sense. In other words, 
Mendelssohn minimized Jacobi’s existential option for faith by explaining it away 
psychologically as a natural antidote for too many sterile metaphysical exertions.195 
 
By now we have come to see that for Mendelssohn common sense was not the 
‘magical’ solution for all philosophical and existential problems. The return to reality that 
                                                
195 Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, 635. 
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Mendelssohn is after is a far cry from reducing philosophical speculation – again, 
Mendelssohn’s life long, deepest passion – to a psychological problem. Indeed, as we 
have seen, it is the very tension between the psychological and the metaphysical that 
lies at the heart of his thinking. There is nonetheless a valid, worthwhile clue in 
Mendelssohn’s association of Jacobi’s leap of faith with his own philosophical return to 
reality or awakening. Mendelssohn’s existentialism, the problem of how to bring one’s 
most abstract insights into contact with lived reality, is not seen in terms of an existential 
either/or between faith and reason, and further, it is not seen as an entirely 
individualistic matter, but as a social, political, and historical problem. 
 
Mendelssohn associated Jacobi’s leap of faith with his loyalty to Christianity, and 
contrasted it with his own rationalism, which he believed was unchallenged by the 
religion he professed. There is ample evidence that Mendelssohn saw in Jacobi a new 
Johann Kaspar Lavater, whose attempt to convert Mendelssohn, some fifteen years 
earlier, had left a lasting impact on Mendelssohn’s physical and psychological condition. 
In a letter to Kant of October 1785, he seeks to draw Kant’s attention to Lavater’s 
presence in Jacobi’s work; Jacobi cites Lavater at the end of his essay as a source of 
solace, which Mendelssohn adds, “conveys no solace to me, because I cannot 
understand it. All in all this work of Herr Jacobi is an unusual mixture, an almost 
monstrous birth, with the head of Goethe, the body of Spinoza, and the feet of 
Lavater.”196 
                                                




In 1769, Lavater had sent Mendelssohn a translation of Charles Bonnet’s Palingénésie 
philosophique and demanded that he either publicly refute Bonnet’s arguments (which 
to his mind presented incontrovertible proof of the truth of Christianity) or convert. 
Mendelssohn refused to do either, and many prominent intellectuals of the time took his 
side, including Georg Christoph Lichtenberg and Herder. 
 
As we shall see in the next chapter, Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem was not only written in 
response to a similar challenge, but is also to be read as a deep philosophical response 
to the very idea that one’s religious and ethical life is dictated or flows from what one 
holds to be true. Neither, however, is it to be conceived as irrational. 
 
Mendelssohn’s identification of Jacobi as a new Lavater is often produced as evidence 
for the depth of Mendelssohn’s misunderstanding of his rival (a misunderstanding the 
responsibility of which at least some commentators attribute to Jacobi’s confusing style). 
Jacobi was far from your run of the mill religious fanatic, and he was certainly not 
interested in converting Mendelssohn. (Indeed, considering that Jacobi’s leap of faith is 
meant to reaffirm one’s life world, it is doubtful that conversion was even deemed a 
viable option.) Nonetheless, as we shall argue, Mendelssohn’s identification is not 
without a point. As will emerge from our reading of Jerusalem in the following two 
chapters, Mendelssohn had reason for deeming Jacobi’s dilemma as grounded in a 
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Christian political-theology, and for thinking that he himself had already dealt with it in 
Jerusalem. 
 
Likewise, I shall not discuss the honest retreat to the flag of faith that you, on 
your part, propose. This proposal is entirely in the spirit of your religion, which 
imposes upon you the duty of suppressing doubts by faith. The Christian 
philosopher may amuse himself by teasing the naturalist and by raising knotty 
points that drive him from one corner into another and invariably elude his grasp 
when it seems surest. My religion knows of no duty to remove such doubts by 
any arguments except rational ones; it commands no [mere] faith in eternal 
truths. I have, therefore, an additional reason to seek conviction [by rational 
means].197 
 
Mendelssohn did not see himself as caught in Jacobi’s dilemma, since, as we shall 
presently see, he had developed a notion of religion that is not threatened by doubts, 
and this because, in a fundamental sense, it is not based on any prescribed beliefs. 
Neither faith nor enlightenment are understood by Mendelssohn through the lens of the 
individual. Before we move to Jerusalem, then, it is helpful to briefly review his 
conception of enlightenment. 
 
 
                                                
197 Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A Biographical Study, 635. 
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3.2 What is Enlightenment? The Division and Unity of Theory and Practice 
In September of 1784 the Berlinische Monatschrift published an answer to the question, 
“What is Enlightenment?” written by Mendelssohn. Kant's much more celebrated 
answer to the same question would be published three months later.198 
 
Whereas enlightenment appears in Kant's essay as a clear cut positive concept, a good 
to be strived for, Mendelssohn's attitude is more reserved. Mendelssohn views 
enlightenment as something that must be thought in its relation to culture. The two 
relate to each other as theory to practice.199 
 
A language attains enlightenment through the sciences and attains culture through 
social interaction. Through the former it becomes better suited for theoretical 
usages, through the latter for practical usages. Both together make it an educated 
language.200 
                                                
198 Foucault repeatedly returned to Kant’s essay as the beginning of a new era of Modernity. 
Foucault does refer to Mendelssohn’s essay, but only in order to mark the common, ultimately 
tragic destiny of Enlightenment and Jewish Haskalah. See Michel Foucault, The Essential 
Foucault: Selections from Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984 (New Press, 2003), 43-44. 
See also Miriam Leonard, Socrates and the Jews: Hellenism and Hebraism from Moses 
Mendelssohn to Sigmund Freud (University of Chicago Press, 2012), 17-64. 
199 David Sorkin has pointed out that “this distinction between practical and theoretical 
knowledge… may well have resulted from his [Mendelssohn’s] view of Judaism.” David. 
Sorkin, Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment, ed. Arthur. Hertzberg (Halban 
Publishers, 2013), 13. Michael Mack focuses his reading of Jerusalem around this distinction. 
See Michael Mack, German Idealism and the Jew: The Inner Anti-Semitism of Philosophy and 
German Jewish Responses (University of Chicago Press, 2013), 79-88. 
200 Moses Mendelssohn. On the Question: What is Enlightenment? In James Schmidt, What Is 
Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions (University of 




Note that the subject of neither culture nor enlightenment is individuals – it is language. 
Language is the subject of Bildung, of formation – the process of articulation and 
realization – which involves the interplay of theory and practice, enlightenment and 
culture. As we shall see, this will be of decisive significance in understanding 
Mendelssohn’s theory of language and belief developed in the second part of 
Jerusalem. 
 
Enlightenment is related to culture as theory is to practice, as knowledge to ethics, 
as criticism to virtuosity. Regarded (objectively) in and for themselves they stand in 
the closest connection, although subjectively they very often are separated.201 
 
We saw in the previous chapter the same formulation developed on the level of the 
individual in Mendelssohn’s division of the faculties. Mendelssohn not only sees 
enlightenment as intertwined with culture, he also fears that enlightenment can be 
corrupted if its entanglement with culture is overlooked. 
 
If certain useful and – for mankind – adorning truths may not be disseminated 
without destroying prevailing religious and moral tenets, the virtue loving bearer of 
enlightenment will proceed with prudence and discretion and endure prejudice 
rather than drive away the truth that is so closely intertwined with it.202 
                                                
201 Ibid. 





3.3 Enlightenment’s Prejudice 
Mendelssohn’s defense of prejudice seems contrary to the spirit of enlightenment. It 
seems his position is one of moderate or conservative enlightenment. Yes, 
enlightenment, but not too much, not if it disturbs the established order of culture.203 But 
Mendelssohn’s position is more nuanced, and it contains the germ of dialectics. 
Mendelssohn’s concern is not so much that enlightenment might, so to speak, throw 
away the baby with the bath water, that, in its hurry to get rid of prejudice it might also 
lose sight of the truth intertwined within it. Rather, he is pointing towards 
enlightenment’s own blind spot, as it were, its own prejudice. 
 
Nothing is more opposed to the true good of mankind than this sham 
enlightenment, where everyone mouths a hackneyed wisdom, from which the spirit 
has already long vanished; where everyone ridicules prejudice, without 
distinguishing what is true in them from what is false.204 
 
                                                
203 Altman is one of the few commentators to see Mendelssohn’s positions as more radical than 
Kant’s. Altman points out that, in defending Kant’s thesis, Mendelssohn went beyond Kant in 
suggesting that in some cases, what Kant called the public use of reason was permissible within 
one’s function (what Kant called the private use of reason). See Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: A 
Biographical Study, 663. Goetschel offers an illuminating comparative reading of both texts, 
which includes a survey of past comparisons. See W. Goetschel, The Discipline of Philosophy 
and the Invention of Modern Jewish Thought (Fordham University Press, 2013), 210-29. 
204 Moses Mendelssohn. On the Question: What is Enlightenment? In Schmidt, What Is 
Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, 57. 
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As Mendelssohn elsewhere puts it, “you can cut through all the roots of an obsolete 
prejudice without completely taking away its nourishment. For in such case it feeds off 
the air.”205 
  
This striking metaphor should be taken to express Mendelssohn’s deep understanding, 
based, in part, on his own experience, that prejudice is not done away with by being 
disproved, by being consciously disavowed. Prejudice is not mere ignorance, a mistake 
to be corrected, and is resistant to better knowledge.206 Mendelssohn is well aware that 
the disavowal of prejudice does not do away with it, and in fact, can itself be a way of 
affirming it, even endowing it with new nourishment. Pure and simply rejecting the past 
can be a way of feeding its effect on the present, and indeed, giving it a new, more 
ephemeral, but for that very reason – inexhaustible – source of nourishment. Outrooting 
will not do, it only makes the problem of the past’s uncritical effect on the present more 
ubiquitous and transparent, invisible, in giving one the illusion of having overcome it 
once and for all. 
 
Mendelssohn ultimately aims at enlightenment’s own prejudice, the problematic illusion 
                                                
205 From Mendelssohn’s introduction to the Menashe Ben Israel’s “Vindication of the Jews”. See 
M. Mendelssohn and M. Albrecht, Jerusalem oder über religiöse Macht und Judentum (Meiner, 
F, 2005), 11. 
206 Octave Manoni has called attention to this common, everyday, yet elusive form of belief 
maintained, rather than rejected through ‘better knowledge’. See Octave Manoni “I Know Well 
but All the Same”, in M.A. Rothenberg, D.A. Foster, and S. ed, Perversion and the Social 
Relation: Sic Iv (Duke University Press, 2003), 68-92. Robert Pfaller develops the distinction 
between (avowed) faith and (disavowed) belief, with far reaching consequences for the critique 
of ideology and the history of religion. See R. Pfaller, On the Pleasure Principle in Culture: 
Illusions without Owners (Verso Books, 2014). 
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that pertains to the project of enlightenment – to enlightenment as a project – that 
prejudice can be done away with. This is, in his mind, The prejudice with a capital T, the 
uncritical presupposition of enlightenment as a project. What is called for is not a rash 
rejection of so called received wisdom, an attitude that has itself become something of a 
received wisdom in the circles of enlightenment, but neither is it a matter of simply 
reaffirming one’s own prejudices; rather, the issue is how to relate in a critical manner to 
that which one – inevitably – receives, what one is confronted with as a given. The 
difficult task, indeed, “Man’s destiny in general,” is “not to suppress the prejudices but to 
shine light on them.”207 This issue of how to relate to the entanglement with the given 
forms the core of Mendelssohn’s engagement with the division between theory and 
practice, and it stands at the center of his political-theological reflections in Jerusalem.   
 
 
3.4 Jerusalem’s Division 
In reading Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem one must begin just before the beginning. Before 
we can engage with the body of the text, a few preliminary remarks as to its structural 
organization and title are in order. 
 
                                                
207 Mendelssohn, “Soll man der einreißenden Schwärmerei durch Satyre oder durch äußere 
Verbindung entgegenarbeiten?” (Jub A 6.1, pp. 137-141). The context, a reply to the question 
“Should one steer the increasing fanaticism by way of satire or political pressure?”, is interesting. 
Mendelssohn here criticizes the self-congratulatory sham enlightenment attitude 
(Afteraufklärung), which consists in mocking other people’s prejudices, as a deep form of 
blindness, in which the other’s supposed superstition, ridiculed, serves to promote one’s own 
sense of superiority. 
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Mendelssohn’s book is divided into two sections. The first is Mendelssohn’s treatment of 
the division between religion and politics, and the second a treatment of Judaism that 
has, among other things, the immediate purpose of responding to a series of 
provocations. The most recent of these was issued by an anonymous writer,208 who 
suggested that, according to Mendelssohn's own publicly expressed views on matters of 
religion and politics, he should abandon Judaism. Mendelssohn was provoked to show 
that his way of life does not stand in contradiction with the philosophical principles he 
has expounded.209 
 
Is Judaism then a particular case, in which the principles elucidated in the first part of 
Jerusalem will be applied or tested? Is it an exception to the rule, or perhaps a 
paradigm? As Willi Goetschel has noted, much in the interpretation of this book has 
suffered from a failure to fully consider the implications of the title in its relation to the 
book.210 It is crucial to allow the ambiguity of the title to resonate fully: Jerusalem, or, on 
                                                
208 Scholarship has identified the anonymous writer as August Friedrich Cranz, but evidence 
suggests Mendelssohn himself thought him to have been Joseph Baron of Sonnenfels. 
209 Altman had already noted that the division of the book is complicated by the “Jewish” 
concerns of the first part and the “philosophical” concerns of the second. We aim, in part, to 
achieve some clarity as to the unity of the book, a unity that is founded, as it were, on division. 
210 See Willi Goetschel, “Athens, Jerusalem, and the Orient Express of Philosophy,” Bamidbar: 
Journal of Jewish Thought & Philosophy (Vienna: Passagen Verlag), no. 1 (2011). Goetschel 
draws attention to how, already in his title, Mendelssohn is signaling a refusal to think in 
accordance with the Athens/Jerusalem dichotomy, and sees Mendelssohn’s project as an 
alternative casting of the universal and the particular. Goetschel interprets the title in light of the 
concluding line of the book, a quote from Zechariah “Love Truth, Love Peace!” In the 
continuation of the passage, the prophet addresses Jerusalem as the city where many and 
powerful nations will seek and worship God. In alluding to the Jewish prophetic tradition, 
Mendelssohn is cryptically promoting the vision of Judaism’s mission to mediate between the 
particularity of all nations on earth, their states and cultures, and the project of a universality of 
worldwide liberation that includes all of humanity without any exception. “Jerusalem”, 
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religious power and Judaism. What does Jerusalem stand for in the title? Is it a 
reference to the historical kingdom, which Mendelssohn treats in the second part of the 
book, or should it be read allegorically, and if so, as an allegory of what? As an image of 
the state or of the divine kingdom? Is it possibly the union of both? Considering that 
Mendelssohn is offering in his book both a philosophical account of politics and religion 
in general, and an account of Judaism, does the title ‘Jerusalem’ stand for the particular 
configuration of religious power proper to Judaism, or does it hold sway over the topics 
of power and religion in general? How does Jerusalem, terrestrial or not, relate to the 
subtitle, dealing with religious power and Judaism? 
 
One should enter the book attentive to what remains unarticulated in the title, which 
refuses the structure of a proposition and offers instead a name as interchangeable with 
either two topics, religious power and Judaism, or their conjunction, leaving it to the 
                                                
Goetschel claims, “symbolizes the universal in the shape of the specificity of a locality, history, 
and particular religion,” and by alluding to this, alternative vision of universality and 
particularity, “Mendelssohn confronts the Christian Hermeneutic of Jerusalem with one whose 
particularity highlights the limits of a universalism that comes at the expanse of the exclusion of 
Judaism, the very source and origin of the spiritual notion of Jerusalem as universal symbol – a 
fact to which Mendelssohn’s contemporaries turned a blind eye.” See Willi Goetschel, Spinoza's 
Modernity: Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Heine (University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 148.  While 
the reading offered here is in line with much of Goetschel’s insights, and indeed is indebted to 
them, a fundamental ambiguity remains. Is the Jerusalem alluded to the historical, earthly one, or 
the messianic ideal? Herder, whose reaction to the book was positive, qualified his support of the 
book by reference to this ambiguity: “To be sure, in the heavenly, or future Judaism no one will 
doubt your theory.” See Alexander Altman, ‘Introduction,’ to Moses Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: 
Or on Religious Power and Judaism, trans. Alan Arkush (Brandeis University Press, 1983), 27. 
This would come to be a recurring line of criticism against Mendelssohn’s book, and we shall 
address it at the end of Chapter 4. 
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reader to divide, gather and conjoin the names and nouns in the title.211 
 
 
3.5 The power of Division: The Political Theological Difference as a Temporal One 
With this background in mind, we now arrive at the beginning. Mendelssohn begins his 
treatment of the distinction between religion and politics by noting that striking the right 
balance between them is one of the hardest tasks of politics, a task for which occasional 
practical solutions have been found, but no sound theoretical ones: 
 
For centuries men have strived to solve it, and here and there enjoyed perhaps 
greater success in settling it practically than in resolving it in theory. Some thought 
it proper to separate these different relations of societal man into moral entities, 
and to assign to each a separate province… but the extent of these different 
provinces and the boundaries dividing them have not yet been accurately fixed.212 
 
Already here Mendelssohn is alluding to the conventional (“some thought it proper”), 
and thus, non-essential origin of thinking a difference in “relations” in terms of the 
difference between “entities” and “provinces.” Mendelssohn will offer an alternative 
vision of the distinction between the “two relations” further on, but he immediately points 
                                                
211 Goetschel notes the homologous structure of Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem: Or, on Religious 
Power and Judaism and his Phaedon: or On the Immortality of the Soul. In both, there is a name 
and a philosophical problem. See Goetschel, “Athens, Jerusalem, and the Orient Express of 
Philosophy,” 24. But in Jerusalem, another name, naturally associated with Jerusalem, namely, 
Judaism appears on the side of the theoretical problem. 
212 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 33. 
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out the double bind of this type of struggle over boundaries. While border disputes 
between these two powers have proven violent and tragic, their concord and harmony 
seem only to come at the expense of what Mendelssohn calls “the noblest treasure of 
Human felicity”: “For they seldom agree but for the purpose of banishing from their 
realms a third moral entity, liberty of conscience, which knows how to derive some 
advantage from their disunity.”213 
 
Indeed, it is possible that this particular mode of distinction, aiming at an impenetrable 
boundary between two entities, is what causes the two domains to ‘bleed’ into each 
other, and in the process to shed blood. Even peaceful separation between them is a 
politics as a “continuation of war by other means,”214 to borrow Foucault’s famous 
reversal, a repressive order that exerts violence on the conscience of its subjects, 
demanding more than mere obedience to laws.215 
                                                
213 Ibid. 
214 See Michel Foucault et al., Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1975-76, 1st ed. (New York: Picador, 2003), 15. 
215 Eric Santner analyzes what he calls the “crisis of investiture,” indeed, a crisis in the institution 
of institution, or the efficacy of the symbolic, in the context of the dissemination of the king’s 
second body into the political body of the new sovereign, “the people,” in the aftermath of the 
French Revolution, as a problematic fall of the transcendent, second body of the king, invested 
by the church, leading not to immanence plain and simple but rather to an excess of immanence. 
See E.L. Santner, The Royal Remains: The People's Two Bodies and the Endgames of 
Sovereignty (University of Chicago Press, 2011). See also E.H. Kantorowicz, The King's Two 
Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton University Press, 1997).The history 
of the state is bound up with a complex relation to the law, one that does not allow a simple 
narrative of secularization. Harold Berman’s Law and Revolution delineates the transformation 
that occurred in European law after: (a) the rediscovery of Justinian Law codes in twelfth-
century Bologna; (b) the subsequent invention of law for the Roman Catholic Church; and (c) the 
Protestant reformation that followed. Berman sees in the “investiture reform” – the struggle over 
the right to invest with office – a crucial moment in the creation of a body of law able to progress 




After a brief yet learned critical discussion of ecclesiastical law, Mendelssohn proceeds 
to criticize the political theories of Hobbes and Locke. Hobbes is criticized for failing to 
properly distinguish might and right, ultimately, nature from society, and Locke for 
making the sole purpose of society temporal welfare, for excluding from the mandate of 
society all consideration of the eternal. While these critiques seem to be independent, 
their connection does encapsulate the essence of Mendelssohn's intervention. To 
establish a convincing distinction between nature and society, between physical and 
symbolic power, one has to give an account of the eternal – not so much as what 
transcends earthly life, but as what prevents its self-enclosure. 
 
The “common good,” writes Mendelssohn: 
 
…includes the present as well as the future, the spiritual as well as the earthly. 
One is inseparable from the other. Unless we fulfill our obligations, we can expect 
felicity neither on earth nor in heaven. Now, two things belong to the true fulfillment 
of our duties: action and conviction. Action accomplishes what duty demands, and 
conviction causes that action to proceed from the proper source, that is, from pure 
motives. To both man is led by reasons; to actions by reasons that motivate the 
will, and to convictions by reasons that persuade by their truth.216 
                                                
western Europe, and the creation of the first state like entity - the church. See H.J. Berman, Law 
and Revolution, the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard University Press, 2009). 




Hobbes, according to Mendelssohn, fails to account for the inherent relation action has 
to duty. His attempt to deduce duty from a realm of action that precedes it is doomed to 
fail. The trouble with Hobbes is that, in making fear the source and motive for political 
organization, his theory fails to account for the social bond it is set to explain: “according 
to his system, all right is grounded in power, and all obligation in fear.”217   
 
A Hobbesian account, in which the motivation for the social bond is fear, does not give 
rise to a proper notion of action and its relation to obligation, to a normative force – as 
distinct say, from physical movement or reaction. One cannot derive the power of 
obligation or duty, what one ought to do, from fear. That is, an account of an action, as 
distinguished from mere causal movement, or reaction,218 entails a relation to a duty, to 
ends, to what one ought to do.219 Mendelssohn’s theory will be an attempt to amend 
                                                
217 Ibid., 35. 
218 Derrida’s critique of political theology revolves around deconstructing this very distinction, 
that is, the distinction between reaction and response. J. Derrida and G. Bennington, The Beast 
and the Sovereign, 2 vols., vol. I (University of Chicago Press, 2010). 
219 This is why Mendelssohn presents Hobbes’ political theory as grounded in what Hobbes 
perceived as the highest good, the greatest felicity, namely the tranquility required for a 
speculative life. Of Hobbes, he writes: “living in a time of strife, and by nature inclined toward a 
quiet, speculative life, he regarded tranquility and safety, no matter how they were obtained, as 
the greatest felicity. He believed therefore, that the public welfare would be best served if 
everything, even our judgement of right and wrong, were made subject to the supreme power of 
the civil authority. In order to do so more legitimately, he assumed that man is entitled by nature 
to everything it has endowed him with the ability to obtain. The state of nature is a state of 
tumult, a war of all against all, in which everyone may do what he can do; everything one has the 
power to do is right. This unfortunate condition lasted until men agreed to put an end to their 
misery, to renounce right and might, as far as public safety was concerned, and to place both in 
the hands of an established authority. Henceforth, whatever the authority ordered was right… 
according to his system, all right is grounded in power, and all obligation in fear.” Mendelssohn, 
Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 35. Mendelssohn does not fault Hobbes for his 
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this. It might seem strange to associate action so closely with duty.220 What 
Mendelssohn’s definition of action aims at, as will become gradually clear, is to reveal 
human activity as social to its core, in that agents act by assuming a certain role, 
function, or symbolic mandate. This feature is nicely captured in English by the dual 
meaning of the word to act. Humans act “as” – as sons, friends, generals or carpenters, 
all of which are social roles that bear with them a sense of commitment, if only implicitly. 
Or as Mendelssohn puts it: “action accomplishes what duty demands.” Acting 
presupposes, as it were, some codified normative space. As we shall see, it is this very 
presupposition that ultimately refers politics to religion. 
 
This is also why Locke, in turn, is criticized for narrowing the scope of human purposive 
strivings, for limiting the goal of politics to the furthering of this-worldly happiness, and 
making politics indifferent to convictions. The separation Mendelssohn attributes to 
Locke amounts to the following maxim: “Believe what you will about what transcends 
this world in private; public matters are of this world.” Mendelssohn believes this 
separation to be untenable. The more action is driven by conviction, Mendelssohn 
                                                
error. For Mendelssohn, the distinction between might and right has become a matter of common 
sense, of ordinary language. “This is a distinctive feature of moral truths. As soon as they are 
brought to light, they become so much a part of the spoken language and so connected with 
man’s everyday notions that they become evident even to ordinary minds.” Ibid., 37. Moral, 
practical truths, become so absorbed in practical life that their moment of appearance before 
consciousness seems to efface itself. As soon as they come to light, they immediately become 
transparent, self-evident truths, hidden in plain sight. 
220 Agamben has dedicated a book length study to discredit the notions of duty and office as 
ethical principles, foreign to but intertwined with the ancient ontology of being and its ethics of 
possibility. For Agamben, Kantian ethics of duty are the universalization of the priestly model, 
itself an attempt to repeat the sacrifice of Christ. See G. Agamben and A. Kotsko, Opus Dei: An 
Archaeology of Duty (Stanford University Press, 2013). 
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argues, the happier people are, and coercion, the province of politics, is driven to a 
minimum. The task of politics then is to relate the two – convictions and actions – not 
simply to separate them. The divorce of practical and theoretical reasoning cannot lead 
to happiness. 
 
With this, Mendelssohn proceeds to criticize the standard understanding of the 
distinction between religion and politics as a distinction between two jurisdictions, one in 
charge of temporal happiness, the other of the eternal. “It is… neither in keeping with 
the truth nor advantageous to men’s welfare to sever the temporal so neatly form the 
eternal.”221 Mendelssohn’s point here is a subtle one, and it is easy to miss its full 
significance. If we are to distinguish between jurisdictions based on a temporal 
distinction, between this present world and the coming one, we are treating the domain 
of time as if it was divisible in the same way space is, as if one could draw a clear cut 
boarder between the present (and by extension, the temporal) and the future (and by 
extension eternity, the world to come). The misunderstanding here is twofold. In the first 
place, it fails to see the internal connection temporality implies between this moment 
and the next, the inadequacy of dividing time as if it was a spatial expansion. Secondly, 
it fails to see this connection as the very site of human eternality. Mendelssohn makes 
the first point by reference to rabbinic sources: “this life, say the rabbis, is a vestibule in 
which one must comport oneself in the manner in which one wishes to appear in the 
inner chamber.”222 
                                                





This world and the coming one are not separable in the same way one territory is 
separated from the next and cannot form two wholly independent jurisdictions. This 
world, the present, is a preparation for the next. To be invested in one is to be invested 
in the other. The second misunderstanding has to do with the human relation to the 
eternal. The crucial, and more difficult point is that it is precisely this strange 
inseparability of time, the link between one moment and the next, that displays the 
presence of the eternal in human life: 
 
Man will never partake of eternity; his eternality is merely an incessant temporality 
[Sein Ewiges ist bloß ein unaufhörliches Zeitliche]. His temporality never ends; it is 
therefore, an essential part of his permanency and inseparable from it. One 
confuses ideas if one opposes his temporal welfare to his eternal felicity. This 
confusion of ideas is not without practical consequences. It shifts the borders of 
the sphere in which man can act in accordance with his capacities, and strains his 
powers beyond the goal which providence has so wisely set for him.223 
 
There is much in this passage that merits unpacking. For now, let us note only this: 
Eternity properly understood is not a limitless expansion of time, but a timeless 
temporality. The presence of the eternal in human life, bound to finite temporality, is not 
to be found by reference to what transcends it, but rather in what is incessant in it, in 




what pushes life forward. What inheres in life is something neither reducible to its 
finitude, nor external to it. Note the image of eternity as an inner chamber. It is an inside 
to which one does not yet have access, a sealed off interior. 
 
This image sheds light on what in chapter 2 we saw as driving Mendelssohn’s proof for 
the existence of God, namely the experience of the inner void as the very site of the 
eternal. We can now begin to see in what way this void or absence is seen by 
Mendelssohn as a positive condition for human life and action. In other words, eternity 
in human life is what opens the very horizon of the future, what inheres and persists, 
beyond the present moment. 
 
Eternity appears, however, as an incessant drive, a repetition, bearing the stamp of the 
past. The power that pushes forward to the future is none other than the great mystery 
of the past, of what appears in the present as persisting – “it is,” as Mendelssohn puts it, 
“an essential part of his permanency and inseparable from it.” The mystery is in its 
persisting – what is experienced as a repetition for which the present cannot account. 
The present is what it is, separated from its past and future by being split, internally, 
between past and future. Rather than being some ideal Other time – which would entail 
thinking of time on the basis of space, seeking its other, eternity, outside of it – is the 
internal index that ties the present to what is to come by virtue of what in it persists from 
the past. It operates as a force within the present, connecting one moment to the next in 
their very separation. Paradoxically, eternity is not beyond the horizon of time, or some 
181 
 
infinitely deferred future, but what separates the present from the future, the timeless 
break between one moment and the next, which opens up the possibility – perhaps 
never to be fulfilled – of a future that is not the mere causal continuation of the present, 
a mere extension of it.224 Ultimately, a distinction in time is a distinction between two 
kinds of difference, between, we could say, quantitative difference and qualitative 
difference.225 The difference between indifference, and difference, if you will. The 
                                                
224 At the core, the problem here is how to relate two elements that lack any mediation, whose 
only mediation is their very gap. This is the context in which Plato discusses the instant – a time 
devoid of time – in his Parmenides. Plato, Complete Works (Hackett Pub., 1997), 388. Plato sets 
up a series of oppositions that do not admit of mediation: movement and rest, being and non-
being, the one and the many, the like and the not like, etc. The crucial point is that the notion of 
an instant becomes necessary where mediation as transition is impossible. When confronted with 
two elements that have no common ground, it is the only thing to establish a connection where 
division is fundamental. Indeed, it is necessary in order to express their non-relation, 
incommensurability or contradiction. ‘A and not A’ is only a contradiction when we assert them 
at the same time. It is this insight that lies at the core of Mendelssohn’s argument for the 
immortality of the soul in his philosophical bestseller Phaedon. The soul, so the argument goes, 
is not something that can be accounted for in terms of generation and degeneration, coming and 
ceasing to be, since its primary feature and contribution is its unity, which is not to be found in 
the phenomenal world. It is in that sense, in having to be conceived as emerging (and possibly 
disappearing) all at once, that Mendelssohn conceives of the soul as something miraculous and 
eternal, unaccountable in purely natural terms, for naturalism allows for no leaps. This is quite 
possibly what attracted the young Jacobi to Mendelssohn’s text, which he had aspirations to 
translate. Note also that Mendelssohn’s argument, seen by some as anticipating key elements of 
Kant’s unity of apperception, had received a critical treatment from Kant in his first critique. 
Conceived as a power, or intensive magnitude, Kant argues, the soul can be thought to wither 
away. See Mendelssohn, Phaedon: Or the Death of Socrates. Kant, Guyer, and Wood, Critique 
of Pure Reason, 449-55. 
225 Note that for Mendelssohn eternity is not experienced in some exceptional time, qualitatively 
different from the continuous present of the everyday. Rather, it is accessible as that very 
repetition, as that which drives life forward. To repeat, the briefest formula to express this 
conception would be “a moment is that which separates between moments.” The fundamental 
unit, or atom of time is the very split between two moments. For an illuminating account of 
atomism on which this account of the structure of time heavily relies,  Mladen Dolar, “The Atom 
and the Void – from Democritus to Lacan,” Filozofski vesting 34, no. 2 (2013). We begin, as it 
were, with a split that precedes both the unity, the qualitatively different (One) and the many. 
The fundamental split named by the instance does not belong on the side of the qualitatively 
different, the singular or exceptional, as opposed to the quantitative, repetitive time of everyday 
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shortest formula for this would be to say that a moment – the indivisible atom of time – 
is that which separates two moments, connecting them by separating them. Thinking of 
division on the basis of time, then, leads us to immediate mediacy, so to speak, in which 
division is the indivisible. One divides into two, two do not merge into one.226 
 
 
3.6 The Division of Power 
If religion and politics cannot be properly conceived as having separate jurisdictions, as 
two entities that are to be harmonized through the articulation of their relationship, and 
both need to be taken as invested in guiding human life towards happiness, there needs 
to be some other criteria to distinguish between them. What forms the distinction for 
Mendelssohn is power itself; not its unity, but its division. It is the division into two kinds 
of power, the coercive power of politics, and the power of persuasion (of claims, 
petitions and commands) that finds it most radical formulation in religion. Rather than 
deriving the power proper to each domain from their supposedly separate jurisdictions, 
Mendelssohn seeks to establish their distinction by studying the different powers they 
operate as the original division of power. Or, perhaps more precisely, Mendelssohn 
situates the distinction between politics and religion at the very site of the original 
                                                
life. Quality and quantity are themselves oppositions mediated by the instant. A division must 
have already taken place. The moment names their division as their relation. 
226 By referencing this slogan of dialectics, I do not mean to propose that Mendelssohn has 
himself explicated a notion of dialectics. However, his thinking does display a confrontation with 
what we might call, after Benjamin, ‘a dialectics at a standstill.’ Contrary to the image of 
Mendelssohn as a mediator, in the sense of a seeker of compromise, I aim to highlight the areas 




division of power, between what we might call “symbolic” and “real” power.227 
 
The state gives orders and coerces, religion teaches and persuades. The state 
prescribes laws (Gesetze), religion commandments (Gebote). The state has 
physical power (Gewalt) and uses it when necessary, the power (Macht) of religion 
is love and beneficence. The one abandons the disobedient and expels him; the 
other receives him in its bosom and seeks to instruct, or at least to console him… 
in one word, civil society, can have the right of coercion… has actually obtained 
this right through the social contract. Religious society lays no claim to the right of 
coercion, and cannot obtain it by any possible contract. The state possesses 
perfect, the church only imperfect rights.228 
 
There is a power – political power – that ultimately manifests itself in exclusion, that 
                                                
227 The division of powers Mendelssohn is outlining is closely linked to the distinction between 
“potestas” and “auctoritas,” analyzed by both Arendt and Agamben. As we shall see, 
Mendelssohn offers a unique account of their original intersection and growing independence. 
See ‘What is Authority?’ in Hannah. Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in 
Political Thought (Penguin Books, 1968), 91-141.and Giorgio. Agamben, State of Exception, 
trans. K. Attell (University of Chicago Press, 2008), 74-88. Agamben has more recently 
reformulated the problem in terms of the relation between “power as government and effective 
management, and power as ceremonial and liturgical reality,” or what he calls ‘kingdom’ and 
‘glory.’ See G. Agamben, L. Chiesa, and M. Mandarini, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a 
Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (Stanford University Press, 2011), xii. 
Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and 
Government, trans. Lorenzo. Chiesa and Matteo. Mandarini (Stanford University Press, 2011). p. 
xii. Agamben’s insistence that this question has not been interrogated before seems strange. Not 
only does it disregard the entire tradition of the critique of ideology, from Marx onwards, it also 
ignores Louis Marin's work on the political theology of absolute monarchy, in which this is the 
central question. See Louis. Marin, Portrait of the King (University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 
216. 
228 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 45. 
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achieves its totality and articulation by means of its power to exclude, to self-constitute 
its boundaries. The other power – religious power – is one that knows of no exclusion, 
and is powerful to the extent that it resists self-enclosure. It is essentially incomplete, 
non-whole. We shall return to this distinguishing below. 
 
It is not surprising that readers have taken Mendelssohn to be denying religion any real 
power. Mendelssohn seems to be allowing the state the full force of law, the right to 
coerce, while allowing religion only the “softer” powers of instruction, consultation, and 
persuasion. The state is allowed to use physical force, while religion is confined to a 
merely symbolic, linguistic efficacy. It is a very elusive power indeed. 
 
The full force and meaning of Mendelssohn distinction between politics and religion, in 
terms of a distinction between law and commandment, only comes into view when his 
book is taken in its totality, that is, when read together with the study of the 
commandment’s role in Judaism. But we can already mark the path on which our 
interpretation will set us. What are we to make of the distinction between Law and 
Commandment? The two, diametrically opposed interpretations of Mendelssohn attitude 
towards religion,229 can be easily matched with two opposing interpretations of the 
                                                
229 See, for example A. Arkush, Moses Mendelssohn and the Enlightenment (State University of 
New York Press, 1994) and Sorkin, Moses Mendelssohn and the Religious Enlightenment. 
Arkush sees Mendelssohn as a deist who understands that enlightenment theism undermines the 
authority of traditional Judaism and seeks to reshape Judaism in a liberal mode. Sorkin sees 
Mendelssohn as a Jewish traditionalist who uses the language of German enlightenment to 
bolster his essentially premodern faith. Gottlieb has recently offered a middle position. See 
Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn's Theological-Political Thought. Gideon 
Freudenthal has recently attempted to defend Mendelssohn’s consistency. See Gideon 
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commandment in its relation to law. One either considers the commandment as 
analogous to Law, but of divine origin, and thus doubts Mendelssohn’s sincerity in his 
endorsement of the enlightenment principles that seem to characterize the first part of 
the book, or one conceives the Commandment as having a purely moral value, focusing 
on it being, in Mendelssohn’s view, non-enforceable. This latter interpretation naturally 
leads to a suspicion of Mendelssohn’s devotion to the religious law he espouses in the 
second part of the book. The key to avoiding this forced choice between Judaism and 
enlightenment is to focus on the fact that Mendelssohn is speaking of a power of 
Commandment – of the imperative – irreducible (and prior) to enforceability.230 
 
Mendelssohn defines the realm of imperfect right in terms of “soft” imperatives – claims 
and petitions. We might suspect that behind every petition, request or advice – the soft 
or polite modes of the imperative – hides a command. We are offered a course of 
action, a choice, but it is always already forced.231 We may choose to deny a petition, a 
claim, but this is not without consequences.232 We operate within a field of unwritten 
                                                
Freudenthal, No Religion without Idolatry: Mendelssohn's Jewish Enlightenment (Notre Dame, 
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012). Freudenthal grounds his interpretation of 
Mendelssohn in a notion of semiotics borrowed from Pierce, and of common sense pragmatism, 
that covers over the questions this interpretation seeks to unfold. 
230 For Kelsen, law is defined in reference to enforceability. See H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 
(Lawbook Exchange, 2005). 
231 Lacan’s canonical example of the forced choice is “Your money or your life.” It is clearly 
forced, in that choosing one item – money – means losing both. See Jacques Lacan, The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis (Karnac Books, 2004), 212. As we shall see, the 
political-theological for Mendelssohn unfolds as the drama of the intersection of force and 
choice. 
232 Interestingly, the lesser known finding of the famous Milgram experiment has shown that 
direct orders are overwhelmingly disobeyed. Obedience was achieved as long as there remained 
a space for justification. 
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laws, implicit duties and obligations. In this view, the petition or the claim only veils the 
command. But what if we turn this picture around? We might then say that behind any 
command lurks a petition, a claim. The fact is that a command is a command even if we 
choose to disobey it. The effectivity of the command in its strong sense has to do with 
our capacity to disobey it. In other words, a command must be internalized, it must be 
chosen.   
 
 
3.7 The Original Divide 
Mendelssohn’s account of the division of power follows the early modern tradition of 
political theory in that it is set as a narrative of the transition from the state of nature to 
that of society. While it is supposedly meant to account for the political theological 
difference, it is marked by a striking absence of any reference to the divine. The only 
implicit link between religion and his account of the transition from nature to society 
consists in his application of the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights and 
duties. The latter, we have seen, pertain to religion, but also cover the entire field of the 
state of nature. 
 
Mendelssohn sets the stage for his discussion by distinguishing between perfect 
(vollkommene) and imperfect (unvollkommene) rights and duties: 
 
The first are called compulsory rights and compulsory duties; the others, however, 
are called claims (petitions) and duties of conscience. The first are external, the 
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others only internal. Compulsory rights may be exacted by force, but petitions may 
be denied. Omission of compulsory duties is an offense, an injustice; omission of 
duties of conscience, however, is merely unfairness.233 
 
Note that the distinction is between inner and external duties. As we shall see, 
Mendelssohn’s narrative revolves around their intersection, the interpenetration of the 
inner and outer. 
 
While the distinction between perfect and imperfect rights is derived from the legal 
theory of Grotius, Mendelssohn articulates it as a relation of humans to their potentiality. 
To appreciate Mendelssohn’s theory, we must hear the full resonance of the German 
unvollkommen: “imperfect” here is to be read as unarticulated, unclear, that which has 
not fully arrived, what is on its way.234 “Right” here is incomplete. The move for 
perfection, as we shall see, is the move to articulation, expression, and the setting of 
boundaries. We can already hear the status of the unvollkommene Recht (imperfect 
right/unarticulated law) as a field of potentiality: what is imperfect is defined by its 
potential for perfection, the inarticulate as a potential for articulation. We can think of 
this realm of imperfect rights as one of unwritten laws, with emphasis placed on 
                                                
233 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 47. 
234 Mendelssohn inherits from Leibniz and Wolf the conception of perfection as the highest unity 
within diversity. Following Leibniz’s conception of reality as the “best possible” world, 
perfection is the mark of reality. Put differently, the better articulated a thing is, the higher its 
actuality, and this merges with a sense of self determination and self-actualization that could be 




unwritten; there is already a field of normative pressure, claims and petitions, but there 
are no norms, no clear criterions and distinctions. Normativity without norms. There is 
nothing to conjoin these claims with the coercive power of law. This vision of the 
primordial state of society is very close to the original sense of community as 
expounded by Roberto Esposito,235 of a cum munus, a common debt, gift or office, in 
which the very boundaries between the common and its members are not quite set, and 
what exerts its pressure is precisely this privation, this “nothing in common,” as Esposito 
puts it. The pure gift and the pure demand or duty truly coincide here – the given of 
community is its own lack, its duty to articulate itself by establishing rights and duties, by 
entering into a social give-and-take. 
 
 
3.8 Mendelssohn’s Minimal Atomism 
Despite his affection for Epicurus, Mendelssohn is far from a political atomist in the 
standard understanding of this term.236 In his account, people do not simply enter 
society as individuals, renouncing some natural rights for some other benefit. Two 
things set Mendelssohn apart from this tradition of thought. Firstly, his understanding of 
the social-political character of human capacities. It is at the level of one’s powers, what 
                                                
235 Roberto Esposito, Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community (Stanford University 
Press, 2010), 1-19. 
236 Mendelssohn’s sympathy for Epicurus is striking, considering the name Epicurus has become 
synonymous, in the Jewish tradition, with heresy. Mendelssohn goes so far as to describe his 
religious views as “quite Epicurean.” Presumably, his point of allegiance with Epicurus is the 
idea that God, properly conceived, is nothing to fear. On Mendelssohn’s attitude to Epicurus see 
Gottlieb, Faith and Freedom: Moses Mendelssohn's Theological-Political Thought, 22. 
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is most fundamentally one’s own, that he introduces sociality.237 Secondly, his account 
of temporality. As we shall see, the transition from the state of nature to that of society, 
in Mendelssohn’s account, is not something that simply happened at some point in time, 
nor is it a necessary, structural presupposition. Rather, it is the intersection of these two, 
mutually exclusive perspectives. 
 
Seeing that no clear boundaries are established, Mendelssohn sets out to isolate what 
could be conceived as properly one’s own. In Mendelssohn’s view, this field of 
potentiality, of inarticulate normative pressure, exerts its powers precisely on the 
capacities of its individual members.238 
 
The goods to which man has an exclusive right are (1) his own capacities; (2) 
whatever he produces by means of those capacities… even in the state of nature, 
before any contract whatsoever was enacted among men, they were excluded 
from the original joint ownership of goods.239 
                                                
237 Mendelssohn’s account of the social bond is perhaps more Democritian than democratic, as it 
is an attempt to deduce the relation between the one and the many from the relation between the 
one and the void. In his account, the split between the one and the many must be internalized, 
must split the one itself: a self-determining one, capable of choice, is internally split between the 
one who issues the command and the undifferentiated many, or the void that is to be unified 
under the command. On the reception and difference between Democritus’ and Epicurus’ 
atomism, see Dolar, “The Atom and the Void – from Democritus to Lacan.” 
238 Recent commentators have noted Mendelssohn’s emphasis on capacities and powers. See 
Goetschel, Spinoza's Modernity: Mendelssohn, Lessing, and Heine. See also Rosenstock, 
Philosophy and the Jewish Question: Mendelssohn, Rosenzweig, and Beyond. Both have seen in 
this evidence of Spinoza’s influence on Mendelssohn. Our account of Mendelssohn’s theory, 
however, is not easily subsumed under a Spinozistic order of immanence. 




Men’s capacities, as Mendelssohn sees it, are the fundamental property, what is 
properly one’s own, independent of any social convention or agreement, that is, 
independent of any established social exchange. That is, for us to be able to speak of a 
relation between some-one and others, to distinguish, minimally, the common from its 
members, the individuals that compile the multitude must be seen as carriers of power, 
as being capable of independent action. Otherwise they would be organs of a whole. 
There would not be a real distinction between the one and the many, and plurality would 
be subsumed under the totality of the common. However, as we shall see, what is most 
properly one’s own appears as what must be appropriated through a certain 
externalization, or rather, more precisely, the crucial moment is the split intersection of 
the inner and outer, which entails a retroactive change in the status of their prior 
separation. 
 
To the extent that one possess such goods “which are not necessarily required for 
maintaining his existence, he is obligated to employ a part of them for the benefit of his 
fellow man, that is, for benevolence. For the improvement of one’s existence is 
inseparable from benevolence.”240 One should pay close attention to the limited sense 
Mendelssohn gives the idea of property here. One’s powers are one’s own, in the sense 
that they cannot be simply used by another. Indeed, this would be the definition of (pre-
symbolic) violence, to force someone. Mendelssohn’s version of the state of nature thus 




pushes to the extreme the disconnect between language and power. There are claims, 
petitions, without the power to coerce on the one hand, and pure violence on the other. 
In other words, in such a state of affairs, what one can do (what is in one’s power) is 
one’s own, insofar as another can either petition him or forcefully – violently, unjustly – 
make him do something, which would be a sheer act of violence. It would be Gewalt 
without Recht. Pure force, without justification.241 
 
But the powers of individuals are only activated as powers to the extent that they can be 
seen as the addressees of demands of others. It is the fact that there is a plurality of 
demands, without a criterion by which to choose, that will make choosing necessary. 
 
Political power, as we shall see, arises with the connecting of force, efficacy, with 
reason, ground or justification.242 Whereas religious power, the power of imperfect rights 
that stands as its background, arises by a certain subtraction – the effectivity proper to 
this domain is linked to its lack. This Recht without Gewalt, without even the power of 
reason, a criterion for decision, is what endows this realm with its own peculiar 
power.243 
                                                
241 The emphasis on force is intended to avoid the productive ambiguity of the German Gewalt, 
which can stand for both sanctioned and unsanctioned violence. 
242 Mendelssohn’s investigation in Jerusalem can be read as complementary to Benjamin’s 
investigation of violence. Benjamin focuses on the problematic entanglement of law and 
violence, the dialectics that makes law forever bound to violence – either law making or law 
preserving, a distinction the law ultimately fails to make. In Mendelssohn, we can see the 
operation of a power that precedes this entanglement. 
243 Mendelssohn’s account allows us insight into the dimension of power that is devoid of 
violence, insofar as violence is connected to enforcement. This is a dimension of power that 




In Mendelssohn’s state of nature, everything belongs to everybody and to no one: 
everybody has equal claims – imperfect rights – and no one has perfect rights. Even 
one’s own capacities belong to this field of normative pressure. They are only privileged 
in the sense that it is up to each member’s discretion to decide on the extent and 
circumstances of the use of his powers. This is Mendelssohn’s law of nature: “That 
man, in the state of nature, is independent, and that to him alone belongs the right to 




3.9 The Freedom of Forced Choice 
The limited sense in which these powers belong to him is that it is up to his discretion to 
decide, not whether or not to dedicate some of his powers to society, but merely to 
determine the particulars: when, what, and to whom to dedicate his powers. One’s 
capacities are not one’s own by being excluded from the field of inarticulate normative 
pressure, or imperfect rights. On the contrary, they are precisely what is addressed by 
this pressure. It is our power over our capacities that allows us to decide. One’s right 
over his power is absolute in this state, as Mendelssohn puts it, because, when it comes 
                                                
anything, but is rather connected with allowing, making something possible. To borrow Werner 
Hamacher’s coinage, one could call this power afformative. See the main text below and Werner 
Hamacher, ‘Afformative, Strike: Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence,’ in A.E. Benjamin and P. 
Osborne, Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience (Routledge, 1994), 110-38. 
244 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 52. 
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to our powers, no one else could be in a better position to decide on the concrete use of 
them: what, when, and how much we are to contribute to the common good. 
 
Mendelssohn’s primordial choice is a forced one. As Christine Korsgaard puts it: 
“Human beings are condemned to choice and action. Maybe you think you can avoid it, 
by resolutely standing still, refusing to act, refusing to move. But it’s no use, for that will 
be something you have chosen to do, and then you will have acted after all. Choosing 
not to act makes not acting a kind of action, makes it something that you do.”245 
Mendelssohn's account gives us a sense of the compulsion involved in acting freely, the 
implicit externality involved in acting out of internal motivation. 
 
For Mendelssohn, what sets capacities apart, and makes them the locus of normative 
pressure, is the inherent link between “improving one’s existence” and the dedication of 
one’s powers for another. 
  
In social life, man must renounce certain of his rights for the common good, or as 
one may say, he must very often sacrifice his own advantage to benevolence. He 
will be happy if this sacrifice is made on his own prompting and when he realizes, 
in each instance, that he acted solely for the sake of benevolence. Benevolence, in 
reality, makes us happier then selfishness; but we must, while exercising it, be 
aware that it springs from ourselves and is a display of our powers [aber wir 
                                                




müssen uns selbst und die Aüsserung unserer Kräfte dabei empfinden].246 
 
Benevolence, properly understood, should be experienced as the expression of one’s 
own powers. But how does one feel himself and the expression of his power in an act of 
benevolence? To answer this, that is, the link Mendelssohn seeks to establish between 
the exercise of one’s power and benevolence, we must observe the transition, offered 
by Mendelssohn, from the state of nature to a state of society. In stark contradistinction 
to standard theories of the social contract, the foundational gesture for Mendelssohn is 
not a reciprocal agreement between two parties but an asymmetrical act of 
commitment, understood as a promise.247 
 
Man in the state of nature, is the master of all that is his, of the free use of his 
powers and capacities… it depends on him alone how much, when, and for the 
benefit of which of his fellow men he will dispense with some of the goods which 
he can spare. All his fellow men have only an imperfect right to his surplus goods, 
a right to petition; and he, the absolute master, has a duty of conscience to devote 
a part of his goods to benevolence.248 
 
This is the state of absolute potentiality, as it were. It is with the first step towards 
                                                
246 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 41. 
247 Even Goetschel, who emphasizes Mendelssohn’s originality in his political theory, and even 
points to the above-mentioned asymmetry, still conceives of it as a contract theory. See 
Goetschel, The Discipline of Philosophy and the Invention of Modern Jewish Thought, 189-209. 
248 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 52. 
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actuality that everything is transformed: 
 
“Once this man has passed a judgement, that judgement must be valid… the action 
must have force [Kraft] and effect [Würkung], if my right is to mean anything at all.” The 
power one has over one’s own capacities has meaning only if and when one decides to 
dedicate some of one’s power to the common good, to assume an obligation. Such an 
act of decision, Mendelssohn makes clear, must have a performative power, effectively 
transferring one’s right over his power to another, making the other’s right perfect and 
his own imperfect. 
 
This foundational act of decision and transfer of power is defined by Mendelssohn as a 
promise, and stands at the basis of the social bond. The foundational moment, passing 
from what one can to what one must do, transferring some of one’s power to the other, 
is the only way for that right to have meaning in the first place.249 One’s independence, 
the right to decide over the use of one’s powers, is only realized when one makes a 
promise, assumes an obligation, and thus effectively transfers some of one’s power to 
another. One has power only insofar as one is capable of dedicating some of that power 
                                                
249 There is an element of retroactivity here. One must presuppose the capacity of choice in order 
to isolate an individual who will be capable of entering into social relations. But that capacity is 
only realized, indeed, is only real, once the subject – as he can now be named, has entered into 
social relations, with his duties and obligations. See Mladen Dolar, 'Beyond Interpellation,' Qui 
Parle 6, no. 2 (1993). As we shall see, for Mendelssohn political subjectification involves a 
remainder, the name of which is religion. The impossible choice not to choose at all, not to self-
constitute or limit oneself, barred by what we can call symbolic castration, has a certain 




– one’s own – to society, allowing the claims of others to become compulsory demands, 
giving the other the force of law and submitting to coercion by others. The self-
determination of an individual sets in motion the articulation of relations, the passage 
from imperfect to perfect right. But as we shall see, for that move to take place, for a 
promise to be issued, for one to give one’s word, one must already have taken a leap of 
faith. 
 
This act of commitment has to be effective. Thus the moment that will expose the 
speaker to the enforcement of others also must display a most peculiar power of 
language, a retroactively performative power. The ‘I will’ that is the outcome of this 
process of the actualization of one’s power, of the ‘I can,’ must come to precede it, as in 
Arendt’s slogan of political action: “we will and we can!”250 
 
 
3.10 The Articulation of Reality and The Real of the Imperative 
The human sense of reality demands that men actualize the sheer passive 
givenness of their being, not in order to change it but in order to make articulate 
and call into full existence what otherwise they would have to suffer passively 
anyhow.251 
                                                
250 See Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970), 86. Arendt’s worry that 
violence has to do with the separation of the I-will and I-can is prefigured in Mendelssohn’s 
Jerusalem, particularly in the second part, to which we shall attend below. 
251 Hannah Arendt and Margaret Canovan, The Human Condition: Second Edition (University of 




In order to realize one’s powers, what makes one independent, one has to internalize 
the imperative, the demands of others. The realization of one’s own power, or potential, 
is only made possible with the internal splitting of that power, its othering. One achieves 
one’s independence, one’s separation from others, by assuming a symbolic mandate. 
 
It is important to note that in Mendelssohn's account the objective order of the social 
world, the reality principle of having to exercise one’s powers against the coercive 
power of others, and the submission to a public criterion of truth, to being held to one’s 
word, is something cut off from the subject, in a sense, as he enters social intercourse. 
That some of the capacity or power of the individual has been conceded to society – in 
order for society to become objective, to assume a law-like, public, and intersubjective 
character, the very features of reality – appears as the condition for the exercise of 
one’s possibilities. Reality is here indeed a principle. Whether or not this would be 
experienced as an unbearable imposition from the outside, or as the “expression of 
one's own power,” is a matter of relating conviction to action. In other words, to realize 




3.11 Having Power 
Mendelssohn’s analysis penetrates the meaning of having power. It is only from within 
this nexus in which language and power intersect that one can be said to have (even his 
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own, supposedly prior) power. You can because you must, as Kant would have it. Note 
that the promise, that moment that creates the bond, does create a temporal nexus 
between religion and politics. As we shall see, understood as the realm of imperfect 
right, from which the law proper emerges, religion can be seen as a realm of pure 
possibilities, and politics as a concrete actualization. But since possibility and actuality 
are codependent terms, such a realm of inarticulate possibilities is not really 
antecedent, but rather only emerges, as background, along with the actualization, as a 
retroactive projection. It is only from within a given present situation of a concrete 
commitment, or indeed a set of binding commitments and articulated laws, that such a 
background, the abstract freedom of what could have been, is projected, like a shadow. 
It is as a result of this slipping into the background that a sense of mystery, of a 
shadowy realm of alternate realities, elusively co-present, emerges. In Mendelssohn’s 
account, before the law, before language and articulation, one does not encounter the 
brute power of nature, but rather something like the very form of language, without any 
identifiable content. A vague sense, so to speak, comparable with the encounter with an 
alien language (on which, see chapter 2), here in the form of demands that cannot be 
answered in the absence of a criterion – an established order, or law. And it this 
absence or lack of organizing principle that makes language exert power.252 By 
                                                
252 The situation is much akin to Lacan’s matrix of desire: “desire is neither the appetite for 
satisfaction nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the 
first from the second, the phenomenon of their splitting.” Jacques. Lacan, Écrits: A Selection, 
trans. Alan. Sheridan (Routledge, 1977), 287. Desire is the result of the gap between needs and 
demands. Needs have to be expressed in language, in demand. But this translation carries a 
residue. The demand is immediately for more, and less, than the fulfillment of the need. The gap 
between them is desire, and the reason why desire is the desire of the other, why what to want – 
the question of the will, needs to be raised. By having one’s desire appear as a question, as a 
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encountering the demands of others without a preexisting principle for response, one 
confronts the alien core of language. One is faced with a primordial forced choice: to 
enter into the social exchange, the give and take with its commitments and obligations, 
or lose oneself in the abyss where the possible and the impossible have not been 
differentiated. But this foreclosure of the impossible choice does not merely push it to 
the background, as a primordial past. Religion with its imperfect right has a role to play 
within the established order. 
 
 
3.12 (No) Time for a Choice 
Mendelssohn’s story of emergence from the state of nature can be read as an attempt 
to account for the very primordial nature of this power of choice, a sense of the 
primordial that is different from an absolute beginning or ground. It is not what one must 
think first, but what must come before the beginning. What is presupposed, implicitly, in 
acting. As Mladen Dolar puts it: “choice is a retroactive category; it is always in the past 
tense, but in a special kind of past that was never present. The moment of choice can 
never be pinpointed; it passes directly and immediately from a ‘not yet’ to an ‘always 
already.’ It is past by its very nature.”253 
 
Recall that what one encounters in this primal scene of society are claims and petitions, 
                                                
matter of choice, one presupposes there is something one ought to want. To ask what do I want, 
is to ask what ought I to want, or what does the other want that I want. 
253 Dolar, 'Beyond Interpellation,' 83. 
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that is, the imperative without the backing of authority, without anything to ensure its 
enforcement. It is precisely here, in its “weak” sense, that one encounters the puzzling 
ontological status of the imperative, of the order. To paraphrase a German saying, order 
ought to be; which also means that order, strictly speaking, is not. There ought to be an 
ought, a standard, a measure, an order. Order is experienced in its real dimension not 
as a given, but as given in its absence, as a task to be accomplished, as something 
which ought to be. It makes the establishment of a social order both necessary and to 
an extent impossible, or at least, incomplete.254 
 
The great merit and power of Mendelssohn’s account lies in what is absent from it, 
indeed, in the role it assigns absence. Mendelssohn does not posit a positive order that 
precedes human sociability and lies outside it, always knocking on its borders, such as 
Hobbes’ war of all against all; a time before time, as it were. One is induced into 
sociality – into history – not by the pressure of nature, but by society appearing as an 
absence of, and thus a call for, its own principal of organization. This primordial scene is 
not a moment in the past, but what every present, in being present, projects into its 
background. The groundlessness of the imperative in its “weak” sense, the claims and 
                                                
254 Compare with the role Kojin Karatani assigns religion in his recent formulation of world 
history, based on a reconceptualization of the material base as the mode of exchange rather than 
that of production. See Kojin Karatani, The Structure of World History: From Modes of 
Production to Modes of Exchange, trans. Michael.K. Bourdaghs (Duke University Press, 2014). 
Karatni posits mode of exchange x, that of the pure gift, as prehistorical hunter-gatherer 
communism, repressed from history, the primordial past the repression of which constitutes 
history, as well as the regulative idea of history, the perpetually deferred ethical horizon of 
history, what it ought to be, or should strive for. He views historical world religions as the return 
of the repressed, the symptomatic presence within history of its repressed past and future-
oriented ethical pressure. 
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petitions of others, is what makes room for self-grounding human action and the 
establishment of laws and boundaries. If laws make things explicit, articulate relations 
and realize potential grounds, then the imperative could be said to make things implicit, 
to open up the space for decision and action as movements towards articulation by 
dropping into the background. 
 
Benjamin’s distinction between what can be communicated through language and what 
can be communicated in it is instructive here.255 The formal aspect of command is 
something that both supports and subverts the structure of law. We could say that the 
imperative, the demand, is what is communicated in, rather than through the law. It is 
the medium of the law, but as such, it carries a message of its own. It is the message 
implicit in the medium as such, in being addressed. In Mendelssohn’s account, it is the 
very absence of concrete norms that, by committing and internalizing the demands of 
others as binding, creates the pressure to enter into normative relations. What is 
internalized in the act of commitment is not a preexisting bond, but the absence of a 
bond as enticing. While Mendelssohn does not establish the connection explicitly, from 
his definition of belief as the trust one puts in a promise, it is apparent that in making a 
promise, a commitment, in beginning to act, one must, if only implicitly, take something 
for granted, that is, take a huge leap of faith. The assumption of a duty is indeed an 
assumption with nothing to vouch for it. 
 
                                                





3.13 The Imperative Between the Performative and the Afformative 
In his seminal commentary on Benjamin’s critique of violence, Werner Hamacher coined 
the term ‘afformative’ to describe what Benjamin dubs divine violence, a power 
juxtaposed to the mythological power of law, caught in the dialectics of (self) 
constitution, between the constitutive and constituted. Afformatives are not a 
subcategory of performatives. Rather, afformative, or pure, violence, is a: 
 
…condition for any instrumental, performative violence, and, at the same time, a 
condition which suspends their fulfillment in principle… while afformations do not 
belong to the class of acts – that is, to the class of positing or founding operations 
– they are, nevertheless, never simply outside the sphere of acts or without 
relation to that sphere. The fact that afformatives allow something to happen 
without making it happen has a dual significance: first, that they let this thing enter 
into the realm of positings, from which they themselves are excluded; and, second, 
that they are not what shows up in the realm of positings, so that the field of 
phenomenality, as the field of positive manifestation, can only indicate the effects 
of the afformative as ellipses, pauses, interruptions, displacements, etc., but can 
never contain or include them. The afformative is the ellipsis which silently 
accompanies any act and which may silently interrupt any speech act. What “is” 
afformative can therefore never be presented in the form of a rule or a law…. 
deposing is neither a historical, nor even a causal consequence, but rather the 
absolute precondition of every historical positing violence… afformative is not 
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aformative; afformance ‘is’ the event of forming, itself formless, to which all forms 
and all performative acts remain exposed.256 
 
Mendelssohn’s imperatives are situated on the edge between the performative and the 
afformative, between self-grounding activity and its own subversive precondition. The 
imperative in his account is not precisely the pure form of law, devoid of content, as it 
might appear. In Mendelssohn’s account, it appears equally as the pure form of 
formlessness, so to speak, of a content without form. The command is neither form nor 
content, but the very gap between form and content, what enables – and disturbs – the 
determination of content by form. 
With this we may, with Mendelssohn, return to religion, which, as the reader might have 
noticed, has been strikingly absent from an account that began by arguing against the 
severance of the eternal and the temporal, the religious and political domains. 
 
Having established the origin of coercive rights as necessary for the realization of 
human capacities, it is clear why no such rights exist in the domain of religion. 
 
Let us now apply this theory of rights, duties, and contracts, to the difference 
between state and church. Both... have as their object actions as well as 
convictions, the former insofar as they are based on the relations between man 
                                                
256 Hamacher, ‘Afformative, Strike,’  Benjamin and Osborne, Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: 
Destruction and Experience, 128. 
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and nature, the latter insofar as they are based on the relations between nature 
and god. Men need each other; they hope for, promise, expect from, and render 
each other services and reciprocal services. The mixture of abundance and want, 
power and need, selfishness and benevolence given them by nature impels them 
to enter into a social connection in order to obtain a wider field of action for their 
capacities and needs. Every individual is obliged to use a part of his capacities… 
for the benefit of the society of which he is a member…. Not so the church!… God 
is not a being who needs our benevolence, requires our assistance, or claims any 
of our rights for his own use, or whose rights can ever clash or be confused with 
ours… In the system of human duties, those towards god form, in reality, no 
special division. Rather, all of man’s duties are obligations towards god. Some of 
them concern ourselves, others our fellow men.257 
 
Note, first, that Mendelssohn does not speak of a relation of man to nature and man to 
God. Religion is rather the relation of nature to God from which man seems to be 
subtracted. It as if being excluded from that relation makes it possible, and necessary, 
for man to be the bearer of duties. The fact that man has to relate to his nature, that his 
being is given to him as a task, is inseparable from a relation of nature to something 
beyond it, that stands as its ground – a relation in which man has no proper place. In 
Mendelssohn’s view, there is no need to add a relation of humans to their God as a 
separate realm of duties. The very phenomenon of having duties, refers – upon 
                                                
257 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 56. 
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reflection – nature to something beyond it, prevents the enclosure of nature. The duty to 
have duties cannot be accounted for on the grounds of nature itself. But it is not by 
adding something to nature, a spiritual, metaphysical soul, that we arrive at the human 
animal. It is the inarticulate nature of human relations that implies a leap in natural 
causality, a break must be assumed. The relation of God to nature here is not so much 
as the creator but as leaving room within creation, leaving something undetermined in 
it.258 God here is not so much the creator of nature as what prevents nature from being 
the sole ground of human freedom. In a sense, humans are subtracted from the relation 
between God and nature because their relation to their own nature is directly that 
relation. It is as if in their practical, ethical obligations, in which they take their freedom 
and duties for granted, humans stand between God and nature, separating between 
them. The old Aristotelian formula for what lies outside the city, outside the political 
realm - either gods or beasts – is given a subtle but not insignificant twist. The 
anthropological difference is not guaranteed by this double exclusion, neither nature nor 
God, but constitutes it. In so far as there are human societies, nature and god are kept 
apart. 
                                                
258 In his commentary on the role of religious law in Maimonides, Amos Funkenstein makes a 
similar argument. The fact that in the fulfillment of ceremonial maxims there is always a degree 
of indeterminacy points, in this reading, to a minimal indeterminacy in creation itself. 
“Maimonides developed one of the most original philosophies of science in the Middle 
Ages…[H]e proved that not only are laws of nature (the ordering structure of nature) in 
themselves contingent upon God’s will; but that each of them must include, by definition, a 
residue of contingency, an element of indeterminacy. No law of nature is completely 
determining, and no natural phenomenon completely determined (omnimodo determinatum), not 
even in God’s mind… The purpose can never determine the material actualization in all respects, 
down to the last particular, a ‘thoroughgoing determination’ is ruled out by the very material 
structure of the world.” ‘Maimonides: Political Theory and Realistic Messianism,’ in A. 




The logical space Mendelssohn establishes for religion is thus not one that allows for a 
separate realm of duties, a distinct relation towards God. Religion, which establishes a 
relation with God, cannot be thought on the model of the relation between humans and 
their nature. God is not a person with claims and needs that are to be settled with our 
own, an entity whose powers and claims can come into collision with our own. The 
transcendence of God is a transcendence of transcendence – it is not simply that God is 
beyond our reach, but that the relation to his being transcends the logic of boundaries 
and their beyond, surpasses the very logic of proper place. Thus, our duties to God are 
not a special set of duties, separable from our duties to ourselves and others. They are, 
in a sense, the pure form of duty, a mute obligation, the power of the imperative as such 
– a pure ought, without content and without the supplement of coercion. They are 
implied in the very phenomenon of normatively structured human relations. 
 
If the pure performative of the promise opens up a movement of articulation of social 
relations, beginning from particular, interpersonal commitments and opening into larger 
and more abstract norms and laws, it only does so against the background of an 
impersonal, inarticulate and impossible (non) relation. The relation to God is not 
reducible to an interpersonal relation, it is a personal relation to the impersonal, which 





3.14 Promise, Oath and Belief in the Other 
If politics is understood by Mendelssohn as a move to the articulation and actualization 
of capacity/potentiality, religion is understood as the power of potentiality as such, of 
what remains unarticulated, in the very act of articulation. Religion is what remains 
unwritten in the act of writing. Far from being purely impotent, therein lies the peculiar 
power Mendelssohn sees as proper to religion. Just as the promise is the foundation of 
political life, it is in Mendelssohn’s opposition to the oath where we can begin to see the 
elusive power of religion.259 
 
To begin to see the full implication of Mendelssohn’s political theology, it is helpful to 
focus our attention on Mendelssohn’s juxtaposition of two social linguistic institutions or 
                                                
259 In the context of his analysis of the oath, which Agamben sees as the most fundamental 
human institution, on the threshold between religion and politics, offering a revealing account of 
anthropogenesis, and of the power unique to human beings, he writes: “Something like a human 
language was in fact only able to be produced in the moment in which the living being, who 
found itself co-originally exposed to the possibility of both truth and lie, committed itself to 
respond with its life for its words, to testify in the first person for them. And just as mana 
expresses, according to Levi-Strauss, the fundamental inadequtaion between signifier and 
signified…so also does the oath express the demand, decisive in every sense for the speaking 
animal, to put its nature at stake in language and to bind together in an ethical and political 
connection words, things, and actions. Only by this way was it possible for something like a 
history, distinct from nature and, nevertheless, inseparably intertwined with it, to be produced.” 
Agamben Giorgio, The Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath (Homo Sacer Ii, 3), 
trans. Kotsko Adam (Stanford University Press, 2011), 69. These words apply almost verbatim 
to Mendelssohn’s account of the promise as the foundational entry into language and society. It 
is only by giving one’s word, and thus, effectively exposing oneself to coercion, to being 
forcefully held to one's word, that one can be said to possess his word in the first place. Only by 
committing, in a gesture of asymmetrical giving, can the social give and take get going. Human 
capacities, the thing most properly one's own, only truly become so in their alienation/expression 
in language in the form of a promise, a commitment. The proper meaning of ‘I can,’ depends on 
a presupposed ‘I promise,’ ‘I commit,’ or ‘I will.’ To have power, as opposed to force, is to 
operate within a field of power, to expose oneself to the power of others. 
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practices, which seem, on the face of it, very close to each other: the promise and the 
oath. In Mendelssohn’s analysis, the former serves as the basis for the transition from 
nature to politics, understood as an actualization of potential, imperfect law (Recht). The 
latter, on the other hand, allows us to see what forever remains beyond its scope, what 
remains ‘on its way’ in that very event, what remains potential in the very passage into 
actuality, and is effective as such. 
 
Mendelssohn draws far reaching and highly controversial conclusions from his division 
of powers. He denies religion not only any form of coercive power, in the widest sense 
possible – religion is denied even the “softer” power of material reward and its denial 
(he calls it indirect bribe and indirect punishment, the awarding and withholding of any 
form of privilege)260 – but also the minimal element of sovereignty, the authority to 
define its own boundaries, to set limits to its scope. He denies this at both the 
immediate social-political level, by denying the right of excommunication,261 but also on 
a more structural level, by denying religion the prescription of principles of belief. 
 
First principles, says Mendelssohn are like the rules of the game. If someone denies 
them, he continues, a judge would be justified in saying: “You deny the basic principles, 
lad! with you all dispute is at an end. But you will at least comprehend that we, too, are 
permitted… to rid the earth of such a monster… yet the priest… is obligated to engage 
                                                
260 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 61. 
261 Ibid., 73. 
209 
 
him in discussion about the principles themselves.”262 Mendelssohn is fully aware what 
this position amounts to. 
 
Some people still appeal to the law of nature. Every society, they say, has the right 
of exclusion. Why should not also a religious society have it? But I reply: this is 
precisely where a religious society constitutes an exception. By virtue of a higher 
law, no society can exercise a right which is diametrically opposed to the primary 
purpose of the society itself. To exclude a dissident... is like forbidding a sick 
person to enter a pharmacy. In fact, the most essential purpose of religious society 
is mutual edification. By the magic power of sympathy one wishes to transfer truth 
from the mind to the heart; to vivify, by participation with others, the concepts of 
reason, which at times are lifeless, into soaring sensations.263 
 
It is in this light, that is, Mendelssohn’s objection to ‘first principles’ in religion, that we 
can understand Mendelssohn’s objection to the institution of the oath. Believing, 
Mendelssohn explains, based on an analysis of the Hebrew word, is not to be 
understood as holding a proposition to be true, but rather trusting, relying on something. 
Trust is granted. What one relies on does not appear in the form of ‘first principles.’ It 
constitutes one’s very disposition – Mendelssohn speaks of Gesinnung, which can be 
                                                
262 Ibid., 81. 
263 Ibid., 74. Interestingly, Mendelssohn then tells the story of an Epicurean – in the Jewish 
tradition, a synonym for a heretic – stumbling into a Stoic school, and being cured of his ailing 




translated as conviction as well as disposition. According to Mendelssohn, there are no 
principles that cannot, or should not be doubted.264 Yet one trusts implicitly, as it were, 
in the very act of thinking, indeed, in the very act of acting. 
 
Furthermore, one cannot even be sure what one’s own most fundamental beliefs are. 
One’s beliefs seems to be, in a way, inexpressible, or rather, expressing them, putting 
them in a propositional form, misses the point in advance. In forcing people to take an 
oath regarding their beliefs: 
 
…we are putting their conscience to a cruel torture when we question them about 
things which are solely a matter of the internal sense. Do you believe? Are you 
convinced? Persuaded?… In case there still remains any doubt in some corner of 
your mind or heart, let us know it or God will avenge the abuse of his name. Even 
if he had to state a proposition from the first book of Euclid, he would, at that 
moment, hesitate and suffer inexpressible torment. The perceptions of the internal 
sense are in themselves rarely so palpable that the mind is able to retain them 
securely and to give them expression as often as it may be desired. They will slip 
away from it at times, just when it thinks it has taken hold of them. I may feel sure 
of something right now, but a moment later, some slight doubt of its certainty may 
sneak or steal its way into a corner of the soul and lurk there, without my being 
aware of its presence. Many things for which I would suffer martyrdom today may 
                                                
264 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 81. 
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perhaps appear problematic to me tomorrow. If, in addition, I must also put these 
internal perceptions into words and signs, or swear to words and signs which other 
men lay before me, the uncertainty will be still greater. My neighbor and I cannot 
possibly connect the very same words with the very same internal sensations, for 
we cannot compare them, liken them to one another without again resorting to 
words.265 
 
Certainty, the conviction in the truth of the matter is ephemeral. Man cannot 
alienate/express/articulate his inner most intimate disposition. The trust here, expressed 
at first by the term “perceptions of the inner sense,”266 is intrinsically bound with their 
inarticulate nature,267 which, as we saw in the previous chapter, is the ground for 
Mendelssohn’s original proof of God. This is a domain that is only real by virtue of being 
on its way to language, neither belonging to it nor outside of it, a kind of mute, alien 
core.268 The inner sense is not an expression of absolute interiority. One’s beliefs are 
rather, to use Lacan’s coinage, extimate. 
 
What one trusts implicitly must remain just that, implicit. As such, it can in fact be the 
                                                
265 Ibid., 66. 
266 Peter Fenves connects Mendelssohn’s “inner sense” with the sensibility of the romantics, 
Mendelssohn’s true heirs, as he implies. See ‘Language on a Holy Day: The Temporality of 
Communication in Mendelssohn,’ in P.D. Fenves, Arresting Language: From Leibniz to 
Benjamin (Stanford University Press, 2001), 80-97. 
267 This, the internal gap in the relation to oneself, to the innermost, is what constitutes the only 
proof for the existence of God that Mendelssohn considered his own original contribution. See 
chapter 2. 
268 In Benjamin’s terms, it is what is communicated in language, not through it, not the content, 
but the medium. See “On Language as Such”, p. 64. 
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basis of intimacy. Only laboriously, and in the course of a life-long intimate friendship, 
may we, occasionally, find communion for our dispositions. As long as that friendship 
consists of profound disagreement, that is. 
 
“With my best friend,” writes Mendelssohn of his discussions with Lessing, “whom I 
believed to be ever so much in accord with me, I very often failed to come to terms 
about certain truths of philosophy and religion. After a long dispute and altercation, it 
would sometimes emerge that we have had each connected different ideas with the 
same words. Our ideas had to rub against each other for a long time before they could 
be made to fit themselves to one another, and before we could say with any assurance: 
Here we agree!”269 
 
What Mendelssohn seems to be implying in this invocation of his friendship with Lessing 
– shortly after his death and before the pantheism controversy – is that it would take the 
labor and nuances of a lifelong conversation with a close friend, fraught with the most 
fundamental disagreement, to bring to language one’s own fundamental beliefs. We can 
already see that belief, for Mendelssohn, is a political-theological complex, in that it 
follows the same structure and logic of articulation. 
 
                                                
269 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 66-7. 
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In the second part of Jerusalem, as we shall see in the next chapter, Mendelssohn 
explores this extimate topography of belief, in the context of a collective, rather than an 




4. Miracle and Tradition	  
 
We have seen that for Mendelssohn, belief is a political/theological complex, or, what 
for him amounts to the same, a matter of articulating the configuration of the private and 
the public, the inner and the outer. If political power is engaged in the setting of 
boundaries and the codification of relations, a movement from the private to the public, 
as it were, and from the abstract to the concrete, then religious power is engaged in 
preventing that movement from reaching its end, serving as a positive ‘obstacle,’ so to 
speak. In the second part of Jerusalem, as we shall see, Mendelssohn recasts these 
‘vectors’ in terms of developmental tendencies inherent in the structure of language, 
and develops a vision of Judaism’s Ceremonial Law as a means to avoid straying too 
far in either direction. Such a position, Mendelssohn believes, makes the event of 
revelation, rather than any particular content revealed by it, the effective ‘ideological 
glue,’ thus allowing for a conception of Judaism as dogma free. Divine legislation, as 
opposed to revelation, Mendelssohn argues, is not a demand to believe in anything in 
particular, but an aid in avoiding two problematic forms of belief. 
 
  
4.1 The Context – In Defense of Judaism 
In Mendelssohn’s account, the political-theological difference is, as we have seen, a 
difference that precedes the entities it differentiates. The separation between the two is 
also their link, in the same way language separates and links the spoken and unspoken, 
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the written and unwritten. The theoretical challenge in thinking such a difference is 
twofold. On the one hand, it is crucial to maintain the difference, the separation into two. 
On the other, the two are only separated or differentiated so long as they remain held by 
the thread of their split, that is, one loses sight of the difference as fundamental if one 
assigns the entities divided too much independence, as if the division has effectively 
created, once and for all, two separate realms. Paradoxically, such was Mendelssohn’s 
argument: it is precisely giving too much credence to the independence of these 
elements, erecting a wall between them, as it were, that causes the wall to crack and 
become a site of struggle, one element threatening to invade the other.  
 
It is precisely the difficulty in grasping this that prompts the two challenges posed to 
Mendelssohn, and to which the second part of Jerusalem offers a reply.270 If the first 
part of the book discusses religion and politics structurally, the second part moves into 
the terrain of history. While it has as its main theme the characterization of Judaism as 
having no principles of belief, making no claims for an exclusive revelation, one of the 
most intriguing and famous discussions in this second part of the book is 
Mendelssohn’s philosophical-historical account of the structure and development of 
language and script, elaborated in one of the digressions characteristic of the text. 
                                                
270 Mendelssohn compares the uncanny effect of his arguments on such readers to seeing the 
apparition of a ghost: “Some… readers and reviewers behaved quite strangely… they did not 
indeed dispute my arguments but, on the contrary, allowed them to stand. No one attempted to 
show the slightest connection between doctrinal opinions and right. No one discovered a flaw in 
the conclusion that my assent or failure to assent to certain eternal truth gives me no right over 
things... yet, nevertheless, they were startled by the immediate conclusions of my arguments as if 




Mendelssohn explains this compulsion to digress in light of the strange topography in 
which he finds his subject matter situated: “My subject matter borders on so many 
others that I cannot always keep to the same road, without deviating into byways.” The 
relation of his subject matter – is it Jerusalem, Judaism, or religious power? – to its 
periphery, to its surroundings, necessitates a movement of thought that digresses rather 
than progresses continuously and uninterrupted.271 With this thematic move into the 
terrain of history, the historical context of its composition also bursts onto the scene. As 
Elias Sacks puts it: “Jerusalem, or on religious power and Judaism is a book that 
Mendelssohn would have preferred not to write.”272 
 
Composed and published over several months from 1782 to 1783, Mendelssohn’s 
Jerusalem was, as we have already seen in the previous chapter but now must 
investigate more closely, composed in response to charges, in part made anonymously, 
that aimed not so much at a critique of his reasoning as implied that his reasoning was 
in contradiction with his practical orientation and way of life – a type of claim that, 
Mendelssohn writes, “ought to be banished forever.” While Mendelssohn finds the 
                                                
271 Indeed, as we shall see, what it at stake for Mendelssohn is the creation of a space that allows 
for the movement of meaning. Such a space can collapse in two opposite ways: either by 
reaching its goal immediately, or by way of infinite approaching. As we shall see, this double 
challenge to human strivings is the fundamental problem to which the text responds. The 
organizational structure of his argument thus corresponds with the elusive thematic core, or the 
object of his endeavor. 
272 E. Sacks, Moses Mendelssohn’s Living Script: Philosophy, Practice, History, Judaism 
(Indiana University Press, 2016), 22. 
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charges obscene and offensive, he accepts that there is a core of truth in them, which 
“cuts to the heart.” 
 
In 1782, a year before Jerusalem appeared, Mendelssohn published a preface to a 
German translation of Vindication of the Jews, a 1656 work by a Dutch rabbi, Menashe 
Ben Israel, urging the readmission of Jews into England. Mendelssohn’s 1782 preface 
addresses an emerging debate among German politicians and intellectuals surrounding 
the question of whether Jews should receive the civic rights of the Christian population. 
Mendelssohn here devotes considerable attention to a 1781 tract by the Prussian 
bureaucrat Christian Wilhelm von Dohm, who insists that Jews should receive a 
substantial degree of civic equality, and that Jewish communities should retain 
privileges such as the authority to excommunicate dissidents. Mendelssohn praises 
Dhom’s call for civic equality but rejects his proposal for the preservation of the power of 
excommunication, arguing instead that all forms of religious coercion are rationally 
indefensible and inconsistent with the teachings of Judaism, a thesis we have already 
seen (in chapter three) developed in the first part of Jerusalem. 
 
 
4.2 The Challenges: Cranz and Mörschel 
The most important response to Mendelssohn’s preface was The Search for Light and 
Right in a letter to Mr. Moses Mendelssohn, published anonymously by the satirist 
August Friedrich Cranz. Cranz’s charge is that if Judaism’s foundational documents 
endorse the punishment of failures to follow Jewish practice, then Judaism is a tradition 
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that permits coercion in religious matters, and Mendelssohn’s rejection of coercion 
commits him to altering or abandoning this tradition, or at least to substantially reforming 
Judaism by eliminating the punishments endorsed since Moses, and perhaps to 
rejecting Judaism altogether in favor of Christianity. 
 
In a postscript to The Search, a chaplain, Daniel Ernst Mörschel, addressed another 
aspect of Mendelssohn’s preface: statements that express a positive attitude towards 
reason’s role in religious life, calling for the toleration of “adherents of natural religion” 
who derive truth from rational reflection, and describing worship as participation in 
“reason’s house of devotion.” Mörschel writes: 
 
I have found signs leading me to believe that you are just as removed from the 
religion into which you were born as from the one that I received from my fathers. 
But I would not find it necessary to accuse you of hypocrisy if your considered 
response led us to conclude that you are equally indifferent to Judaism and 
Christianity because you are, in your sense [of the term] “a despiser of all 
revelation.” As proof of my suspicion, aside from [statements defending 
adherents of natural religion], I quote the following passage verbatim from your 
preface: Reason’s house of devotion requires no locked doors.273 
 
                                                
273 Ibid., 26. 
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Mendelssohn is not called out to revisit his claims, against which, as he notes, there 
was raised no substantial objection, but rather to confess that his positions are in 
contradiction with his way of life. Against Cranz’s charge, which he admits is not an 
unreasonable description of the manner in which some of his coreligionists understand 
matters, Mendelssohn distinguishes between the “original” constitution in which God 
was directly the King, and all subsequent historical configurations. We shall come back 
to this surprisingly elusive “origin” at the end of this chapter. The point here is to note 
that Mendelssohn provides a defense of coercion only under these, unique conditions. 
He further provides a more substantive defense of the idea of divine punishment as a 
feature of divine mercy. In light of his critique of the notion of duties towards God 
(discussed in chapter one), Mendelssohn rejects the idea that there can be offenses 
against God (God cannot suffer offenses), thus disqualifying the notion of infinite 
punishment. In contrast to the anxiety regarding punishment and salvation 
characterizing an economy of grace, Mendelssohn presents the certainty that God will 
leave no offense unpunished as the supreme form of mercy. Punishment serves to 
prevent the anxiety regarding ones standing before the divine.274 Against Mörschel, he 
will have to show how that his rejection of revelation does not lead him to atheism. In 
order to rise to this challenge, he proposes a conception of (his) religion, that does not 
rest on revelation, yet does not succumb to atheism. 
 
                                                
274 Nietzsche shows how divine mercy and forgiveness create an infinite debt. Mendelssohn sees 
in the idea that God will not allow for human sin to go unpunished the mark of his paternal 
mercy, for the promise of due punishment puts a limit on human indebtedness. 
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What he saw was, in part, not wrong. It is true that I recognize no eternal truths 
other than those that are not merely comprehensible to human reason but can 
also be demonstrated and verified by human powers. Yet Mr. Mörschel is misled 
by an incorrect conception of Judaism when he supposes that I cannot maintain 
this without departing from the religion of my fathers. On the contrary, I consider 
this an essential point of the Jewish Religion and believe this doctrine constitutes 
a characteristic difference between it and the Christian one. 
 
 
4.3 Divine Legislation 
Judaism, Mendelssohn argues, is not a revealed religion, at least by the standard 
Christian, understanding of that term. It is rather a divine legislation. 
 
I believe that Judaism knows of no revealed religion in the sense in which 
Christians understand this term. The Israelites possess a divine legislation – 
laws, commandments, ordinances, rules of life, instruction in the will of God as to 
how they should conduct themselves in order to attain temporal and eternal 
felicity, propositions and prescriptions of this kind were revealed to them by 
Moses in a miraculous and supernatural manner, but no doctrinal opinions, no 
universal propositions of reason. These the eternal reveals to us and to all other 
men, at all times, through nature and thing, but never through word and script.275 
                                                




What marks the difference between ‘divine legislation’ and the realm of ‘doctrinal 
opinions’ and ‘universal propositions’ is their medium of transmission. What is, or can 
be, a universal proposition, is not to be revealed through word or script. It should be 
accessible to all,276 and transcend the plurality of languages and traditions. Whatever 
we are to make of “divine legislation” as opposed to “divine revelation” must be related 
to the way that the former is bound up in ‘word’ and ‘script,’ bound up, that is, in a 
medium of tradition that differs in its accessibility from the universality of nature.277 
 
Historical truths, Mendelssohn argues, are distinct in their relation to the medium of their 
transmission. It is not that Judaism has historical, particular dogmas, such as the belief 
in election, or the story of exodus, as opposed to universal truths. This would only mean 
that the universally valid proposition Judaism finds fundamental has as their content 
                                                
276 It is based on this aspect of the argument, and Mendelssohn’s distinction in other contexts 
between public and private miracles that commentary has traditionally understood 
Mendelssohn’s distinction between divine legislation and divine revelation to consist in the 
public nature of the former in contrast to the private nature of the latter. 
277 Mendelssohn’s translation strategy follows and exemplifies the logic of this distinction. 
Consider the following example: “And now the divine voice proclaimed: I am the eternal, your 
God, who brought you out of the land of Mizrayim, who delivered you from bondage… A 
historical truth, on which this people’s legislation was founded, as well as laws, was to be 
revealed here – commandments and ordinances, not eternal religious truths.” Note, not only that 
the understanding of universal truth is presupposed but also that Mendelssohn has no trouble 
translating the name of God, traditionally forbidden for pronunciation as it risks disclosing 
something of the nature of the Godhead, in one single word – the eternal, but he does not 
translate the Hebrew name for Egypt, which he renders in transliteration from the Hebrew as if to 
retain its semantic horizon as a site of enslavement. The proper name of God can be translated by 




historical facts.278 But the distinction between universal truths and historical ones is 
much more than a difference in subject matter. Judaism is organized, in Mendelssohn’s 
view, around the act and event of divine legislation, being addressed by the issuing of 
the commandment. It is not the content of revelation so much as the very act that is 
here decisive, and indeed, operative. Judaism is not organized, in Mendelssohn’s view, 
around the content of divine legislation, which is accessible to all, but by being its 
addressee, by being commanded. 
 
 
4.4 The Division of Truth: Necessary, Contingent and Temporal (Historical) 
Mendelssohn proceeds to divide and subdivide truth. First there are eternal truths, 
themselves divided into necessary and contingent truths, both stemming from God, from 
his intellect and will respectively. The former are necessary in that they are conceivable 
in no other way, the latter are necessary in their actuality “because they became real in 
this and no other way.” To the first set belong the propositions of mathematics and the 
art of logic, to the second belong the general propositions of physics and psychology, 
“the laws of nature, according to which this universe, the world of bodies and the world 
of spirits is governed. The former are immutable even for the Omnipotent, because God 
himself cannot render his infinite intellect changeable; the latter, however, are subject to 
                                                
278 This seems to be how Kant understood Mendelssohn’s argument here. See his discussion of 
rationality in historical belief in relying on the testimony of others in ‘What is Orientation in 
Thinking?’ Kant and Reiss, Kant: Political Writings, 244. 
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the will of God and are immutable only insofar as they are in accord with his 
intentions.”279 
 
Now, beside these eternal truths, necessary and contingent, are historical, temporal 
truths: “Things which have occurred once and may never occur again; which have 
become true at one point in time and space through a confluence of causes and effects, 
and which, therefore, can only be conceived as true in respect to that point in time and 
space.”280 
 
It is easy to assume that historical truths are a subset of contingent truths. And yet, 
perhaps, there is a clue in the fact that Mendelssohn does not divide them so. Historical, 
temporal truths are distinguished from the eternal, in both its contingent and necessary 
manifestations. Neither contingent nor necessary, history is where, it would seem, the 
contingent and the necessary, what belongs to the will and the knowledge of God 
respectively, intersect, not unproblematically.281 For we have seen in previous chapters 
                                                
279 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 91. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Agamben’s suggestion that the key question of power in the West pertains to the relation 
between the “governmental, administrative” and the “ceremonial, liturgical” leads him to trace 
their genealogies to the question of the being and acting of God, that is, the tension between the 
being of God having to be though as immutable, and the event nature of revelation, at the dawn 
of the classical age and the rise of Christianity in late antiquity. See Agamben, Chiesa, and 
Mandarini, The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and 
Government. His complex archeology thus leads him, interestingly, to what Boyarin considered 
to be the key axis around which Jews and Christians, over the span of centuries, constituted their 
respective difference, what he calls logos-theology, the status of the revealed word of God. The 
process resulted in the Christian theological doctrine, on the one hand, from which Agamben 
derives his “division of power,” and the rabbinical institutionalization of a legal discourse that 
refrains from such a doctrine. See D. Boyarin, Border Lines: The Partition of Judaeo-
Christianity (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006). Boyarin is here following recent trends in 
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that a crucial aspect of Mendelssohn’s metaphysical theology is his insistence on the 
irreducible gap between God’s knowledge, the eternal, immutable representation of 
what is best, and his creation, through an act of will, of what falls short of the ideal, our 
contingent world. 
 
Historical time is the site where the necessary and the contingent intersect. Note that 
Mendelssohn speaks of the confluence of causes and effects. While this may be taken 
as the intersection of more than one causal chain, it can also be read as the intersection 
of cause and effect themselves, as if they were themselves separate elements here 
intersecting. There is a way to bring these two reading together: history would then be 
the realm of consequences, where causes intersect with effects, and the confluence of 
causal chains would be indicative of that. The question ‘Why?’ as it pertains to an 
historical event is not to be explained by mere reference to a causal chain. It involves 
the intersection of several such chains. This seems to be the very definition of what, 
from a modern standpoint, is defined as contingency – it just happens to be the case 
that these causal chains have here intersected. But reference to contingency seems to 
do very little to quiet the question.282 It is here precisely the absence of a cause – there 
                                                
research that reject the idea of Judaism as a ‘mother’ religion, preceding, and superseded by 
Christianity ad ideological constructs. Rabbinic Judaism and Christianity are more profitably to 
be considered as ‘twin’ religions, articulating their identities in reference one to the other. See 
I.J. Yuval, Two Nations in Your Womb: Perceptions of Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and 
the Middle Ages (University of California Press, 2006). 
282 See E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (Clarendon 
Press, 1963), 69-70. Evans-Pritchard, explaining the nature of witchcraft among the Azande of 
the southern Sudan, began with the example of a granary which, one day while people were 
sitting beneath it, collapsed. The Azande, who know about termites, are not satisfied with this as 
a reason for the calamity. They ask rather about the particularities of the event. Why did the 
granary collapse at that moment, and with certain people beneath it? Evans-Pritchard argues that 
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is no one cause that accounts for the intersection of the relevant causal chains – that 
has the relevant effect. The question of meaning of an historical occurrence lies in its 
singularity – why here and now, why do these people – and is in that sense only raised 
in light of this absent cause, and cannot be explained away by evoking contingency. 




4.5 Event and Authority 
Temporal truths involve a punctuation of the flow of time, a point in which a proposition 
becomes true. Mendelssohn is proposing a conception of history that insists on both 
necessity and contingency, both the truth and its occurrence. It is the nature of this 
punctuation of time by truth that he believes differs from the conception of revelation he 
attributes to Christianity. What is immediately veiled by revelation is revelation itself, to 
the extent that one takes the revealed content to be decisive. It is the eventual nature of 
revelation that is sidestepped by the truth revealed in it.  
                                                
what they are after is what caused such causal chains to intersect, at that time and place. In 
looking for their answer, they find the witch to whom the event is attributed. In revisiting Evans-
Pritchard’s classical study, James Siegel compares the search for a magical explanation with 
modern trauma. It is not true, he says, that we simply let go of such excessive ‘why’ questions: 
“We understand that we cannot answer the question posed by Azande. But we pose it also, all the 
same. When, for instance, we are involved in a bad accident, the sign of our being traumatized is 
precisely that we feel compelled to repeatedly recall the scene of the accident. A similar accident 
happening to someone unknown to us is less likely to stimulate such memories. If it does, we 
believe we identify with the person in the scene with ourselves…There is a singularity about the 
event when 'I' am involved in it… It is not the breaking of the traffic laws that makes the 
accident abnormal. It is that they were broken in such a way that I became a victim. A victim not 
merely of negligence and perhaps criminality but a victim of circumstances.” J.T. Siegel, 




Historical propositions, “which have become true at one point in time and space through 
a confluence of causes and effects, and which, therefore, can only be conceived as true 
in respect to that point in time and space [ die sich zu Einer Zeit zugetragen, und 
vielleicht niemals wiederkommen; Sätze, die durch einen Zusammenfluß von Ursachen 
und Wirkungen in einem Punkte der Zeit und des Raumes wahr geworden, und also 
von diesem Punkte der Zeit und des Raumes nur als wahr gedacht werden können].”283 
 
The German von, here translated as ‘in respect,’ allows for a slightly, yet meaningfully, 
different translation: it is from that point in time that these events are to be thought, that 
is, not only can they not be thought before, and need to be thought in relation to that 
moment in time, but it is also from within that very break in time that they are to be 
conceived. Truly conceiving them entails situating oneself within that very break. 
 
These sets of propositions – necessary, contingent and temporal – differ also in respect 
to their “means of persuasion, or in the manner in which men convince themselves and 
others of them.” In accordance with their different nature, they belong to different 
epistemological registers. The doctrines of the first kind, the necessary truths, “are 
founded upon reason, that is, on the immutable coherence and essential connection of 
ideas, according to which they either presuppose or exclude one another.” Such are 
mathematical and logical propositions. They all show the possibility or impossibility of 
                                                
283 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 91. 
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thinking certain ideas in association with others. The truths of the second kind, eternal 
and contingent, what we would call, empirical, require in addition to reason also 
observation. Here, the reliance on others can be seen as contingent upon the limitation 
of our time. Given the opportunity, we could, perhaps gladly, verify such truths with our 
own experience. 
 
This is where historical truths differ. Here, trust in the testimony of others is not only 
necessary but belongs to the nature of the event. 
 
Those passages which, as it were, occur but once in the book of nature must be 
explained by themselves, or remain incomprehensible; that is, they can only be 
perceived, by means of the senses, by those who were present at the time and 
place of their occurrence in nature. Everyone else must accept them on authority 
and testimony… In historical matters, the authority and credibility of the narrator 
constitute the only evidence. Without testimony, we cannot be convinced of any 
historical truth. Without authority, the truth of history vanishes along with the 
event itself.284  
 
The transition from the second kind of truth, which we may call empirical, to historical 
truths involves a fundamental change in the role, function, and even meaning of the 
term experience. Whereas empirical fact must be indifferent to the impressions of its 
perceiver, in principle repeatable and equally accessible to anyone’s experience, and 
                                                
284 ibid., 93. 
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thus the reliance on the testimony of others is accidental, historical experience is 
essentially mediated by others. 
 
The truth of an event is inseparable from its mediation, its transmission, and that is what 
sets them apart epistemologically. An event is never properly known by an individual 
knower, relying solely on his cognitive powers. To recognize an event is a collective, 
and historical, transgenerational, enterprise. 
 
However, this move away from empirical fact does not imply for Mendelssohn the 
problematic mysticism of revelation as traditionally understood, namely, an ultimately 
private, incommunicable affair, and one that relies on the miracle of divine grace. 
 
Miracles and extraordinary signs are, according to Judaism, no proofs for or 
against eternal truth of reason. We are, therefore, instructed in scripture itself not 
to listen to a prophet if he teaches or counsels things contrary to established 
truths, even if he confirms his mission by miracles.285 
 
For Mendelssohn, the belief in miracles is secondary to the trust one must assign to a 
tradition. A miracle would only be taken as a sign, as something carrying meaning, for 
those who already see themselves as inheritors of the tradition. To understand the 
effectivity of miracles is to understand the effectivity of language. Of one’s own 
language, that is, of speaking a language amongst the plurality of languages. The status 
                                                
285 Ibid., 99. 
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of the effectivity of history and tradition is inseparable from their plurality, from there 
being histories and traditions. Indeed, the trouble in inquiring after the authority of 
tradition is that tradition and authority form a kind of hermeneutical circle: tradition is that 
form of life in which authority is in full sway, authority is the traditionally grounded 
power.286 
 
Mendelssohn thus reverses the order of miracle, authority and tradition: a miracle can 
never be the explanation for tradition. Rather, tradition is the miracle to be explained. 
Authority here must be granted – it is the condition of possibility for there being a 
medium of tradition. And authority cannot be derived from a miraculous act. At best, a 
miracle can be an additional sign, alongside writing and other linguistic signs, which 
serves to confirm authority.  
 
Divine legislation, as opposed to divine revelation, is fundamentally inseparable from 
tradition and authority. The elevated status of trust in authority in the case of such truths 
is linked to their status as events. An event in the meaningful sense of the term, i.e., 
more than a mere occurrence but that which marks a break between before and after, 
which raises a question of meaning, is something that simply does not exist without a 
medium of tradition, or fidelity, to borrow Badiou’s language.287 The event does not have 
                                                
286 See H.J.S. Maine, Ancient Law (J. Murray, 1912). 
287 Compare with Badiou’s definition of fidelity: “I call fidelity the set of procedures which 
discern, within a situation, those multiples whose existence depends upon the introduction into 
circulation (under the supernumerary name conferred by an intervention) of an eventual multiple. 
In sum, a fidelity is the apparatus which separates out, within the set of presented multiples, 
those which depend upon an event. To be faithful is to gather together and distinguish the 
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the status of an objective, empirical fact, it does not belong to the order of nature, of 
what happens. It never simply is or has taken place, but it always in some sense ought 
to have taken place, remains to come.288 An event is imperative, it has a deontological 
dimension and it engages the practical attitudes – desires, wishes and actions – of 
those involved with it, not only their cognition. A fact is to be acknowledged and 
reckoned with, an event is to be realized and reinterpreted.289 The event to a large 
extant is nothing but the tradition it ensues, the fidelity it instigates, the commitment to 
realize it. It is in essence directed towards transmission and thus cannot be thought 
outside its subjectification. An event is not an occurrence that can be rendered as a 
mere matter of fact. While empirical facts must be “out there” regardless of our 
recognition, waiting to be discovered, events are unheard of only in the sense that there 
                                                
becoming legal of a chance.” A. Badiou, Being and Event (Continuum, 2005), 232. Without 
going into the highly technical language and complex ontological structure of Badiou’s 
enterprise, we can here point to an affinity on the issue of the complex existential dependence at 
play – fidelity is to separate between what is given in a situation, and what owes its existence to 
such an intervention. 
288 In more dynamic terms, closer to the sense given to the event in Heidegger, Agamben speaks 
of an event/origin as something that “cannot be understood in any way as a given that can be 
situated either in a chronology… or even beyond it, in an atemporal metahistorical structure… it 
is rather, a force working in history… just as the child in psychoanalysis expresses a force that 
continues to act in the psychic life of the adult… something… necessarily presupposed as having 
happened but that cannot be hypostatized into an event in a chronology… not in fact an event 
that can be considered completed once and for all; it is always under way…” G. Agamben, The 
Sacrament of Language: An Archaeology of the Oath (Homo Sacer Ii, 3) (Polity, 2011), 10-11. 
289 Bringing together the two senses, in English, of the word realization, as making something 
real and existent and as coming to a different understanding of past events. Eli Friedlander makes 
this observation in the context of his reading Benjamin’s notion of the dialectical image, a 
reworking of his notion of origin as something that lies neither in the past nor in the present but 








4.6 Hearing Voices 
At issue in Divine legislation, Mendelssohn makes clear, is how to hear, even listen to, 
the voice that issues the commandment. 
 
I return to my previous remark. Judaism boasts of no exclusive revelation of 
eternal truths that are indispensable to salvation… revealed religion is one thing, 
revealed legislation, another. The voice which let itself be heard on Sinai on that 
great day did not proclaim, “I am the eternal, your God, the necessary, 
independent being, omnipotent and omniscient, that recompenses men in future 
life according to their deeds.” This is the universal religion of mankind, not 
Judaism; and the universal religion of mankind, without which men are neither 
virtuous nor capable of felicity, was not to be revealed there. In reality, it could 
not have been revealed there, for who was to be convinced of these eternal 
doctrines of salvation by the voice of thunder and the sound of trumpets? Surely 
not the unthinking, brute like man, whose own reflections had not yet led him to 
the existence of an invisible being that governs the visible. The miraculous voice 
would not have instilled any concepts in him and, therefore, would not have 
convinced him. Still less would it have convinced the sophists whose ears are 
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buzzing with so many doubts and rumination that he can no longer hear the voice 
of common sense. He demands rational proofs, not miracles.290 
 
Note the slippage from the thundering voice of trumpets to the sober, silent voice of 
common sense.291 The point of conjunction of these two opposites is their disjunction 
with the content they aim to support. The voice offers no aid to the universal truth – it 
can only undermine it.292 There are two kinds of deafness that correspond to the two 
problematic modes of consciousness. The unthinking brute cannot comprehend the 
sublimity of the invisible, he has no concept of such a power (as a source of language). 
                                                
290 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 97-8. 
291 My reading of the voice in Mendelssohn largely follows Dolar’s notion of the voice; not the 
fully present support of meaning that came under Derridean attack under the name of 
phonocentrism, but the elusive voice-object that undermines meaning. See M. Dolar, A Voice 
and Nothing More (MIT Press, 2006). 
292 It is interesting that Mendelssohn approaches the problem of the voice from the opposite end 
to the manner in which it appears in Kant. In Kant, human freedom begins with the ability to 
quibble with the voice, understood as instinct. See, ‘Conjectural Beginning of Human History,’ 
in Kant and Reiss, Kant: Political Writings, 223-4. An interesting point of overlap between 
Mendelssohn and Kant occurs in the way the voice for both seems to slip between domains, 
which might be the most salient feature of its elusive materiality. Kant moves from the voice of 
God to the voice of nature – presumably, at this level there is no difference. The problem of 
listening to the voice posed here by Mendelssohn emerges for Kant in his second critique. See 
Kant and Beck, Critique of Practical Reason, 51.For discussion see Dolar, A Voice and Nothing 
More, 83-103. For Kant, we must first learn to distance ourselves from the voice, be able to see it 
as external – heteronomous – and therefore, not a real source of authority for us. We must then 
learn to hear the voice of reason, which is inaudible because it is our internal exterior, that which 
only arises in us, but is for that reason, the only thing capable of pushing us beyond our nature 
(inclination). Second nature would be a kind of repetition and substitution of a lost power. The 
picture for Mendelssohn is quite different. He is offering here no speculation as to what came 
before historical time. Since the voice belongs neither outside nor inside there is no point in such 
a narrative of internalization. The voice can only be heard, so to speak, at the very site of such a 
splitting between inside and outside, before and after – nature and culture. Dorothea Von Mücke 
discusses Kant’s voice in the context of the emerging discourse of human lack of instinct. See 
D.E. von Mücke, The Practices of the Enlightenment: Aesthetics, Authorship, and the Public 
(Columbia University Press, 2015), 38. 
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The voice, if heard, can do nothing but scare him out of his wits. For him the voice 
would drown the message, he could hear nothing but its violence, its raw power. The 
voice cannot instill any understanding in him, cannot push him towards meaning. Its 
authority cannot be thus established. The sophist, on the other hand, can no longer 
hear the voice of common sense, as his ears are “buzzing with doubts and ruminations.” 
The sophist does not have an ear for common sense, quite literally: sense for him does 
not cohere, and is divorced from all that is common. For him sense belongs only on the 
side of distinction and differentiation, the skeptic unmasking of what is commonly held to 
be true as mere appearance, as semblance. The sophist’s ears are abuzz with doubts 
as to the veracity of what he is a hearing. For the sophist, the voice is no longer audible, 
since it is completely infused in the text. The brute is incapable of moving beyond the 
mere force of enunciation, while for the sophist enunciation dissolves without remainder 
in the enunciated message. 
 
In Mendelssohn’s account, a tradition that is to be truly alive would have to avoid both of 
these opposing modes of consciousness, which make hearing the voice – opening the 
space for mediation itself as meaningful – impossible. What he sets out to isolate is a 
tradition founded upon this voice, a way of life that makes this voice audible. A means 
(medium) and technology (practical know-how) animated by the commanding voice, 
rather than the message it carries. As we shall see, the ceremonial law is understood by 
Mendelssohn as a way to hear the voice proclaiming the law, and to avoid the two 





4.7 The First Detour: Progress, Between the Naive and the Skeptic  
Mendelssohn’s opposition to the idea of God revealing essential truths to parts of 
humanity, coding them in particular languages and addressing them to particular 
peoples, leads him to a critique of the notion of progress.293 The idea of divine 
revelation, of God revealing the truth necessary for His creation’s felicity, in a particular 
moment and to particular people, is in contradiction with the idea of divine providence.  
 
It is by designing the appropriate media for the discovery of truths that Mendelssohn 
sees the mark of providence. The truths necessary for human felicity cannot depend on 
a supernatural revelation: 
 
If therefore, mankind must be corrupt and miserable without revelation, why has 
the far greater part of mankind lived without true revelation from time 
immemorial? Why must the two Indies wait until it pleases the Europeans to send 
them a few comforters to bring them a message without which they can, 
according to this opinion, live neither virtuously nor happily?294 
 
                                                
293 Arendt’s judgement of Mendelssohn as lacking a conception of history is thus hardly justified. 
The reason Arendt could not locate a conception of history in Mendelssohn is because of his 
explicit rejection of a progressive account of history. See H. Arendt, The Jewish Writings (Knopf 
Doubleday Publishing Group, 2009), 7-8. Arendt’s judgment in this regard has been up until 
recently a consensus in the literature. For the only exception so far, to the best of my knowledge, 
see Sacks, Moses Mendelssohn’s Living Script: Philosophy, Practice, History, Judaism. 
294 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 94. 
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While eternal truths must be accessible to all, the manner in which they become 
manifest in particular life forms varies in degree and quality from a rather inarticulate but 
vivid practical disposition to one that is more finely articulated but therefore also 
weakened in its effectivity. 
 
According to the concepts of true Judaism, all the inhabitants of the earth are 
destined to felicity; and the means of attaining it are widespread as mankind 
itself, as charitably dispensed as the means of warding of hunger and other 
natural needs. Here men are left to brute nature, which inwardly feels its powers 
and uses them, without being able to express itself in words and speech except 
in the most defective manner and, as it were, stammeringly. In another place, 
they are aided by science and art, shining brightly through words, images, and 
metaphors, by which the perceptions of the inner sense are transformed into a 
clear knowledge of signs and established as such.295 
 
Mendelssohn opposes the notion of progress, in so far as it suggests that at particular 
moments in history particular life forms have had an exclusive access to universal truth. 
Mendelssohn does not deny the difference in knowledge and refinement between 
contemporaneous cultures, what we might call civilization, and he recognizes this 
difference as an advancement, a progress, but in a qualified sense. It comes with a 
cost. The gaining of clearer knowledge is not always necessary or useful. 





The man who lives simply has not yet divided the objections which so greatly 
confuse the sophist. For him the word nature, the mere sound, has not yet 
become a being that seeks to supplant the deity. He still knows but little of the 
difference between direct and indirect causality; and he hears and sees instead 
the all vivifying power of the deity everywhere – in every sunrise, in every rain 
that falls… this mode of conceiving things has in it something defective, but it 
leads directly to the recognition of the invisible, omnipotent being, to whom we 
owe all the good which we enjoy. But as soon as an Epicurus or a Lucretius, a 
Helvetius or a Hume criticizes the inadequacy of this mode of conceiving things 
and (which is to be charged to human weakness) strays too far in the other 
direction, and wants to play a deceptive game with the word nature, providence 
again raises up other men among the people who separate prejudice from truth, 
correct the exaggerations on both sides, and show that truth can endure even if 
prejudice is rejected. At bottom, the material is always the same, – there 
endowed with all the raw but vigorous juices which nature gives it, here with the 
refined good taste of art, easier to digest, but only for the weak. On balance, 
men’s doings and morality of their character can perhaps expect just as good 
results from the crude mode of conceiving things as from the refined and purified 
concepts.296 
 
                                                
296 ibid., 95. 
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There is a certain excess to human life,297 which the naïve consciousness senses 
vividly everywhere, but, for that very reason, misperceives. By seeing everything as full 
of life, invested with meaning, it cannot isolate and conceive the source that animates. 
Things appear as immediately invested with meaning, alive and vital. Alas, the process 
of conceptual clarification, set on purifying meaning from the realm of the sensual and 
securing a sound understanding, is soon led to act against itself, to undermine its own 
quest for knowledge. The conceptual apparatus ‘cooks’ the Real it is after, ‘digesting’ a 
processed and weakened (conceptually mediated) version of reality, a reality precisely 
devoid of its raw, pre-conceptual force. Seeking to divest our picture of reality from all 
emotional investment and to perceive it objectively leads to an objectivity devoid of its 
object. Better put, objectivity itself becomes the object, they coincide entirely. While the 
naïve perception is attributed to human weakness in face of the excess it encounters, 
the incapacity to perceive things clearly leading to mystification; conceptual clarification 
soon becomes itself a form of defense, capable of digesting only a reality purified and 
distilled so as to be digestible by its own powers of understanding. Indeed, in purifying 
all meaning from the perceptual world, the excessive power that the naïve 
consciousness senses and perceives in the world around it attaches to the process of 
                                                
297 Erich Santner speaks of the “too muchness” of life as a problem shared by Freud and 
Rosenzweig. One of his suggestions is to consider trauma as generated “by too much of address, 
by an excess immanent to an address that resists metabolization, that is symbolically 
‘indegistable.’” See E.L. Santner, On the Psychotheology of Everyday Life: Reflections on Freud 
and Rosenzweig (University of Chicago Press, 2007), 32. 
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purification itself, which therefore tends towards its own self-undermining.298 The skeptic 
falls under a subtler deception, but a deception nonetheless. 
 
Naive consciousness is crude, but has a sense for the mystery. The skeptic falls prey to 
the illusion that one could eliminate all mystery. The truth that is to survive the 
correction of prejudice is the truth of mystery, so to speak, or more precisely, what the 
naive consciousness takes to be mysterious. Sure enough, what the naïve mode of 
conceiving things sees as a mysterious power behind the realm of appearances, 
endowing everything with life, can be explained away by rational, scientific thinking. But, 
recall that the role of Bildung for Mendelssohn is not to simply do away with that sense, 
but rather to shine a new light on it. This ‘doing away’ with prejudice, leads, in his 
analysis, to a sophism blind to the illusion it is wrapped up with, namely, the 
mystification of knowledge, which turns a blind eye to the inescapability of mediation. 
The skeptic demands a piece of knowledge that is immediate, purified of all human 
projections, and thus ends up only being capable of perceiving (“digesting”) a reality 
completely mediated by his conceptual apparatus. Demanding that everything would be 
grounded soon leads to despair; the doubt whether there is anything we can know that 
is worth the effort.299 
 
                                                
298 Zupančič interprets in similar terms Nietzsche’s ascetic ideal, as a drive for purification that 
ultimately turns against itself. Alenka Zupančič, The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche's Philosophy of 
the Two (MIT Press), 46-71. 
299 See Chapter 2 on Mendelssohn’s condition of impossibility. 
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The issue for Mendelssohn is how to retain an amount of naivety, the sense of mystery, 
not as a manner of not knowing, of keeping ignorant about unpleasant facts of life, but 
as the very attitude of research and discovery. 
  
 
4.8 Everything Fundamental: Mendelssohn’s Elusive Belief 
Mendelssohn recognizes in these ‘shapes of consciousness,’ to use the Hegelian term, 
a practical attitude or disposition. While such a minimal discrepancy between 
consciousness and its implicit presuppositions is unavoidable, as he proceeds to 
account for (his own) tradition he will do so in terms that seek to avoid the double pitfall 
or the deadlock presented by the alternative between skepticism and crude naivety. 
 
Although the divine book that we received through Moses is, strictly speaking, 
meant to be a book of laws containing ordinances, rules of life and prescriptions, 
it also includes, as is well known, an inexhaustible treasure of rational truths and 
religious doctrines which are so intimately connected with the laws that they form 
but one entity. All laws refer to, or are based upon, eternal truths of reason, or 
remind us of them, and rouse us to ponder them. Hence, our rabbis rightly say: 
the laws and doctrines are related to each other like body and soul. I shall have 
occasion to say more about this below, and shall content myself here with 
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presupposing it as a fact, of the truth of which anyone can convince himself if he 
pursues the laws of Moses for that purpose, even if only in translation.300 
 
Mendelssohn will unpack a little the connection a tradition establishes between truth 
and doctrine,301 the strange unity achieved by it, in his discussion of Ceremonial Law. 
What keeps his focus here is the strange appeal such a tradition exhibits (although the 
two issues are by no means unrelated). 
 
The experience of many centuries also teaches that this divine law book has 
become, for a large part of the human race, a source of insight from which it 
draws new ideas, or according to which it corrects old ones. The more you 
search in it, the more you will be astounded at the depths of insight which lie 
concealed in it. At first glance, to be sure, the truth presents itself therein in its 
simplest attire and, as it were, free of any pretentions. Yet the more closely you 
approach it, and the purer, the more innocent, the more loving and longing is the 
glance with which you look upon it, the more it will unfold before you its divine 
beauty, veiled lightly, in order not to be profaned by vulgar and unholy eyes. But 
                                                
300 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 99. 
301 A major concern for Walter Benjamin throughout his career, which, after H.N Bialik, he will 
come to call Hallakha and Aggadah. This notion occupies Benjamin’s thought in particular in his 
essay on Kafka. We know that he had received from his friend Scholem a first edition copy of 
Mendelssohn’s Jerusalem at the same time he immersed himself in Kafka. See Walter Benjamin, 
‘Franz Kafka: On The tenth Anniversary of his Death,’ in W. Benjamin et al., Selected Writings, 
vol. II, part 2 (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005), 794-816. 
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all these excellent propositions are presented to the understanding, submitted to 
us for consideration, without being forced upon our belief.302 
 
The truth presents itself in a deceptively simple attire, “free of any pretentions.” And yet 
it becomes a “source of insight” from which one “draws new ideas” or “corrects old 
ones.” The more one is capable of gazing at it innocently, the more it reveals its beauty. 
The issue is how to adopt such a gaze, how to trust in the possibility of uncovering 
meaning, confronted with an object that appears to hide nothing. 
 
In truth, everything depends here also on the distinction between believing and 
knowing, between religious doctrines and religious commandments. To be sure, 
all human knowledge can be reduced to a few, fundamental concepts, which are 
laid down as the bases. The fewer these are, the more firmly the structure will 
stand. But laws cannot be abridged. In them everything is fundamental; and in 
this regard, we may rightly say: to us, all words of scripture, all of God’s 
commandments and prohibitions are fundamental.303 
 
The text contains ordinances, as well as eternal truths (which are in principle accessible 
to anyone). What is unique, Mendelssohn suggests, is precisely their connection, the 
                                                
302 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 99-100. As Altman notes, in 
speaking of the beauty of the Torah, Mendelssohn is making use of a metaphor with a long 
tradition, comparing the Torah to a hidden, beautiful woman. See Altmann, Moses Mendelssohn: 
A Biographical Study, 543. Mendelssohn is not merely simplifying the metaphor, as Altman 
suggests. The beauty here is a result of the pursuit – the lover has to overcome the ugliness and 
plainness of his beloved. On the long history of this metaphor see G.G. Scholem, On the 
Kabbalah and Its Symbolism (Schocken Books, 1965), 32-86. 
303 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 101-2. 
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vivid manner in which they relate to each other (like body and soul). But what maintains 
this relationship of life between them? Or indeed, any relationship at all? 
 
Mendelssohn is here confronting the core of the challenge he has set himself up to 
meet. He has struggled to separate the two realms – that of reason and that of 
commandment – absolutely, and is now aiming at their conjunction. 
 
Commandment and prohibition, reward and punishment are only for actions, acts 
of commission and omission which are subject to man’s will and which are 
guided by ideas of good and evil and, therefore, also by hope and fear. Belief 
and doubt, assent and opposition, on the other hand, are not determined by our 
faculty of desire, by our wishes and longings, or by fear and hope, but by our 
knowledge of truth and untruth.304 
 
The separation seems absolute, and the connection between the two realms 
impossible. Belief is separated from all desire and motivation, cannot be effected by 
rewards or punishment and should only be susceptible to reasons. But this absolute 
separation begins to falter. 
 
Among all the prescriptions and ordinances of the Mosaic law, there is not a 
single one which says: you shall believe or not believe. They all say, you shall do 
or not do. Faith is not commanded, for it accepts no other commands than those 
that come to it by means of conviction. All the commandments of the divine law 
                                                
304 Ibid., 100. 
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are addressed to man’s will, to his power to act. In fact, the word in the original 
language that is usually translated as faith actually means, in most cases, trust, 
confidence, and firm reliance on pledge and promise.305 
 
While trust, like belief, cannot be the result of a command, and is not a matter for the 
will, it differs from the former in its relation to the truth. While a belief can be shaken by 
evidence and argumentation, trust can only be broken. Belief is either justified or not, 
trust is granted. If rational belief is indifferent to the will, to reward and punishment, trust 
can be said to be equally indifferent to knowledge, to evidence and argumentation. 
Recalling Mendelssohn’s division of the faculties, we might say that trust belongs to the 
subjective poll, the vector that issues from the inside to the outside, seeking to realize in 
reality what it wishes for, whereas belief in this context belongs on the objective poll, the 
vector that seeks to adjust our inside in accordance with external reality. 
 
The text of tradition is paradoxically more revealing, seen as having more and more 
meaning to be uncovered the more the gaze is trusting. Naivety here is not the mark of 
mere simplicity, but of the capacity for fascination, for enchantment, as an attitude of 
interpretation, of the uncovering of truth. What opens up the space of engaged reflection 
is a certain indifference or suspension of conceptual determination, which makes it 
possible to perceive in the plain looking text ever more meaning to uncover. 
 




After surveying Jewish history to give support to his claim that Judaism has no 
principles of belief, Mendelssohn refers the insisting reader to Hillel for guidance. 
 
Should you, nevertheless, want to obtain to their quintessence, listen to how the 
great teacher of the nation, Hillel the Elder, who lived before the destruction of 
the second temple, conducted himself in this matter. A heathen said: “Rabbi, 
teach me the entire law while I am standing on one foot!” Shammai, whom he 
had previously approached with the same unreasonable request, had dismissed 
him contemptuously; but Hillel, renowned for his imperturbable composure and 
gentleness, said: “Son, love thy neighbor as thyself. This is the text of the law; all 
the rest is commentary. Now go and study!”306 
 
What allowed Hillel to answer the heathen? Did he have a better conception of the 
essence of Judaism so that he could reduce it to a single maxim? This is clearly not 
Mendelssohn’s intention, as he has just emphasized the impossibility of the reduction of 
the law. And indeed, Hillel’s answer certainly does not offer a reduction that would 
render the engagement with the tradition redundant. Hillel can only serve as the hero of 
                                                
306 Ibid., 102. It is worthwhile noting that this is not an entirely faithful quotation. While this 
version of the so-called golden rule or rule of reciprocity, important to Christianity, has biblical 
origins (Leviticus, 19:18), Hillel’s version is put in the negative: “That which is hateful to you, 
do not do to your fellow.” We see here again that for Mendelssohn the core idea can be put in 
different words with relative ease. What is veiled in this translation is the possible undertone of 
scolding, of Hillel reprimanding the heathen who approached him. Mendelssohn’s choice of 
evoking the biblical verse rather than Hillel’s version, however motivated, thus veils the 
undercurrent of hostility and aggression embedded in the ethical maxims, and which drew 
Sigmund Freud in Civilization and its Discontents to his own exegeses of this famous verse. See 
S. Freud, J. Strachey, and P. Gay, Civilization and Its Discontents (W.W. Norton, 1989), 66-9. 
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Mendelssohn’s story to the extent that his abridgment fails, albeit in a very specific and 
productive way. 
 
Hillel’s maxim, like the foundational text, is dressed in deceivingly simple attire. There is 
no apparent difficulty in comprehending it, let alone one that would prompt an engaged 
study of an entire tradition. What the Hillel story is set up to demonstrate is the sense in 
which laws, in opposition to propositions, cannot be abridged. What cannot be captured 
by understanding is precisely the force of the maxim, its instructiveness. What practical 
maxims in themselves reveal is the gap between the simplicity of understanding them 
and the profound, immense difficulty in making them instructive, effective. In the ethical, 
practical realm, Mendelssohn thought, examples do not serve to clarify an abstract idea, 
but rather, to bring the ideas from the mind to the heart. 
 
 
4.9 The Second Detour: Mendelssohn’s Critique of Media 
Mendelssohn sees the Ceremonial Law as a way to hear the voice, a manner to be 
attentive, and receptive, to the act and event of revelation, rather than to its content.307 
                                                
307 Compare with the mystical idea of the divine voice as the empty core of revelation, reported 
by Scholem. Scholem concludes his reflections on authority and mysticism with the following 
tale about the theories of the Hassidic Rabbi Mendel of Rymanov, a younger contemporary of 
Mendelssohn’s, baring remarkable resemblance to our interpretation of Mendelssohn. “Rabbi 
Mendel Torum of Rymanov (1745-1815), one of the great Hassidic saints, throws a striking light 
on the whole problem of the relationship between authority and mysticism. The revelation given 
to Israel on mount Sinai is, as everyone knows, a sharply defined set of doctrines, a summons to 
the human community; its meaning is perfectly clear, and it is certainly not a mystical formula 
open to infinite interpretation. But what, the question arises, is the truly divine element in this 
revelation? The question is already discussed in the Talmud. When the children of Israel 
received the ten commandments what could they actually hear, and what did they hear? Some 
maintained that all the commandments were spoken to the children of Israel directly by the 
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This entails for him a notoriously complex digression into the nature and history of 
language and means of communication. Since the Ceremonial Law is for Mendelssohn 
a medium in which to receive the very mediation of revelation, he is compelled to reflect 
more explicitly about the advantages and shortcomings of mediation in general. 
 
It seems to me that the change that has occurred in different periods of culture 
with regard to written characters has had, at all times, a very important part in the 
revolutions of human knowledge in general, and in the various modifications of 
men’s opinions and ideas about religious matters, in particular; and if it did not 
produce them completely by itself, it at least cooperated in a remarkable way with 
other secondary causes.308  
 
                                                
divine voice. Others said that only the first two commandments: ‘I am the Lord thy God’ and 
‘thou shalt have no other gods before me’ (Exod. 20:2-3) were communicated directly. Then the 
people were overwhelmed, they could no longer endure the divine voice. They had been obliged 
to receive the remaining commandments through Moses. Moses alone was able to withstand the 
divine voice… who repeated in a human voice those statements of supreme authority that are the 
ten commandments. This conception of Moses as interpreter of the divine voice was developed 
much more radically by Maimonides, whose ideas rabbi Mende of Rymanov carried to their 
ultimate conclusion. In rabbi Mendel’s view, not even the first two commandments were reveled 
directly to the whole people of Israel. All that Israel heard was the aleph with which in the 
Hebrew text the first commandment begins…. this strikes me as a highly remarkable statement, 
providing much food for thought. For in Hebrew the consonant aleph represents nothing more 
than the position taken by the larynx when a word begins with a vowel. Thus, the aleph may be 
said to denote the source of all articulate sound… to hear the aleph is to hear next to nothing; it is 
the preparation for all audible language, but in itself contains no determinate, specific meaning. 
Thus, with his daring statement… rabbi Mendel transformed the revelation on mount Sinai into a 
mystical revelation, pregnant with infinite meaning, but without specific meaning.” Scholem, On 
the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism, 29-30. 
308 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 104. 
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Mendelssohn here already outlines in passing what is perhaps the most elusive 
question pertaining to media in general, the question of its effectivity. The extent to 
which means of communication, from natural language to electric media, can be taken 
to shape and transform the opinions and ideas, which, it would seem, they are meant to 
merely mediate. Unpacking this is essential in the endeavor to conceptualize the 
effectivity of the ‘divine legislation,’ the very giving of the law, apart from any particular 




4.10 The Formation of Language – The Primal Scene of Signification 
Scarcely does a man cease to be satisfied with the first impressions of the 
external senses (and what man can long remain content with them?), scarcely 
does he feel the urge implanted in his soul to form concepts of those external 
impressions, when he becomes aware of the necessity to attach them to 
perceptible signs, not only in order to communicate them to others, but also to 
hold fast to them himself, and to be able to consider them again as often as 
necessary.309 
 
Note how perception appears immediately as something that demands or pushes itself 
to be rendered into concepts. It is as if the lack of concepts appears as a meta-maxim to 
                                                
309 Ibid., 104-5. 
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construct concepts, in the same way that, in Mendelssohn’s ‘original proof,’ the lack of 
(self) knowledge was seen as a demand for self-articulation.   
 
The first step toward the separation of general characteristics he can, and indeed 
must, take without making use of signs, for even now all new abstract concepts 
must still be formed without the help of signs and are only later designated by a 
name. The common characteristic must first be separated by the power of 
attention from the fabric with which it is interwoven and must be rendered 
prominent. What facilitates this is, on the one hand, the objective power of the 
impression which this characteristic is capable of making on us, and, on the other 
hand, the subjective interest we have in it.310 
 
What Mendelssohn’s primal scene of signification highlights is the absolute ambivalence 
between sign and signified, and between subjectivity and objectivity. The isolation of a 
feature, of a distinctive mark, involves in equal measure the two dimensions, or vectors, 
of Mendelssohn’s drive. The scene is everywhere ambivalent. For what is a 
characteristic mark? This account of the emergence of a pure difference is a scene of 
outmost tension between the emergence of a pure sign and a pure object, or signified. 
What is entailed in this abstraction of a characteristic is precisely this ambivalence, 
redoubled on each side of the distinction. It is the ambivalent distinction between an 
abstract concreteness, so to speak, the “this” of pure reference, of determination without 
                                                
310 Ibid., 105. 
249 
 
content, and concrete abstractness, the palpable presence/absence or the objectivity of 
indeterminacy as such. 
 
The zero-experience of sense is not the experience of a determinate sense, but the 
absence of sense; more precisely: the frustrating experience of being sure that 
something has a sense, but not knowing what this sense is. This vague presence of a 
non-specific sense is sense “as such,” sense at its purest – it is primary, not secondary, 
i.e., all determinate sense comes second, it is an attempt to fill in the oppressive 
presence-absence of the that-ness, of sense without its what-ness.311 
 
In what sense is this the zero-experience of sense? This ambivalence of the primal 
scene of signification is caught, as it were, in the act of primal distinction, between 
distinction and indistinction, between difference and indifference. It is the ambivalence 
between a pre-symbolic sign with thing-like characteristics, a sign that directly 
intervenes in reality, which cuts into the fabric of being, and an object with sign-like 
characteristics, an object that is imperceptible in itself, and stands for its own cut, taking 
the place of its own separation from the background, folding that from which it was 
removed – the undifferentiated totality, ‘the fabric’ of being – into itself, as the 
indeterminate object. 
 
                                                
311 S. Žižek, Living in the End Times (Verso, 2010), 378. But the greatest usefulness of this quote 
is that it is in direct relation to liturgy: “Why is this liturgy necessary? Precisely because of the 
precedence of non-sense over sense; the liturgy is the symbolic frame within which the zero level 
of sense is articulated.” 
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Whatever it is that was thus isolated, a unique sign or unfathomable object, it does not 
quite reach understanding or consciousness; it cannot be grasped, only momentarily 
retained, and with great effort. It is not isolated by designation, by fixing its meaning in a 
sign, but by repetition itself, a signifying repetition that precedes thought. 
 
But this throwing into relief and consideration of the common characteristic costs 
the soul some effort. It does not take long for the light which attention 
concentrated on this point of the object to disappear again, and the object is lost 
in the shadow of the whole mass with which it is united. The soul is not capable 
of advancing much farther if this effort must be continued for some time and has 
to be repeated too often. It has begun to set things apart, but it cannot think.312 
 
What sets an object apart from its surroundings, the unfathomable x that is in it more 
than itself, that vivifies and attracts our attention is, in principle, not something that can 
be pinpointed once and for all. There is a sense for sense, so to speak, but no concrete, 
articulated thought. There emerges therefore a separation and repetition in the soul, 
prior to thinking. It can repeat this pure mark or cut, but it cannot endow this repetition 
with significance. It seems repetition must be repeated. 
 
What is one to advise [the soul] to do? Wise providence has placed within its 
immediate reach a means which it can use at all times. It attaches, either by a 
natural or arbitrary association of ideas, the abstracted characteristic to a 
                                                
312 Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 105. 
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perceptible sign which, as often as its impression is renewed, at once recalls and 
illuminates this characteristic, pure and unalloyed. In this manner, it is well 
known, originated the languages of men, which are composed of natural and 
arbitrary signs, and without which man would be but little distinguished from the 
irrational animals; for without the aid of signs, man can scarcely remove himself 
one step from the sensual.313 
 
But how is a perceptible sign connected to an abstracted characteristic? The answer 
may lie in what Mendelssohn himself seems compelled to repeat, as if arbitrarily. Not 
once but twice does Mendelssohn here mention the division of signs into ‘natural’ and 
‘arbitrary.’314 If we take this division – and its repetition – to be revealing, we can offer 
the following interpretation, which will prove helpful in coming to terms with 
Mendelssohn’s ensuing reflection on media.  
 
                                                
313 Ibid. 
314 In his ‘Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge’ (1746), Condillac had presented a theory 
of the origin of language that played a seminal role in eighteenth-century discussion of the 
philosophy of language. Rousseau, Diderot, d’Alembert, and Herder take their cues from 
Condillac’s ‘Essay.’ While Mendelssohn may not have had firsthand knowledge of Condillac, he 
carefully studied Rousseau’s second discourse, which refers to Condillac, and which 
Mendelssohn translated in 1755 directly after its publication. This gave Mendelssohn indirect 
knowledge of the seminal conception of the origin of language Condillac had introduced. 
Condillac stresses the fundamental role of signs for the process of cultural development. 
Defining language as the constitutive faculty of the mind’s activity, thinking emerges, Condillac 
observes, as defined by the limits of language. For a discussion of Condillac’s semiotics, see 
Dorothea E. von Mücke, Virtue and the Veil of Illusion: Generic Innovation and the Pedagogical 
Project in Eighteenth-Century Literature (Stanford University Press, 1991), 18-61. For a 
comparison between Condillac’s and Herder’s semiotics see ibid, 161-73.  
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The ambivalence of the sign-thing is mediated by the distinction between two kinds of 
signs: arbitrary and natural. This is the distinction between two orders of mediation – 
‘natural signs,’ which connect signs to their signified by means of resemblance, a 
continuity between the sign and its signified, and one which connects them arbitrarily, 
by means of the connection between signs themselves. The origin of language is to be 
traced back to the split and distinction between two fundamental media, one which 
operates by evoking the perceptible, similarity (the imaginary), and one which operates 
by evoking the imperceptible (symbolic) difference. One medium operates in a medium 
of continuity with what it mediates, the sharing of qualities between image and depicted 
(resemblance), and the other by means of a break, a disconnect between sign and 
signified (representation).315 In this way, the ambivalence between the sign and the 
thing is represented, so to speak, in the very distinction between two modes of 
representation or mediation.316 While we rely on both orders of representation for our 
understanding, it is in their very separation that Mendelssohn’s primal scene of 
signification is represented. In Kantian terms, understanding relies on the combination 
of both these orders, of the order of concepts (symbolic, arbitrary signs, which reach 
their objects by means of definition, reference to other concepts) and intuition 
(imaginary, sense perception). But such combination always implies their underlying 
split. 
                                                
315 This is the irreducible division, the division as irreducible, characteristic of temporal 
difference, discussed in chapter 1. 
316 Historically, the two translations of the Greek mimesis, imitation and representation. See B. 
Cassin et al., Dictionary of Untranslatables: A Philosophical Lexicon (Princeton University 




Mendelssohn’s ensuing reflections on language trace the various trajectories taken by 
these two linguistic dimensions in their development into media of communication. Such 
developments carry advantageous as well as problematic dimensions 
 
 
4.11 The Swerve of Language 
Natural signs develop quite naturally into hieroglyphs: 
 
In the course of time, one may have found it more convenient to take images of 
the things… instead of things themselves; later, for the sake of brevity, to make 
use of outlines, and next, to let a part of the outline stand for the whole, and at 
last, to compose out of heterogeneous parts a hapless but meaningful whole; 
and this mode of designation is called hieroglyphs.317 
 
While the development of signs from pictorial representation to hieroglyphs can be 
accounted for “quite naturally,” the transition to alphabetical script “seems to have 
required a leap, and the leap seems to have required “more than ordinary human 
powers.”318   
 
Thus, while Mendelssohn does not explicitly argue that alphabetic script is a 
development of arbitrary signs, they do seem to follow the same logic, which also 
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318 Ibid., 108. 
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explains why no developmental schema is offered. Indeed, Mendelssohn’s fascination 
with the alphabetic system of signs has to do with what we may call its purely symbolic 
character, the fact that it signifies through an interplay between signs, none of which 
directly signifies. The miraculous quality of the alphabet is that there is no accounting for 
its genetic development, no transition describable between representing by means of 
similarity between the sign and the signified and the representation by means of 
interplay between signs. “The real difficulty presented… by the transition to our script 
consisted in the fact that, without preparation and cause, one had to conceive a 
deliberate plan of designating, by means of a small number of elementary signs and 
their possible transpositions, a multitude of concepts which would seem neither to admit 
of being surveyed nor… encompassed.”319  
 
 
4.12 The Fetishizing of Media: Means and Meaning 
Mendelssohn is not juxtaposing our ‘good’ alphabetic script to the problematic 
hieroglyphs. All development of media has a dialectical effect on society. It contributes 
to its advancement, but at the same time it creates new modes of illusion and servitude. 
 
The development of writing and modes of designation must also have had 
different effects on the progress and improvement of concepts, opinions and 
knowledge. In one respect, to their advantage. The observations, experiments 




and reflections in astronomical, economic, moral and religious matters were 
multiplied, propagated, facilitated, and preserved for posterity. These are the 
cells in which the bees collect their honey, and save it for their enjoyment and 
that of others. However, as always happens in things human, what wisdom builds 
up in one place, folly readily speaks to tear down in another, usually employing 
the very same means and tools… what had been simplicity and ignorance now 
became seduction and error… the great multitude was either not at all or only 
half instructed in the notions which were to be associated with these perceptible 
signs. They saw signs not as mere signs, but believed them to be things 
themselves. As long as one still used the things themselves or their images and 
outlines, instead of signs, this error was easily made. For besides their 
signification, the things also had a reality of their own. The coin was, at the same 
time, a piece of merchandise which had its own use and utility, therefore, the 
ignorant person could easily misjudge and wrongly specify its value as coin. 
Hieroglyphs could, to be sure, partly correct this error, or at least did not foster it 
as much as the outlines did, for its images were composed of heterogeneous and 
ill-matched parts, misshapen and preposterous figures which had no existence of 
their own in nature and could, therefore, as one should think, not be taken for 
writing. But this enigmatic and strange character of the composition itself 
afforded superstition the material for all sorts of inventions and fables… 
hypocrisy and willful abuse were busy, and furnished it with tales which it was not 
clever enough to invent. Whoever had once acquired consequence and authority 
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wished, if not to increase, at least to preserve them. Whoever had once given a 
satisfactory answer to a question never wanted to be remiss in his responses.320  
 
Note how the very advancement represented by hieroglyphs, the fact that they cannot 
be mistaken for a simple representation of a natural object, becomes the very manner in 
which they deceive. By giving an image without any natural correspondence, 
hieroglyphs give the impression of being the image of the supersensible itself, giving an 
image to what has none. Hieroglyphs for Mendelssohn are dangerous in so far as they 
threaten to saturate the empty space of the missing image.321 They substitute in place 
of that which has no image an image that does not depict anything. Although some of 
Mendelssohn’s rhetoric speaks of manipulation of these features of the medium, it is 
ultimately the medium itself that pulls its users into a web of deception. Indeed, under 
the new media condition: “What had been simplicity and ignorance now became 
seduction and error.” This might explain why there is no straightforward road of 
articulation and clarification. If in the previous juxtaposition of naïve and skeptic 
consciousness, naive perceptions, relying on figurative language and vivid imagination, 
besides having their own merit, could in principle be easily corrected and refined, 
hieroglyphs represent a different set of relations with respect to the truth. The “enigmatic 
character” of the new composition is productive of fables, and it restructures society 
around them. Since the signs are opaque, the multitude must believe there are others 
                                                
320 Ibid., 110-11. 
321 This is precisely the functionality of the psychoanalytic concept of fetish: it is the last thing 
seen before the void; standing on the edge of the absent, it comes to stand for it. 
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who are in a position to interpret these mysterious signs, while those in positions of 
authority must believe in the ignorance of the masses and are invested in propagating it, 
never shying away from supplying the multitude with what they demand.  
 
The elusive critical point Mendelssohn is aiming to point out is the objective illusion 
entailed in media fetishization. It is not only the naive believers who are duped by a 
cynical intellectual elite, the priestly cast; both are, as it were, under the charms of the 
medium they are involved in interpreting and manipulating. In an important sense, it 
renders the distinction outlined above, between naive and skeptic consciousness, 
meaningless – since here, illusion is not to be corrected by the refinement of 
knowledge, it pertains to the nature of the medium, it is objective. The priests 
misleading the masses share in their fundamental illusion. The trap is in the very 
relation to language, in which both enlighteners – those in charge of theoretical 
knowledge – and the masses are led astray by the nature of the sign. But it is the final 
step that is the most crucial, namely, the recognition that the media critic does not fare 
any better in this objective illusion. If the Egyptians are duped in that they confuse signs 
with the supersensible, the substitute for the thing itself, the clever media critique who 
points this out is “guilty” of what amounts to the same mistake, albeit on a different 
register – after all, he is attributing to the medium the power to shape the minds and 
lives of the people duped by it, to create practices and beliefs. Material qualities become 
the direct causal agent for the suppressible. Like the most naive of believers, he is 
attributing to the medium a magical power of sorts. And therein lies the real “magic” of 
the medium – it is effective whether you believe in it naively, abuse it cynically or 
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analyze it skeptically. The bottom line remains the same. There is, in that sense, no 
position of knowledge external to it, immune to its deception. The remedy for this kind of 
objective illusion is therefore not a change in consciousness, but has to be a practical 
one, namely the creation of a space where a different articulation of society and 
language is possible. 
 
Mendelssohn explicates his media critique of idolatry in his discussion of hieroglyphs. 
However, the same structural problem that is exemplified in hieroglyphs pertains, in a 
subtler but for that reason more dangerous way, to the modern, alphabet-based means 
of communication. Mendelssohn is not dividing the signs into good alphabetic symbolic 
signs and bad hieroglyphic imaginary ones. Both are needed, and both present a 
potential problem. The Ceremonial Law aims at warding off the problematic nature of 
both hieroglyphs and the alphabet in a modern print society.  
 
 
4.13 Hieroglyphs and Idolatry 
Mendelssohn belongs to a tradition of thinkers322 in the history of religion that sees in 
monotheism not an achievement of progress or election but the original religious idea, 
and other forms of worship as a straying away from that fundamental religious core. 
However, this notion of his should be read in accordance with his conception of belief as 
                                                
322 Following in this context in the footsteps of Maimonides, in all likelihood. On Maimonides’ 
conception of monotheism as ‘original’ see Funkenstein, Perceptions of Jewish History, 131-54. 
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being irreducible to its explicit expressions. Take his description of the “man who lives 
simply”: 
 
[He] has not yet divided the objections which so greatly confuse the sophist. For 
him the word nature, the mere sound, has not yet become a being that seeks to 
supplant the deity. He still knows but little of the difference between direct and 
indirect causality; and he hears and sees instead the all vivifying power of the 
deity everywhere – in every sunrise, in every rain that falls… this mode of 
conceiving things has in it something defective, but it leads directly to the 
recognition of the invisible, omnipotent being, to whom we owe all the good 
which we enjoy.323 
 
It is on this level that Mendelssohn’s deism is placed. The intuitive sense of mystery, of 
something more behind appearances, a power vivifying them, is itself a recognition of 
the invisible, omnipotent being; however it is one that could be, and tends to be, 
misconstrued. This is where in Mendelssohn common sense and metaphysics both 
coincide and part ways. Some sense of the divine, Mendelssohn believes, is 
inescapable, and is inscribed in dispositional attitudes, regardless of the conscious 
contents of the believers. While there is merit in articulating these intuitive perceptions, 
namely, avoiding a brutish mystification, a problematic structuring of society around a 
secret core, accessible only to a few, there is also a risk involved in the push towards 
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articulation, as we will come to see shortly. Seeing that beliefs are a complicated matter, 
highly dependent on mediation, Mendelssohn is careful to note that we cannot simply 
assume we are witnessing idolatry. 
 
“In Judging the religious ideas of a nation that is otherwise still unknown, one must, for 
the same reason, take care not to regard everything from one’s own parochial point of 
view, lest one should call idolatry what, in reality, is perhaps only script.”324 
Mendelssohn gives the example of a foreigner visiting Europe, who, seeing the 
inscription on a church wall, concludes that Europeans worship black lines on a white 
surface. “Our own travelers may very often make similar mistakes when they report to 
us on the religion of distant people… In plundering the temple, the conquerors of 
Jerusalem found the cherubim on the ark of the covenant, and took them for idols of the 
Jews… in the same way, at the present day, readers still laugh at the Indian 
philosophers who say that this universe is borne by elephants…”325  
 
In all these cases, observers all too hastily assume that signs are worshiped directly, as 
substitutes of what they represent. Mendelssohn is well aware that worshipful practices 
and beliefs are embedded in symbolic representation and figurative linguistic practices. 
Thus, the distinction between script and idolatry is not as simple and straightforward as 
one might assume. Idolatry for Mendelssohn is not simply the worship of idols. What 
seems like such a worship might be a legitimate expression of a symbolic worshiping of 
                                                




the invisible, omnipotent deity. The dangerous core of idolatry is the over proximity and 
even confusion between the material nature of the medium and the content it aims to 
mediate. And while it is easier to see this in signs that seem to operate on the basis of 
resemblance, it’s far from being the case that the arbitrary signs are immune from such 
peril. Mendelssohn gives the example of the Pythagoreans: 
 
A certain school of philosophers conceived of the bold idea of removing men’s 
abstract concepts from everything figurative and image like, and of attaching 
them to such written signs as could, by their nature, be taken for nothing else, to 
numbers. Since numbers in themselves represent nothing, and are not in natural 
relation with any sense impressions, one should suppose that they would not be 
liable to any misinterpretation; one must take them for arbitrary written signs of 
concepts, or else consider them unintelligible. Here, one should think, the rudest 
intellect could not confound signs with things, and every abuse would be 
prevented by this subtle device. To anyone who does not understand numbers 
they are empty figures. Those they do not enlighten they will, at least, not lead 
astray. However, soon enough folly took its wonted course even in this school. 
Dissatisfied with what one found so intelligible, so comprehensible, one looked 
for a secret power in the numbers themselves; for an inexplicable reality, again, 
in the signs, by which their value as signs was again lost. One believed, or at 
least one made others believe, that all the mysteries of nature and the deity were 
concealed in these numbers; one ascribed miraculous power to them, and 
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wished to satisfy through them and by means of them not only men’s curiosity 
and avidity for knowledge but also all their vanity, their striving for high and 
unattainable things, their forwardness and greed, their avarice, and their 
madness.326 
 
While all signs systems are susceptible to distortion, there are important distinctions to 
be drawn between the logic and mechanism of their respective deceptions. Alphabetic 
script, and its further development in Mendelssohn’s contemporary print society, 
deceives precisely by displaying things on the surface. 
 
The alphabetic script makes man, according to Mendelssohn, “too speculative.” It 
“displays the symbolic knowledge of things and their relations too openly on the surface; 
it spares us the effort of penetrating and searching and creates too wide a division 
between doctrine and life.”327 
 
Hieroglyphs are a perversion of figurative language (natural signs). They extend their 
signifying logic of resemblance beyond its proper limitations by drawing excessive 
attention to themselves, thus effectively no longer signifying, pointing towards the 
beyond, but coming to substitute it, take its place. But what is the problem with 
alphabetical signs? Whereas hieroglyphs present an illusion of mystery, alphabetical 
script produces the illusion of transparency. If hieroglyphs pretend to be mysterious, full 
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of meaning, while in fact they are mere signs, alphabetical script pretends to be a 
transparent means to an end. 
 
It is relatively easy to see the problem with a sign assuming the place of the signified, 
taking its place. But what is the problem with a sign pretending to be a sign? The key is 
the connection between the illusion pertaining to the “displaying of things too openly on 
the surface” and the creation of “too wide a division between doctrine and life.” While 
with hieroglyphs we have already reached the level where knowledge about the true 
nature of the signs does not dispel their effectivity, their “magic,” here knowledge is 
itself, directly, a mode of not knowing, or not believing what you know. 
 
Consider Mendelssohn’s critical description of “the great upheaval in the whole system 
of human knowledge and convictions” brought about by the print revolution: 
 
We teach and instruct one another only through writings; we learn to know nature 
and man only from writings. We work and relax, edify and amuse ourselves 
through overmuch writings. The preacher does not converse with his 
congregation; he reads or declaims it in a written treatise. The professor reads 
his written lectures from the chair. Everything is dead letter… hence it has come 
to pass that man has almost lost his value for his fellow man. Intercourse with the 
wise man is not sought, for we find wisdom in his writings. Hoary age has lost its 
venerableness, for the beardless youth knows more from books than the old man 
knows from experience. Whether he understood correctly or incorrectly does not 
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matter; it is enough that he knows it, bears it upon his lips, and can talk about it 
more boldly than the honest old man who, perhaps, has the ideas rather than the 
words at his command.328 
 
With alphabetic script, knowing becomes a way of actively not knowing, of indifference 
to the significance and consequences of what one possesses as knowledge and holds 
to be true. Under these conditions, the gap between doctrine and life is indeed 
unbridgeable. 
 
The Ceremonial Law, which Mendelssohn calls a ‘living script,’ was meant to avoid both 
pitfalls. The written as well as the unwritten laws have directly, as prescription for action 
and rules of life, public and private felicity as their ultimate aim. But they are also, in 
large part, to be regarded as a kind of script, and they have significance and meaning 
as ceremonial laws. They guide the inquiring intelligence to divine truths, partly to 
eternal and partly to historical truths upon which the religion of this people was founded. 
 
The Ceremonial Law was the bond that was to connect action with 
contemplation, life with theory… to induce social contact between school and 
teacher, inquirer and instructor…and it fulfilled this mission in the early period, 
before the constitution degenerated…329 
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The Ceremonial Law produces a certain excess of meaning, but it also produces a 
movement of ongoing interpretation. The symbolic actions performed are meaningful, in 
the sense that they relate, point to, or may bring up doctrines and tales, but they do not 
possess a determinate meaning. They give rise to an open ended, though not 
boundless, contextualization. In this way, they establish relations of intellectual authority 
of the kind Mendelssohn felt was no longer available in modern life. As Benjamin would 
remark in the context of his programmatic engagement with Kant’s philosophy: “For the 
enlightenment, there were no authorities, in the sense not only of authorities to whom 
one would have to submit unconditionally, but also of intellectual forces who might have 
managed to give a higher context to experience.”330 
 
The living script, the performance of symbolic activities that have no ultimate ground or 
reason, is a way to avoid the ideological closure of a life form, to avoid an over 
familiarity or stiffening habituation. These are excess practices, and in their 
excessiveness, resist total habituation, a totally smooth and transparent functioning. 
“Far from being an obstacle to the living experience of meaning, the presence of such 
‘enigmatic signifiers,’ which emanate unknown meaning, i.e., this very obstacle to a full 
                                                
330 Walter Benjamin ‘On The Program of The Coming Philosophy,’ in Benjamin et al., Selected 
Writings: 1913-1926, 101.The essay offers a revision of the Kantian philosophy, particularly its 
concepts of knowledge and experience, so that it can account for religious experience. 
Interestingly, it is in this context that Benjamin appeals to Mendelssohn’s authority as both 
demanding and enabling the overcoming of Kantian philosophy from within, so to speak: “Every 
demand to return to Kant rests on the conviction that this system, which encountered a notion of 
experience whose metaphysical aspect met with approval of men such as Mendelssohn… will 
prove adequate for a new and higher experience yet to come. This simultaneously presents the 
primary challenge faced by contemporary philosophy and asserts that it can be met.” 
Mendelssohn, Jerusalem: Or on Religious Power and Judaism, 102. 
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transparency of meaning, is what makes a given symbolic space truly alive, engaged in 
a passionate struggle to unearth meaning and is the ultimate source of its vitality.”331 
 
The fact that these are signs one produces oneself, in one’s very activity, is crucial for 
Mendelssohn, since it makes the fixation on images impossible. Being part of a “living 
script,” participating in the sign system, means it is only legible from above, so to speak, 
from God’s eye view. Meaning cannot, according to this line of reasoning, be attached 
too firmly to the signs themselves, allowing them to stand in for and block the empty 
space of the impossible image. Instead, it moves and animates the social body itself. 
 
Such media conditions are true to the event of legislation, precisely by effectively 
refraining from assigning it significance, by keeping the space open for re-interpreting 
the very foundation of the tradition. Mendelssohn’s wager is that Ceremonial Law is a 
way to utilize the structural gap between practice and theory, what one does and what 
one understands, in a way that constantly refers one to the other, thus keeping them in 
constant, yet flexible contact. 
 
But is this a description of what the Ceremonial Law is, or of what it ought to be? We 
are brought back to the question that was left open in the title of Mendelssohn’s book; 
which Jerusalem is Mendelssohn referring to? The heavenly, or messianic Jerusalem to 
come at the end of days, or the historical, earthly one? The ideal or the real? 
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From what we have seen in Mendelssohn thus far, we should not expect the answer to 
fall on either of these two alternatives. For Mendelssohn’s makes great efforts not to 
separate the real from the ideal in such a way that allows for no contact between them, 
and nor does he seek to conflate them. 
 
Mendelssohn attributes the ideality of the Ceremonial Law, as we have seen above, to 
the ‘original constitution,’ which he proceeds to describe as the direct rule of God over 
the Jewish nation. 
 
In this original constitution, state and religion were not conjoined, but one; not 
connected, but identical. Man’s relations to society and his relation to God 
coincided and could never come into conflict. God, the creator and preserver of 
the world, was at the same time the king and regent of this nation; and his 
oneness is such as not to admit the least division or plurality in either the political 
or metaphysical sense. Nor does this monarch have any needs. He demands 
nothing from the nation but what serves its own welfare… hence, in this nation, 
civil matters acquired a sacred and religious aspect, and every civil service was 
at the same time a service to God… everything down to the least police measure 
was part of the divine service.332 
 
It was only in this context, Mendelssohn replies to Morschel’s charges, that religious 
offenses were punishable, since they were, at the same time, political offenses. With the 
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destruction of the temple all civil bonds were dissolved, and with them all punishment in 
religious affairs. 
 
But why, I hear many a reader ask, why this prolixity to tell us something that is 
very well known? Judaism was a hierocracy, an ecclesiastical government, a 
priestly state, a theocracy, if you will. We already know the presumptions which 
such a constitution permits itself. By no means! All these technical terms cast the 
matter in a false light, which I must avoid. Invariably, all we want to do is to 
classify, to fit things into pigeonholes… but why do you seek a generic term for 
an individual thing, which has no genus, which refuses to be stacked with 
anything, which cannot be put under the same rubric with anything else? This 
constitution existed only once; call it the Mosaic constitution, by its proper name. 
It has disappeared, and only the omniscient knows among what people and in 
what century something similar will again be seen. Just as, according to Plato, 
there is an earthly and also a heavenly Eros, there is also, one might say, an 
earthly and heavenly politics. Take a fickle adventurer, a conqueror of hearts… 
and speak to him of the song of songs… just as little will a politician a la mode 
understand you if you speak to him of the simplicity and moral grandeur of that 
original constitution. As the former knows nothing of love but the satisfaction of 
base lasciviousness, the latter speaks… only of power, the circulation of money, 
commerce, the balance of power and population; and religion is to him a means 
which the lawgiver uses to keep the unruly man in check… this false point of 
view… I had to remove from the eyes of my reader. For this reason, I have not 
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called the object by any name, but sought to represent it with its properties and 
determinations. If we look at it directly, we shall see in true politics, as a 
philosopher said of the sun, a deity, where ordinary eyes see a stone.333 
 
This is quite a remarkable passage. Beginning with a caution against labeling as a way 
to avoid understanding, grappling and coming to terms with the singularity of his subject 
matter, Mendelssohn seems to compromise with this demand for nomination and gives 
a proper name – the Mosaic constitution – to this singular constellation, which is no 
longer, and who is to tell if and where something similar will again come about? 
Jerusalem, a name without an object, meets its unnamed object. 
 
We seem to have arrived at an answer. Mendelssohn was talking about the historical, 
biblical Judaism. But he immediately proceeds to speak of an earthly and heavenly 
politics. It was with the aim of overcoming the cynical outlook on politics, a view that 
considers politics as a mere exercise of power, that he had avoided naming the object. 
Here, it seems clear, heavenly is not meant to designate a different sphere, but rather, a 
different outlook. A strategy meant to make the reader see the heavenly or divine in 
earthly politics. Offering the metaphor of looking directly at the sun in order to gauge its 
divinity as an analogy to his descriptive rather than nominative strategy sheds a 
blinding, excessive light, rather than an illuminating one, just like looking directly at the 
sun. Mendelssohn had to blind his readers with too much light, make them look directly 
at the object that should illuminate others, and never be viewed directly. How can this 
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direct gaze at the sun come to terms with Mendelssohn’s earlier statement that the 
nature of his object, bordering on so many others, make digressions and detours the 
only available mode of exposition? The object we come to gaze at directly is the 
digression itself. Mendelssohn wants his readers to come to see an object that exists 
only in digression. The ideal, Mosaic constitution, as it turns out, was extremely short 
lived, passing in a glimpse of an eye. 
 
I have said that the mosaic constitution did not persist long in its erstwhile 
purity… already in the days of the prophet Samuel, the edifice developed a 
fissure which widened more and more until the parts broke asunder completely. 
The nation asked for a visible king of flesh and blood….334 
 
But just a few pages before, Mendelssohn had put the date of corruption even earlier. 
Already in the first days after the miraculous lawgiving, the nation relapsed into the 
sinful delusion of the Egyptians, and clamored for an image in the shape of an 
animal.335 
 
Is Mendelssohn playing a cynical game, or just being inconsistent? Could it be that the 
true Judaism had lasted for only a couple of days; and in any case, was corrupted 
completely by the time of the prophet Samuel, even before the establishment of the 
political kingdom of Israel? The perfect unity of state and religion, which Mendelssohn is 
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forced to name the ‘Mosaic constitution,’ is neither an historical reality, nor an abstract 
ideal to strive for. Actual, historical Judaism is nothing but a serious of failures to live up 
to its ideal, and this from the very beginning. But it is only from these failures that the 
ideal – what could, and should have been – can shine through. 
 
 
4.13 Judaism, Between Past and Future 
In Jerusalem, Mendelssohn developed a vision of Judaism as caught between two 
poles of attraction; between the forward propelling drive for knowledge, and the fixation 
on the abyss of the primordial.336 His understanding of belief as an ideological complex, 
which does not allow for a purely intellectual understanding of belief, nor reduces it to 
irrational, intuitive perception, but rather calls for an examination of the linguistic and 
social modes of belief, may account, in part, for his relative disconnect with the 
passionate dilemma between knowledge and belief he played an instrumental role in 
transmitting to subsequent generations. His account of Judaism as organized around an 
ideological glue, so to speak, that is irreducible to any doctrinal content, may contribute 
to an understanding of a life form that had been marked, in the greater part of its history, 
                                                
336 Jan Assman, in his polemic with Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, has put forward the notion 
of counter religion to name the significant shift in the history of religion that arises with the 
introduction of the distinction between true and false religion. See J. Assmann, Moses the 
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Stroumsa, Transformations of the Inner Self in Ancient Religions (Brill, 1999).This notion may 
require a qualification in the case of Judaism, if we take Mendelssohn seriously. Judaism in this 
light is both a counter religion, and a counter counter religion. 
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by its dispersity between cultures, and was perhaps meant by Mendelssohn as a 
conception of tradition that need not be threatened by fundamental epistemic 
changes,337 a tradition that could survive, as a tradition, even the vicissitudes of 
modernity. But the result is, above all, an anti-essentialist account of Judaism. Judaism 
is nothing but the sum total of its failures to live up to its idea, and that idea, in turn, is 
not a mere abstraction, but what, in continuously failing to have been realized, exerts 
what Walter Benjamin would call a “weak, messianic power.” 
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